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PREFACE 
This study grows out of work that each of the authors have previous-
ly done on the dynamics, in various social contexts, of family recovery 
from disasters. In those earlier studies, the importance of ethnicity 
and race was left largely unexplored. Our previous research did note the 
importance of culture, age, and social class as determinants of patterns 
of aid utilization. To that mix of social variables we now add race and 
ethnicity (and/or religious affiliation) as additional pieces in the 
puzzle of family recovery. 
Four sites are discussed, each with its own mix of disaster agents, 
ethnic groups, patterns of destruction, aid utilization, and victim 
recovery. We examined a tornado in Texas, a flood in Utah, an earthquake 
in California, and a hurricane in Hawaii. Groups affected by the disas-
ters were, among others, bl acks, Hi spani cs, Japanese-Ameri cans, Fi 1 i-
pinos, and Mormons. This study looks at various factors--particularly 
aid from official and "unofficial" sources--that affected the recovery of 
those disaster victims. 
The United States has an institutionalized structure of public and 
private organizations that aid the victims of natural disasters. Our 
study examines some of the patterns of aid utilization across the various 
groups of victims and the effects of such programs on victim recovery. 
Understanding the complexities of a dynamic social process like family 
recovery requires consideration of a large number of influences. While 
we have attempted to focus on those judged to be most relevant, there 
always remains the possibility that others not examined here may prove to 
have greater explanatory power. This work should be read as part of the 
continuing effort of several researchers to understand and conceptualize 
the process of long-term family recovery from disasters. 
We would like to thank the National Science Foundation and William 
Anderson, the NSF project manager, for their support. We would also like 
to acknowl edge the generous ass i stance of Sha ron Maste rs, New Mexi co 
State University, and Jan McStay, Battelle Human Affairs Research Center, 
who each organized and conducted the field work for this project and who 
contributed to this final report in many other ways as well. 
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CHAPTER I 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
Study: Areas 
When this research began in early 1982, our primary goal was to 
examine the differential effects of various types of aid and aid programs 
on the postdisaster recovery of black and Mexican-American victims in 
comparison to "non-minority" victims. We have remained faithful to that 
goal although we have expanded the number of ethnic and cultural groups 
exami ned beyond those ori gi na 11 y proposed for study. Thi s increase was 
accomplished in part by adding research sites to the original two sites 
designated for study and, in part, by including one multi-ethnic site 
(Hawaii) in our research. 
The research grows out of previous research that both authors have 
worked on, independently and jointly, including comparisons of disaster 
recovery between two cultures (Bolin and Trainer, 1978; Bolin and Bolton, 
1983), between rural and urban areas (Bolin, 1981), and between elderly 
and non-elderly disaster victims (Bolin and Klenow, 1983). Our focus in 
this research is on aid from federal, state, and local agencies and its 
effects on the recovery of victim families from disasters. In addition 
to these formal aid programs, we also consider aid and social support 
received from family, friends, and neighbors. We identify variations in 
patterns of aid utilization across several racial and ethnic groups at 
four disaster sites, and demonstrate how these patterns are associated 
with differential rates of family recovery. 
The four sites studied include (in order of consideration): 
1) Paris, Texas (tornado) 
2) Salt Lake City, Utah (flooding) 
3) Kauai, Hawaii (hurricane) 
4) Coalinga, California (earthquake) 
Patterns of aid utilization and family recovery are examined and compared 
among mi nority groups as we 11 as between mi nor it i es and whites. From 
these compari sons, po 1 icy recommend at ions are deve loped and presented 
regarding the nature of rehabilitation and recovery programs offered to 
disaster victims. 
Three of the four sites were studied using general sociological 
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survey techniques. The exception, Salt Lake City, was analyzed using in-
depth interviewing techniques on a small sample of victims and disaster 
agency personnel. The different methods used in Salt Lake City reflect a 
conscious choice on our part: the technique was considered most appropri-
ate to that disaster site given the scope of impact and the actual num-
bers of vi ct ims i nvo 1 ved. However, as di scussed in the methods sect i on, 
the i ntervi ew protoco 1 was deri ved from the schedu 1 e used at the other 
sites and thus is comparable, although not statistically. 
While our intent in this research--to examine the nature of aid 
utilization by victims and their recovery patterns--is not new (e.g., 
Bo 1 in, 1982; Drabek and Key, 1984), the study does break new ground in 
that the victims represent a range of ethnic (as well as religious) 
groups. The groups stud i ed, of course, are cross-cut by age and soci a 1 
class dimensions that have been found in other research to affect disas-
ter response and recovery outcomes. Th iss tudy also departs from pre-
vious research in that we examine victims of a number of different disas-
ter agents (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes). 
The number of influences on how families respond to and recover from 
disaster are potentially limitless. Our goal here is to focus on a 
limited number of variables--such as ethnicity and its accompanying 
cultural features, aid utilization (or the lack thereof), social support, 
demographic and social class, as well as the physical impacts of the 
disaster agent itself--and to give a broad overview of the family re-
covery process across the several ethnic groups and disaster sites ex-
amined. 
Because of the range of disaster impacts, ethnic groups, and social 
responses that we encountered, each chapter focuses on somewhat different 
features of disaster recovery, depending on what, in each case, we con-
sidered most pertinent for understanding recovery at that particular 
site. For example for the Paris, Texas disaster, race, social class, and 
age are singled out, while culture (religion) is concentrated on in the 
the Salt Lake City case. Thus, the varying sites provided us with a 
unique opportunity to study the recovery process for different social 
groups in different social contexts with varying degrees of local, state, 
federal, and private disaster aid available to the victims. 
2 
Organizatio~l1.e Book 
This report is divided into six major chapters. General theoretical 
and conceptual issues are discussed in Chapter II, and a brief review of 
previous research is given. Chapter III is about the Paris, Texas tor-
nado. Chapter IV describes the effects of the Salt Lake City flood. 
Chapter V analyzes the impacts of Hurricane Iwa on Kauai. Chapter VI 
deals with the Coalinga, California earthquake. The final chapter pre-
sents our findings and suggests explanations for differences in recovery 
and outcome. 
We outline the particular instruments, research sites, sampling 
techn i ques, and fi e 1 d procedures for each study site in each chapter. 
Following a discussion of disaster agent and site characteristics, the 
general features of the population sample--including ethnic, demographic, 
and disaster loss characteristics--are examined. The analysis for each 
site continues with consideration of material losses, injuries, temporary 
housing and related residential dislocations, disaster impacts on family 
interaction and social support networks, psychosocial impacts, aid pro-
grams and their utilization, insurance use, and related social dynamics. 
One intent of the analysis is to refine a multivariate model of family 
recovery conceptual i zed and deve loped in an ear 1 i er research proj ect 
(Bolin, 1982). Multiple regression and related multivariate statistical 
techniques are used in reviewing the data from most of the sites in order 
to select sets of important determinants of family recovery. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH ISSUES 
This research focuses on variations, due to differences in ethnicity 
and class, in disaster victims' ability to cope with and recover from 
losses and disruptions incurred during natural disasters. The study of 
the complex interplay of class and culture comprises a major portion of 
all sociological research. Therefore, in order to avoid a voluminous 
literature review, we only cite pertinent work concerning disasters and 
analogous social situations. However, the identification of disasters 
and "analogous situations" itself implies a theoretical perspective, and 
before reviewing the literature, we first detail that perspective which 
has guided this research. 
Families and Stress 
~ocial Syste~~, Subsystems, and Stress 
System and system stress are general sociological concepts that have 
been readily accepted by a number of disaster researchers who have 
focused on the family as a unit of analysis (e.g., Drabek et al., 1975. 
Drabek and Key, 1984; Bolin, 1982). It should be noted that the con-
ceptual use of "systems" in the research reviewed here, and in our re-
search as well, should not be confused with formal general systems theory 
(e.g., Buckley, 1967) which WdS pupuldr in Lhe 1960s among some 
theori sts. General systems theory is now mori bund--a perspect i ve whose 
promise outweighed its utility (e.g., Ritzer, 1983). Nor is the use of 
general notions of social systems here to be confused with the static and 
politically loaded structural-functionalism popularized by Parsons 
(1951). System is used in this research as a sensitizing concept, a word 
that alerts the researcher and reader to possible interactions between 
various actions of society in specific circumstances. Unlike Parsonian 
funct i ona 1 i sm, the idea does not rely on theoret i ca 1 tauto 1 ogi es of 
functional requisites or system homeostasis. 
We have followed what is referred to as an "open systems perspec-
tive" (e.g., Drabek and Key, 1984) in which the family system--an inter-
dependent set of coresidential persons linked by blood, marriage, or 
both--is viewed as having varying degrees of interaction with other 
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social entities (systems) in its environment (Kantor and Lehr, 1975). 
The family is an "open system" because it interacts with the environing 
social order, either with kin, neighborhood, community, or the economic 
structures of society. 
Haas and Drabek (1970) as well as others (e.g., Mileti et al., 1975) 
utilize the notion of system stress as a part of the open systems per-
spective. Stress, according to these authors, is said to exist when the 
demands on a social system exceed the system's ability to respond to all 
demands. In this context, disasters are viewed as creating a set of 
demands on a stricken family (e.g., search, rescue, evacuation, clean-up, 
reconstruction). Many families cannot respond to all such demands unless 
they acquire additional resources, and the stress they experience there-
fore initiates a set of coping responses--responses that are in fact the 
subject of this report. These coping strategies usually involve obtain-
ing additional material, social, and/or psychological resources. 
Families may acquire necessary resources through a variety of social 
support systems including kin, neighborhoods, formal disaster agencies 
(FEMA, Red Cross, etc.), and informal and/or local organizations 
(churches, civic organizations, etc.). Thus, the linkages families 
establish with various entities in the community constitute systems of 
interaction (Wellman, 1974) that can facilitate a family's response and 
recovery from disaster. In our analysis we focus on a number of these 
systems: the victim family/kin group system, the victim family/neighbor-
hood system, and the victim family/disaster organization system. The 
latter includes all organizations, formal and informal, that a family 
utilizes in their recovery. 
Families and Social Support 
The relationships a family has with its kin group are the subject of 
much sociological research (see Lee, 1980, for a relatively recent review 
of these studies). Most of this work points out the importance of kin 
relations for American families, whether in or out of crisis. The exten-
siveness of kin relations and the strength and energy of the ties 
typically vary by class and ethnicity, with blacks, Hispanics, and cer-
tain religious groups maintaining more active relationships than others 
(Lee, 1980; Staples and Mirande, 1980). 
Recently, research has focused on social support networks--sets of 
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persons that families and individuals rely on in times of crisis. The 
concept of social support has been important for some time in sociologi-
cal research on the family (e.g., McCubbin et al., 1980; Stack, 1974; 
Lopata, 1978; Cantor, 1979). In the studies done so far involving 
chronic and acute stress (Kahn and Antonucci, 1980), social support has 
been found to moderate or buffer the effects of both. Social support, of 
course, is unlikely to occur in the absence of available resources for 
those giving support to the stricken, whether those resources are 
material or psychological (Bolin, 1983). Kahn and Antonucci (1980) have 
a 1 so suggested that the qua 1 i ty of the support gi ven is perhaps more 
important as a stress mitigator than the sheer number of persons in the 
support network. 
Kahn and Antonucci (1980) identify three elements in social support 
--affect, affirmation, and aid. The authors define affect as the 
emotional component of social support, affi rmation as agreement by those 
in support with the statements and behaviors of those in crisis,. and aid 
as transactions in which direct aid (money, labor, etc.) is given by the 
support networks. The first and third have particular currency for 
disaster research and will be discussed later. 
Disasters and the Disruption of Social S~q[_~ 
The specific role of social support in family response to disasters 
has been considered by several researchers who have di scussed the issue 
both in terms of kinship relations and in the more recently developed 
jargon of social support networks. Drabek and his colleagues have shown 
the kin support network to constitute a key decision-making context 
regarding potential evacuation (Drabek, 1969; Drabek and Boggs, 1968; see 
also Clifford, 1956). Further, Drabek et ale (1975) have examined the 
effects of disasters on the number and quality of ties or linkages that 
disaster victims maintain or create with their friends and relatives. In 
general, the data show (e.g., Drabek and Key, 1984; Bolin, 1976) that 
disasters often strengthen the relationships that victims have with their 
primary support groups, if such ties were relatively sound to begin with. 
More recently Bolin (1983) found social support to have a role in mitiga-
ting psychosocial disruption due to disaster. In his study Bolin (1983, 
p. 11) writes 
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Social support should be seen as part of the coping mechanisms 
that can be used by disaster victims to reduce the ••• stress-
es placed on them. Not all disaster victims have such 
networks available nor do all disaster victims utilize them 
even if they are. Support of the primary group can provide 
victims with types of aid that formal organizations cannot. 
Also ••• the so-called therapeutic community seems to increase 
the willingness of support networks to help victims in whatever 
ways necessary. 
The role of support networks as "stress buffers" has recently been 
suygested in other disaster literature (Golec, 1982; Bahr and Harvey, 
1979) as well as in the more general stress research (e.g., Kahn and 
Antonucci, 1980). 
In cultures with strong kinship systems, extended kin function as a 
primary giver of both emotional and material aid promoting family re-
covery (Bolton, 1979; Bolin and Bolton, 1983). In societies that empha-
size kinship less, support networks have been shown to provide important 
affective support mitigating the effects of disaster trauma (Bolin, 1976; 
Drabek and Key, 1984). 
The death of family members and other close persons is the most 
direct way disasters disrupt social support networks. In the Buffalo 
Creek disaster, for example, one half of the survivors had lost close 
friends or relatives (Gleser et al., 1981), significantly disrupting 
traditional support networks and greatly adding to the survivors' yrief 
and bereavement. Children are particularly vulnerable to psychological 
impairment as a result of death in the family (Perry and Perry 1959; 
Blaufarb and Levine, 1972). 
Societal responses to disasters--such as evacuation, temporary 
housing, and relocation--can also disrupt social support networks and 
place additional stress on victims. Several studies have discussed 
relatives as providers of emergency shelter for disaster victims and 
evacuees (Instituut voor Soci aal Onderzoek, 1955; Moore, 1964; Bates et 
al., 1963; Davis, 1977; Trainer and Bolin, 1976; Loizos, 1977; Bolin, 
1982)--an important social support function. Evacuation is a relatively 
common response to both human-caused (Houts et al., 1980; Levine, 1981) 
and natural di sasters (Drabek, 1969; Drabek and Boggs, 1968). Evacuation 
is often to the homes of relatives, thus placing victims in a socially 
supportive context (e.g., Loizos, 1977); this is particularly true of 
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societies in which the responsibility to kin overrides such problems as 
overcrowding and increased monetary demands (Loizos, 1977; Bolton, 1979). 
However, in situations where families are separated during evacuation 
(e.g., Young, 1954; Boyd, 1981) or evacuate to the homes of non-kin 
(e.g., Instituut voor Sociaal Onderzoek, 1955), the likelihood of nega-
tive psychological impacts is increased significantly. Other research 
has indicated (Bolin, 1982; Bolin, 1984) that beyond a period of approx-
imately one month, the relationship between a host family and evacuee 
family, even if they are kin, begins to deteriorate, resulting in a 
possible breakdown in the social support offered by the host family. The 
deterioration is usually manifested in interpersonal conflict due to 
crowding and money problems (Bolin, 1984) and is another potential 
stress on the evacuated family (ct., Loizos, 1977). Thus, while evacua-
tion can result in victim families being physically close to primary 
group support, under some ci rcumstances such support may break down. 
This is particularly likely in cultures in which there are not strong 
kinship ties. 
Temporary housing is another societal response that can disrupt 
support networks. Temporary housi ng as well as longer-term or permanent 
relocation results in "relocation stressors" (Parker, 1977, p. 548). 
Because temporary housing is frequently located away from the impact zone 
of a disaster (e.g., Bolton, 1979; Davis, 1977) and frequently also away 
from established transportation systems (Davis, 1977; Ciborowski, 1967) , 
the emotional benefits of social support in a familiar surrounding may be 
denied relocated victims. The inability to move back to former neighbor-
hoods increases psychological stress on victims (Miller et al., 1981), in 
part by denying them the therapeutic effect of social support in the 
post-disaster community (Milne, 1977; Wettenhall, 1979). For example, 
following the large scale evacuation of Darwin, Australia after a devas-
tating cyclone, those evacuees who could not return to their homes and 
neighborhoods suffered the most stress and exhibited the greatest number 
of psychosocial problems (Western and Milne, 1979). 
In addition, the temporary housing itself often causes additional 
stress. Trailers, in particular, seem to cause difficulties, especially 
if the trailers are placed in camps or courts specifically constructed 
for disaster victims (Bolin, 1982; Quarantelli, 1982). Not only do such 
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courts remove victims from the supportive environment of their old neigh-
borhoods (Bolin, 1982), they can also add to victims' fear of disaster 
recurrence if the camps are located in perceived high risk areas as 
happened at Buffalo Creek (Erikson, 1976). Because trailers are issued 
on a first come, first served basis, the temporary housing camps seldom 
refl ect the soci al patterns of the preimpact nei ghborhoods (Gl eser et 
al., 1981) and as a consequence can create "further disruption to social 
networks. • • retardi ng the rei ntegrat i on of fami 1 i es into establ i shed 
neighborhoods" (Trainer and Bolin, 1976, p. 55). 
Several researchers have al so pOinted out that temporary housi ng is 
often found by victims to be crowded and of substandard quality (Birnbaum 
et al., 1973; Bolin, 1982), culturally inappropriate (Hogg, 1980; 
Mitchell, 1976; Mitchell and Miner, 1978), or accompanied by excessive 
bureaucratic intrusion (sometimes perceived as harassment from officials) 
into the lives of the occupants (Bolin, 1982). As one respondent report-
ed (Bolin, 1982, p. 171), "We lived in a FEMA trailer for five months; 
for the last two months the lady from FEMA hounded us about when we would 
be movi ng out. I had been i nj ured and. • in the hospita 1 so thi s 
treatment particularly bothered me." 
Relocation and its attendant disruption of neighborhood patterns. 
social support networks, and familiar surroundings also compounds the 
stress that vi ct ims experi ence (Ahearn and Castellon, 1979; Ti erney and 
Baisden 1979; Dudasik, 1980). Because the stressful effects of evacua-
tion, temporary housing, and relocation are long-term (Erikson, 1976; 
Bolin, 1982; Hogg, 1980), they may produce chronic or delayed stress 
disorders among victims; and because such social responses to disasters 
tend to isolate victims from the needed comfort of their support net-
works, those effects may be compounded. 
In the case of human-caused di sasters such as Love Canal (Levi ne, 
1981), there is no acute impact phase at a 11. Instead, a peri od of 
chronic threat and uncertainty is followed by the dispersal and reloca-
tion of the victims. At Love Canal the chronic stress of being exposed 
to toxic chemicals of uncertain danger was followed by the loss of homes 
(see Fried, 1966) and the disruption of neighborhood support networks as 
victims were relocated across a wide area away from the danger zone 
(Holdren, 1982). 
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~~~~~_~~~~s~~ __ ~_~~~~~_~odel 
Families as social systems undergoing stress due to either internal 
or external factors have long been the subject of sociological research, 
and much of the current work is influenced by the half century of family 
stress research that began with Burgess (1926) and a number of studies 
examlnlng how families responded to the capitalist economic crisis of the 
1930s in the U.S. (e.g., Angell, 1936; Cavan and Ranck, 1938; Koos, 
1946). Perhaps the most influential development has been Hill's classic 
family stress model--the so-called A,B,C,-X formulation (Hill, 1949; also 
Hill, 1958; Hill and Hansen, 1962). This model suggests that A (the 
stress event--in Hill's work, war-induced spousal separation) interacts 
with B (a family's stress-meeting resources) and with C (family percep-
tion or definition of the situation) to produce -X (the crisis situa-
tion). According to Hill (1949) the family is initially disorganized by 
the stressor, but then goes through a recovery phase in which it reestab-
lishes some level of organization and equilibrium. 
Burr (1973), as part of his effort to develop a comprehensive deduc-
tive theory of family behavior, has expanded Hill's model. Burr intro-
duces concepts of vul ne rabi 1 ity and regene rat i ve power, and his mode 1 
suggests that the stressor event coupl ed with the 1 evel of a family's 
vulnerability (amount of resources) influences the severity of the crisis 
experienced by the family. In addition, a family's definition of the 
stress event influences their vulnerability, and their regenerative power 
affects their ability to recover from the disruption. 
Much of the clinical and sociological research on family stress 
depends on and shares particular terms and definitions. Stressors are 
often defined as any life events of such magnitude that they cause change 
in families (McCubbin, 1980). Similarly, stress consists of family 
responses to stressors and generally refers to tensions and disruptions 
not adequately dealt with by the family (Burr, 1973). Crisis is the 
extent of disorganization due to a lack of family coping resources (Burr, 
1973; Lipman-Blumen, 1975). Lipman-Blumen has offered a comprehensive 
categorization tool for assessing family crises (such as those produced 
by disaster), as well as for classifying stressors. The system classi-
fies crises and stressors by the following dimensions (Lipman-Blumen, 
1975, p. 890): internality vs. externality; pervasiveness vs. bounded-
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ness; precipitate onset vs. gradual onset; intensity vs. mildness; trans-
itoriness vs. chronicity; randomness vs. expectability; natural vs. 
artificial origin; perceived unsolvability vs. solvability. This system 
is similar to a number of classification models for disasters (e.g., 
Barton, 1970). 
While, in our research, disasters are viewed as major disruptive and 
stress-producing events, it must be remembered that families experience 
continual stresses as a result of routine as well as unexpected events, 
e.g., bi rth of a child, divorce, widowhood, unemployment, residential 
changes, illness (McCubbin et al., 1980). Thus, disasters were rarely 
the first or only stress-producing event in the families studied. 
In the literature there seems to be a tendency to view the family as 
a closed system, reacting to stressors based on internal resources (e.g., 
Hill, 1958; Hansen and Hill, 1979). McCubbin and his colleagues have 
suggested that more attent i on be pa i d to the 1 inks that fami 1 i es under 
stress establish with various support networks (McCubbin, 1979; McCubbin 
et al., 1980). As noted previously, such support networks will be consi-
dered as an important coping resource for families impacted by disasters 
(Bolin, 1982). In the this research such extra-familial support systems 
include kin, neighborhood, formal disaster agencies, and informal/local 
organizations. 
Disaster Research and Long-Term Impacts 
This study is but one part of a large body of research conducted by 
social scientists on the many aspects of human response to disaster. A 
great deal of resea rch has been conducted on the wa rni ng, impact, and 
evacuation phases of disaster (e.g., Mileti et al., 1975; Perry et al., 
1980). However, because the research discussed here focuses on long-term 
recovery, the 1 i terature revi ewed wi 11 be restri cted to those studi es 
which relate to the long-term effects of disasters on families and indi-
viduals. 
Disasters and Mental Health 
One growi ng area of research concerns the short- and long-term 
impacts of di sasters on mental health. Although thi s has been a concern 
of disaster researchers for decades, there is a surprising lack of con-
sensus concerning whether such impacts exist to any significant extent 
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and, if so, how to detect and measure them (Perry and Lindell, 1978; 
Quarantell i, 1979). In general, sociological research has seldom found 
severe psychopathologies among disaster victims, but rather has focused 
on transitory mental health problems and problems in coping. 
Available literature may be divided into two general groups: so-
called clinical studies and more broadly focused disaster case studies 
using general sociological survey techniques. In the clinical studies, 
much of the evidence for mental health problems as a result of environ-
mental stresses derives from studies of human-caused "disasters" such as 
war and the war-related experiences of survivors (e.g., Chodoff, 1970, 
Hocking, 1970; Segal, 1974), nuclear war (e.g., Lifton, 1967), fires, 
explosions, and accidents (e.g., Lindy et al., 1981; Carlton, 1980; 
Raphael, 1977). Many of the recent clinical studies focus on one event 
in particular, the Buffalo Creek disaster (e.g., Titchener and Kapp, 
1976; Gieser et al., 1981), a catastrophe so devastating that the endur-
ing psychosocial reactions of survivors have been labeled the "Buffalo 
Creek Syndrome" (Titchener and Kapp, 1976, p. 295). Although the evi-
dence from Buffalo Creek is important, some reviews have demonstrated 
that only Buffalo Creek shows a link between disasters and "severe 
psychopathologies" (Baisden, 1979, p. 328). 
Human-caused di sasters appear to be associ ated with mental health 
problems more often than natural disasters for a number of reasons. 
Specifically, in human-caused disasters blame can be assigned; in natural 
disasters, culpability is much more difficult to establish. Thus, anger 
at the "callousness and irresponsibility of other humans" (Lifton and 
Olson, 1976, p. 10), blame assignation, and feelings of being victimized 
by others are associated with mental health problems among victims and 
survivors of human-caused events (e.g., Bucher, 1957; Janis, 1951). 
A wide range of emotional responses to disasters have been 
described in the literature dealing with both human-caused and natural 
events. General fears, anxieties, and tensions are frequently mentioned 
as common emotional responses (e.g., Taylor et al., 1970; Bates et al., 
1963; Blaufarb and Levine, 1972; Bolin, 1982; Richard, 1974; Milne, 
1977). Such responses have been reported across a range of di saster 
types including tornadoes (Taylor, 1977), earthquakes (Greenson and 
Mintz, 1972), nuclear plant accidents (Houts et al., 1980), hailstorms 
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(Leives1ey, 1977), cyclones and hurricanes (Bates et al., 1963; Parker, 
1975), train accidents (Raphael, 1977) and floods (Ollendick and Hoffman, 
1982). 
One of the classic formulations of psychosocial response to disas-
ters is Wallace's (1956) "disaster syndrome"--a cognitive dysfunction 
characteri zed by shocked and dazed behavi or. Di saster syndrome as a 
response to unexpected and severe events is repeatedly mentioned in the 
sociological literature (e.g., Barton, 1970; Perry and Lindell, 1978), 
although Kinston and Rosser (1974) suggest that perhaps only 10% of 
disaster victims develop acute problems requiring intervention. General-
ly, sociological researchers are more likely than clinical researchers to 
treat such cognitive disturbances as normal and shortlived (cf., Barton, 
1970; Zusman, 1976). 
Situational as well as deeper depression is also mentioned in the 
literature as a relatively common emotional response to impact and loss 
(e.g., Taylor, 1976). Severe or prolonged disasters appear to be linked 
to more severe depression (e.g., Hocking, 1970; Knaus, 1975; Leivesley, 
1977) • 
Psychosomatic and physical health problems are typically reported 
after many disasters (e.g., Logue et al., 1981), and sleep disturbances 
are a common reaction reported by a number of researchers (Flynn and 
Chalmers, 1980; Bolin, 1982; Hocking, 1965; Church, 1974; Price, 1978). 
General physical illness does not appear to be a long-term consequence of 
disasters (e.g., Parker, 1977; Melick, 1976). 
Disasters also seem to be able to cause a variety of interactive or 
interpersonal disturbances, and the effects of disasters on family rela-
tionships have received much recent attention (Drabek and Key, 1984; 
Bolin, 1982; Erikson, 1976; Taylor, 1976). Irritability and the inabili-
ty to get along well with other fami ly members duri ng recovery has been 
one Significant finding (Bolin, 1982; Henderson and Bostock, 1977). 
Qua rante 11 i (1979) has also cons i dered "response generated demandS II 
--a concept important to studies of long-term response. He demonstrates 
that it is important to cons i der if and how soci a 1 responses to di sas-
ters, almost independent of impact related disruptions, can prolong or 
even create problems among victims. While the initial physical impacts 
of disasters can potentially create mental health problems, how the 
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larger society responds to disasters can create or maintain heightened 
stress levels that cause psychological and social problems that might not 
otherwise have occurred. Thus, in the case of major disasters--in par-
ticular those requiring large-scale federal intervention, long-term stays 
in emergency shelters, or re10cation--menta1 health problems are some-
times generated by the demands of recovery (as distinct from the initial 
traumatic event). 
Besides considering various stressors, the vulnerability of differ-
ent demographi c groups to di saster-i nduced psycho1 ogi cal prob1 ems must 
also be considered. Early disaster research (Friedsam, 1961; Moore, 
1958) specifically suggested that the elderly were "at risk." However, 
recent research has indicated that, in fact, the elderly are less likely 
to require mental health support services than other victims (Bell, 1978; 
Huerta and Horton, 1978; Bolin and K1enow, 1983; Kilijanek and Drabek, 
1979). In a number of studies children have been found to be particular-
ly vulnerable to disaster stress (e.g., B1aufarb and Levine, 197-2; Lacey, 
1972, Newman, 1976; K1iman, 1976); flynn and Chalmers (1980) suggest 
that children are vulnerable because of their lower coping capacities. 
Similarly, Bolin (1982) found that large families were more subject to 
emot i ona 1 problems fo 11 owi ng di saster, pe rhaps refl ect i ng the greater 
number of dependent children. In addition, following severe disasters, 
researchers have observed separation anxieties (Bolin, 1982; Boyd, 1981; 
Singer, 1982), phobias, and sleep disturbances among children (Frederic, 
1977; Newman, 1976; Perry and Perry, 1959). 
--- While children and large families appear particularly vulnerable to 
the stresses of disaster, several other demographic groups seem less 
vulnerable. Those groups include blacks (G1eser et a1., 1981), those 
with higher education levels (Bolin, 1982), those with higher incomes 
(Bolin, 1982), and those with extensive social support networks (Bolin, 
1983; Huerta and Horton, 1978; Lucas, 1969). 
Generally speaking, the literature on stress and psychosocial .dis-
order views demographic characteristics as mediators between the stressor 
and coping responses; such characteristics affect how persons understand 
and interpret the stressor (Lumsden, 1975) and are also associated with 
the available coping resources of victims (G1eser et a1., 1981). G1eser 
et a1., (1981) in their study of Buffalo Creek found that blacks ex-
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perienced lower incidences of psychic trauma than whites. Similarly, 
they found that children scored high on disruption scales while victims 
of high socioeconomic status scored low. Such findings are consistent 
with Bolin's recent research (Bolin, 1984). In addition, some studies 
show that the relationship between age and stress-caused psychosocial 
disruption tends to be curvilinear for udults, with younger and older 
adults scoring lower on psychopathology scales than those of middle age 
(Kessler, 1979). 
Because the demography as well as ethnicity of victims figures 
prominently in our research, some pertinent studies on class, ethnicity, 
and mental health should be mentioned. Warheit et al. (1976), for 
example, found that blacks, femal~, the poor, and those with low educa-
tion had the highest rates of depression. However, they also found that 
race effects disappear when socioeconomic status is controlled, indica-
ting that clas~_was a more significant variable than. race. Similarly, 
Mirowsky and Ross (1980) found Mexican-Americans to suffer less distress 
than whites. While Mexican-Americans may be distressed by low incomes, 
some Hispanic cultural factors (family-centeredness, extended kin net-
works) buffer the stress of poverty (Madsen, 1964; Lomnitz, 197U; Farris 
and Gl enn, 1976). The same however was not found by Mi rowsky and Ross 
(1980) for blacks. With blacks, class status was the predominant factor 
and not black ethnicity (Gaity and Scott, 1972; see also Antunes et al., 
1974; and Dohrenwend, 1966). The importance of race and class as de-
terminants of individual and family disaster response will be examined 
more thoroughly later. 
Long-Term Family Recovery 
Several studies of natural disasters have recently focused on the 
long-term recovery of victim families. Drabek and his colleagues (e.g., 
Drabek et al., 1975; Erikson, 1976; Drabek and Key, 1984) have produced 
some of the most sophisticated research on the long-term impacts of 
natural disasters. One important contribution of their research has been 
analyses of the types of relationships or linkages that victim families 
establish in order to obtain recovery aid and resources. They found 
(Drabek and Key, 1984) that besides relying on internal resources in 
recovery, victims received aid from extra-familial sources, including 
extended family, friends, and organizations. 
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Currently, disaster researchers commonly discuss the "therapeutic 
community" (Barton, 1970) as a contextual factor in recovery. Therapeu-
tic community refers to the emergence of support and altruistic norms in 
communities after disasters--a process that facilitates a collective 
response to disaster. However, just as a community can create a suppor-
tive context for family recovery, it can also constrain that recovery. 
For example, in a study of a community stricken by a massive tornado, 
Bolin (1982, p. 61) notes that 
although elements of the therapeutic community were ••• present, 
these 'utopian elements' are balanced or ••• negated by the 
inequities that rapidly manifested themselves in the form of price 
gouging, unscrupulous contractors, and rapidly rising rents. 
In a more theoretical vein, Trainer and Bolin, (1976, p. 288) identify 
three community-level constraints on family recovery: physical con-
straints, temporal constraints, and subjective constraints. Physical 
constraints usually consist of destroyed community facilities and 
neighborhoods that delay a return to normal daily activities. Temporal 
constraints involve the time required to carry out routine and recovery-
related tasks in the postdisaster environment. Delays in clearing roads 
and reestablishing transportation, failure to provide public transporta-
tion, the necessity to spend significant amounts of time attempting to 
acquire aid--all reduce the time available for more direct recovery-
related activities as well as for nondisaster-related family activities. 
Subjective constraints include the disruption of a family's sense of the 
familiar and normal caused by reconstruction activities. 
Because the community constitutes an important frame of reference 
for disaster victims, disrupted services and altered community patterns 
occurring simultaneously with the other serious demands of a disaster can 
contribute to overall victim stress and inhibit recovery. Furthermore, 
communities may be transformed in the reconstruction process through 
ch anges in thei r geography and phys i ca 1 1 ayout, re 1 ocat i on of nei ghbor-
hoods, relocation of business districts, and so on. As noted, these 
recovery-generated disruptions can generate long-term sociocultural 
transformations which undermine the sense of well-being. (e.g., Dudasik, 
1980; Trainer and Bolin, 1976). 
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Communities as a complex social whole constitute symbolic objects 
providing orientation for residents (Hunter, 1974, 1975; Fried, 1966) and 
are the basis of residents' cognitive maps (Suttles, 1972; Trainer and 
Bolin, 1976). These mental maps render the local community familiar, 
safe, and readily accessible to those who reside there. Beyond this, 
residents identify with their communities and, in so doing, form part of 
their concept of themselves (Hunter, 1974). Cognitive identity with the 
community is likely to increase with length of residence and with parti-
cipation in local activities and organizations (Bell and Newby, 1971). 
Because disasters disrupt residents' sense of spatial organization and 
identity with the community, social and behavioral problems may follow 
(e.g., Barkun, 1974; Hogg, 1980). Thus, disasters not only result in a 
disruption of expected services but also tend to sever the social ties 
many victims have to the locale--ties which may provide important psycho-
logical support in times of stress. Trainer and Bolin (1976, p. 280) 
state that after disasters, ties with "voluntary associations, churches 
and recreational groups may. •• have to be reestablished after the 
period of concentration on immediate emergency and recovery activities." 
Further, they note that (p. 280) 
social activities will be disrupted due to the relocation of 
families and to the destruction of the physical facilities for the 
various activities. Other activities may be disrupted not a direct 
consequence of the disaster, but rather due to changes in the 
physical setting during and after reconstruction. Reconstructed 
communities seldom are identical to their pre-disaster form. 
Spatial relocation of activities not only affects those directly 
impacted by the disaster, but others in the community as well •• 
The complexities of social life may be disturbed for periods extend-
ing beyond to actual physical reconstruction of the community. 
Although the focus of this research is on the long-term recovery of 
minorities, little previous disaster research has focused on these groups 
at any stage of disaster impact or recovery. Of the research available, 
a good deal examines the effect of race and ethnicity on warning response 
and evacuation behaviors (e.g., Lindell et a1., 1980; Perry et al., 
1980). The effect of the mass medi a on di saster response ina bl ack 
community has also recently been analyzed by Beady and Bolin (1983). 
It is more difficult to find research on ethnic minorities in the 
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recovery stages of a di saster. Moore (1958), ina study of the effects 
of tornadoes on several Texas towns, di d have some black and Hi spani c 
victims as part of his sample. In general, he found blacks to have 
suffered greater losses proportionally than others and, consequently, 
suggested that they had greater need for external resources to facilitate 
recovery. 
In another study of a tornado in Texas, Minnis and McWilliams (1971) 
examined changing patterns of residential segregation. The Lubbock 
tornado that they examined disrupted existing housing patterns, and in 
the aftermath, some neighborhoods became somewhat more racially integra-
ted. The researchers examined victim tolerance of this changing 
neighborhood composition, finding that blacks were more tolerant of 
integration than were whites (pp. 169-170). 
Much of the 1 iterature useful for understandi ng bl ack recovery from 
disaster comes not from the disaster literature, but from research on the 
black family. Research on minority families has examined the role of 
social support among blacks (e.y., Martin and Martin, 1978; Lin et al., 
1979; Lopata, 1978) and reliance on kinship networks during times of 
stress such as unemployment. Staples (1976) reports that American blacks 
are more likely to have extensive and cohesive kinship networks and are 
1 i kely to rely on those networks under stressful ci rcumstances (e.g., 
Babchuck and Ballweg, 1971; Cantor, 1979; Jackson, 1971; McAdoo, 1978). 
Stress due to events such as unemployment or desertion is analogous to 
stress caused by disaster. Hence reliance on social support by minori-
ties may be expected following disasters and may be an important part of 
the long-term recovery process of minority families. 
Bolin (1984) found that for black disaster victims, primary group 
aid appeared as a neg~~~ factor in economic recovery; the primary group 
was not a useful source of economic aid. He also notes that blacks were 
frequently unable to qualify for certain governmental recovery programs--
an issue that will be examined in more detail later. Nonetheless, it was 
found that social support of black victims did contribute to their emo-
tional recovery. 
Bolin's research has also examined long-term recovery of tornado 
victims and included a comparative analysis of rural and urban victims, 
as well as a similar comparison of the elderly and non-elderly (Bolin and 
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Klenow, 1983). Other research by Bolin (1982) on the long-term recovery 
of families is directly relevant to the current research. Indeed, in-
strumentation as well as the general theoretical orientation of the 
present study follows closely that of the earlier work. For this reason, 
some key findings regarding differential impacts of the disaster as well 
as Bolin's multivariate model of family recovery will be reviewed. It 
was found that elderly victims were more likely to experience a long-term 
decline in their standard of living than others, but that older victims 
experienced fewer disaster-related strains in family relationships and 
were less likely to express anxiety over future disasters. The elderly 
tended to "underutilize" federal aid programs (particularly SBA), as did 
lower socioeconomic status victims. Social class was also found to be a 
determinant in the use of FEMA trailers--victims of lower socioeconomic 
class being more likely than others to live in them as temporary shelter. 
Lower socioeconomic status victims, younger victims, and those with large 
numbers of dependents were each more likely to receive money from Indivi-
dual Family Grant programs. Bolin also reported that rural disaster 
victims tended to receive less aid from fewer sources than did urban 
victims, a factor that slowed rural victims' recovery. 
In summarizing recovery outcomes of the disaster victims, Bolin 
(1982, p. 240) reports: 
1) 
2) 
Elderly and rural victims were relatively slower in their 
economic recovery. 
Elderly victims scored higher on the emotional recovery index 
than others. 
\ 
3) Large families (containing more than 3 dependents) were slower 
in both their emotional and economic recovery. 
4. Most victims, irrespective of age, disaster losses, income, or 
family size were likely to evaluate the recovery aid they 
received as inadequate. 
\ 
\ 
I n model i ng the recovery process, Bo 1 i n defi ned a combi nat i on of 
socioeconomic and impact variables. Interacting with aid, social disrup-
tion and social support were shown to be factors determining emotional 
and economic recovery outcomes (Bolin, 1982; see also Bolton, 1979; 
Bolin, 1976; Drabek and Key, 1984). 
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Bolin and Bolton (1983) tested a model of the recovery process in a 
compari son of family recovery in Lat in Ame ri ca and the United States. 
Their model was similar to that just described with the important addi-
tion that this one was cross-cultural; their analysis highlighted differ-
ences in response and recovery strategi es that were attri butabl e to 
culture. Features of Latin American culture that affected recovery were 
the strong familial ties and the patronage system in which personal 
obl igations rather than universal rules determined access to recovery 
resou rces. Thus in Lat in Ameri ca cont i nuity of employment (as a result 
of patronage) was an important determinant of recovery, while in the 
U.S., aid from ~overnmental sources was a key factor in recovery. 
In general, the purpose of models of the recovery process is to 
deve lop an unders tandi ng of the i nte rp 1 ay of factors affect i ng recove ry 
outcomes. In the present research the concern is with the effect of the 
race/ethnicity of the victims. Previous research has already shown 
(Bolin, 1982; Drabek and Key, 1984; Bolin and Bolton, 1983) that the 
availability and utilization of extra-familial aid and disaster insurance 
are important determinants of recovery outcomes. As Bolin (1982, p. 241-
242) has written, "[nhe determi nants of family recovery are many and 
varied: recovery is the outcome of family [demographic] characteristics, 
social support networks, aid programs and insurances ••• " Recovery has 
also been shown to be influenced by disaster impacts and losses--both of 
a material and personal (injuries/deaths) sort (Bolin, 1982). 
In thi s study, a general model of the recovery process is used as a 
guide to analysis of the data. In the model, recovery is viewed as the 
outcome of predi saster condit ions and characteri st i cs interacting with 
disaster impacts and losses. These di saster effects create specific 
factors and processes during recovery (e.g., obtaining recovery aid), and 
all factors interplay to determine recovery outcomes. In this analysis, 
_ predisaster conditions and characteristics include socioeconomic status, 
age of family members, family size, race/ethnicity, and related back-
ground characteristics. Impacts!losses include material losses to home, 
home contents, and vehicles; personai losses including injuries to family 
members, deaths of family members or friends; psychological impacts 
(bereavement, anxiety, etc.); disruption of family lifestyle and living 
patterns. Recovery involves such factors and processes as utilizing 
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support networks, obtaining organizational aid, settling insurance 
claims, living in temporary housing, relocating residences, and resolving 
psychological impacts. Recovery has been measured along a number of 
dimensions (cf., Bolin, 1982; Bolin and Bolton, 1983; Drabek and Key, 
1984), but the essential dimensions considered here are economic and 
emotional recovery. For our purposes economic recovery is measured 
subjectively by asking respondents to evaluate whether they feel they 
have recovered economically from the effects of the disaster. Similarly, 
emotional recovery is a sUbjective evaluation by victims that feel they 
are "over" the emotional impacts of their disaster experiences. In the 
chapters that follow, differences in recovery will be considered, focus-
ing on patterns of aid utilization and ethnicity/race as key elements 
determi ni ng recovery outcomes. In the fi na 1 chapter, di fferences among 
sites will be evaluated comparatively. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PARIS, TEXAS TORNADO 
Introduction 
On April 2, 1~82, a tornado touched down outside of Paris, Texas and 
proceeded eastward through the city, tearing apart neighborhoods, killing 
and injuring many people, and leaving hundreds of others homeless. With 
that event, the 1 i ves of many persons were i nel uctably changed, and a 
complex array of social responses was begun. In this chapter, the nature 
of the response and recovery of victim families in Paris will be an-
alyzed. The tornado devastated both black and white neighborhoods and 
thus afforded a uni que opportunity for compari ng the recovery processes 
of two racial groups. 
Research Design and Implementation 
Three factors made Paris a good site for the purposes of this re-
search. Fi rst, there were almost equal numbers of black and white vic-
tims. Secondly, the tornado was so severe that there was a large pool of 
victims who suffered moderate to serious losses from which to draw a 
sample. Finally, the site was declared a disaster by the President, 
thereby insuring the presence of federal disaster organizations in addi-
tion to the many local, state, and independent organizations. 
Family surveys began in mid-December--eight months after the torna-
dO's impact. To ensure an adequate sample from among those residents 
with destroyed homes and those with major damage, a goal was established 
to interview approximately 400 families, or about 25% of the 1530 fami-
lies reported by the Red Cross to be affected. Approximately equal num-
bers of black and white respondents were interviewed across a range of 
disaster loss levels, and in the end, a total of 431 victims (28.2%) were 
interviewed. 
Surveys were administered to one adult family member in each house-
hold selected for interview. Interview schedules contained 178 ques-
tions, measuring 340 variables. The instrument utilized in the Paris 
survey is virtually identical in form and content to the surveys used at 
the other research sites--the only differences being those required by 
site-specific concerns (disaster agent, local socio-cultural forms, etc.) 
Interview schedules sought information on a wide variety of family 
22 
demographic characteristics including: age and sex composition, size, 
type, residential history, and income, education, occupation, and marital 
status of heads of household and respondents. The schedu 1 es a 1 so con-
tained a number of Lickert scale attitude items, scaled from strongly 
agree to strongly di sagree, that presented respondents with statements 
describing typical disaster-related impacts. Responses to these items 
could indicate a range of psychological, emotional, economic, social, and 
family-related disruptions. Another series of questions elicited infor-
mation on physical impacts, such as injuries, deaths, property and finan-
cial losses, as well as on emergency period activities, and aid determin-
ation, utilization, and adequacy. The importance of aid in emotional and 
economic recovery was also recorded. Additional questions were asked 
regarding various aspects of insurance coverage and regarding victim ex-
periences while living in FEMA mobile homes. Finally, respondents were 
asked a series of questions designed to assess the level of their emo-
tional and economic recovery, and to determine additional opinions on aid 
programs, reconstruction activities within their neighborhoods, and 
officials' handling of the disaster and its aftermath. 
In addition to the family interviews, city, state, federal, and 
nongovernmental disaster relief organization officials were interviewed 
to obtain general backyround information on the tornado and its after-
math. Newspaper accounts and other published sources of information were 
a 1 so used to develop the ch rono logy presented below. I ntervi ews with 
officials were conducted two months prior to the family interviews, and 
follow-up interviews were conducted at the time of those interviews. 
After receiving training, eighteen persons, recruited from local 
organizations and a local junior college, conducted the actual inter-
views under the supervision of a field director. The survey was publi-
cized in the community in several ways. The two local newspapers ran 
press releases on the survey two months prior to and again at the actual 
time of the interviews, and one radio station ran periodic press releases 
during the field work. The city manager, the police department, the 
mayor, disaster relief agencies and organizations, and local community 
leaders were informed of the survey when interviewing began. 
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Paris: A Chronology of the Disaster 
At 9:15 a.m. on Friday, April 2, 1982, the National Weather Service 
issued a tornado warning for portions of north central and northeast 
Texas. Thi s warni ng was to expi re at 3 :00 p.m., but severe weather con-
tinued and the warning was extended to 9:00 p.m. Therefore, at 3:00 p.m. 
a watch was in effect for Lamar County, of which Paris is the county 
seat. It was not until approximately 4:10 p.m. that a tornado (or per-
haps a pair of tornadoes) was sighted moving toward Paris. The tornado 
traveled eastward through the northern part of the city, bypassing the 
central business district but hitting two residential neighborhoods--an 
older neighborhood in the northwest and a newer neighborhood in the 
northeast. The southern sect i on of the city was 1 eft vi rtua lly un-
touched. 
The tornado cut a swath of destruction approximately five miles long 
through the city. Although the funnel cloud was estimated to be about 
200 yards wide at the ground, its accompanying heavy winds damaged prop-
erty across a half-mile wide strip. The tornado traveled at approximate-
ly 50 miles an hour and stayed on the ground for 20 to 30 minutes. 
According to the Red Cross, 11 people were killed. Of these, four 
were in mobile homes, and five were persons 65 years old or older. A 
total of 322 people were injured, 59 of whom were admitted to area hos-
pitals. 
Immediately following the storm, the Red Cross conducted a "wind-
shield survey"--a house-to-house, street-by-street survey delineating the 
total area affected and the amount of damage sustained. They found that 
426 houses, two mobile homes, and 130 apartments sustained major damage; 
and 519 houses, and 122 apartments sustained minor damage. In addition, 
a number of small businesses and six churches sustained various levels of 
damage. Two larger businesses, the American Box Company and the Paris 
Lumber Company, were totally destroyed. Total damages were estimated to 
be in excess of $50 million. 
A total of 1530 fami 1 i es were affected by the tornado through i n-
jury, death, or property loss or damage. Of the city's 26,000 residents, 
nearly 10% were left homeless. Approximately 3,000 residences were with-
out electrical power for at least 24 hours, and thereafter electrical 
service was only restored piece-by-piece in the disaster area. Gas ser-
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vi ce for 400 to 500 houses was damaged or interrupted by the storm but 
was generally brought under control within 24 hours. Phone service was 
interrupted for some 3,000 to 4,000 residents, although most phone ser-
vice was also restored within 24 hours. In addition, water service 
ceased briefly due to loss of power at a pumping station. 
The city's emergency warning system was put into operation despite 
recent disagreement on its design. A year prior to the disaster, the 
city council turned down a proposal to install fixed warning sirens, and 
a new system was scheduled to be voted upon again by the council. The 
system that was in effect utilized police, fire, sheriff, and ambulance 
vehicles stationed around the city. At about 3:30 p.m. on the day of the 
disaster, after the National Weather Service had confirmed the existence 
of a tornado, those vehicles traveled up and down the streets of the town 
sounding their sirens. Although city officials maintained that their 
emergency plan worked well, at budget hearings in June of 1982, a fixed 
warning system was approved. 
The city of Paris had an emergency management plan, and its coordi-
nator set up an emergency operations center in the police department 
building the evening of the disaster. At the same time, the Texas De-
partment of Public Safety requested assistance from the National Guard, 
and these two groups, along wi th the city's po 1 i ce depa rtment, estab-
lished security procedures for the disaster zone. The city council met 
in an emergency meeting and instituted a 10:00 p.m. curfew for one week 
for the area affected by the disaster. A pass system to the disaster 
area was also put into effect. 
Additional emergency vehicles and aid came from Oklahoma and parts 
of northeast Texas. Dallas and surrounding areas sent 60 paramedic teams 
which participated in search and rescue operations. On April 2, the Red 
Cross set up two emergency shelters in the cafeteri as of two publ ic 
schools. However, most victims probably sought emergency shelter with 
family and friends not affected by the disaster. Only a few victims 
utilized the Red Cross shelters, and one shelter was subsequently closed. 
The Salvation Army did take in about 40 victims the night of the disas-
ter. 
On April 8th, Paris and Lamar County were declared disaster areas 
by the federal government, making disaster relief programs available to 
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residents. These programs included temporary housing, low-interest SBA 
loans to repair or replace uninsured homes and businesses, and other 
forms of individual and community assistance. On April lOth, two disas-
ter assistance centers (DACs) were set up to provide one-stop assistance 
to victims seeking federal, state, and nongovernmental aid and services. 
The DACs were closed by April 15th, although applications continued to be 
taken at the local FEMA headquarters. By April 27th, 84 mobile homes and 
four travel trailers were in place, providing temporary housing. Since 
local restrictions prohibited the placing of mobile homes on private 
lots, mobile homes were placed in temporary FEMA courts. However, travel 
trailers were allowed on private lots where home rebuilding was taking 
place. In addition to mobile homes, other temporary housing assistance 
was provided by FEMA which placed 299 families in rental houses and 
apartments and provided monetary assistance to victims staying with 
family and friends. By May 27th, 90% of all eligible applicants were 
housed in temporary or permanent residences. 
After the initial emergency period, new assistance organizations 
came forward, and those already engaged in emergency assistance redirect-
ed their efforts to longer-range assistance and community restoration 
programs. FEMA began searching for permanent housing for those families 
in temporary shelter. Eligible families were guaranteed three months 
temporary housing assistance, after which they had to be recertified for 
housing every 30 days. By September 22,123 families out of the 387 
placed by FEMA in temporary housing were still in need of permanent 
housing. Low-income families proved particularly difficult to place, 
because low-income rental units were scarce. Many families had to wait 
until rebuilt units became available in a tornado-damaged housing com-
plex. By the time of the survey interviews, most families had found 
permanent housing, with only the most difficult to place remaining in 
FEMA mobile homes and rental housing. By December 31,1982 all FEMA 
mobile homes and travel trailers had been removed from Paris, and FEMA's 
local operations were closed. 
Approximately a week after the disaster, the curfew for the stricken 
area was lifted. Debris removal and cleanup, conducted by the city with 
partial funding from FEMA and the assistance of a local army reserve 
construction unit, began soon after search and rescue operations were 
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completed. Utility and street repair--partially funded by a Community 
Development Block Grant project--was conducted by the Department of 
Public Works. The block grant also aided in the repair and rebuilding of 
low-income and substandard housing and rental units. The city council 
used the building permit process to prevent price gouging by unscrupulous 
contractors attempting to take advantaye of home owners anxious to re-
build their homes. In addition to these activities, the city approved 
the fixed disaster warning system as well as a warning system utilizing 
local cable television. Moreover, other facets of the city's emergency 
response program were reviewed, modified, and expanded. 
Initially, Red Cross aid was limited to the provision of food and 
shelter. While the organization continued to provide meals to victims, 
staff, and volunteers working in the cleanup, it subsequently expanded 
its efforts, and, on April 5th, opened two centers to provide direct 
assistance to victim families. This aid was accomplished by setting up a 
line of credit with local merchants for necessities, such as beds, 
clothing, shoes, cooking and eating utensils, and first month's rent. In 
addition, workers at the centers compiled case records containing infor-
mation such as family data, sustained damage, injuries, property owner-
ship, insurance, assets, and employment. 
On April 16th, the Red Cross was notified that the FEMA mobile homes 
would not be available for purchase by victims. From case records, the 
organization had identified 305 low-income and elderly families whose 
homes had sustai ned major or total damage. It was therefore decided to 
enter an Additional Assistance Phase in which aid is provided for such 
things as rebuilding, repair, medical bills, furnishings, appliances, 
prescriptions, and occupational supplies. During this phase, the Red 
Cross assisted in rebuilding 30 houses, funded major repairs of three 
other homes, bought two houses and two trailers, and funded numerous 
other lesser home repairs. Their repair and rebuilding efforts were made 
available primarily to low-income and elderly home owners. They were not 
able to aid renters to any great extent, but they did expand their assis-
tance to include victims outside of the declared area. The Red Cross was 
assisted by work crews from other disaster relief organizations, includ-
ing the Mennonite Disaster Service and Christian Public Service. By 
September, the Red Cross had served over 68,000 meals and assisted 1103 
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families with medical care. The Red Cross Disaster Headquarters was 
closed in Paris on September 24th, and personnel made only intermittent 
site visits thereafter. It is estimated that the Red Cross spent over 
one million dollars in assisting families in Lamar County. 
An additional substantial amount of private assistance was provided 
through the Interfaith Disaster Services (IDS) of Paris and Lamar County. 
IDS, a nonprofit organization, incorporated during the second week of May 
as a result of the efforts of Church World Service and IDS officials from 
Wichita Falls, Texas (which had undergone a major tornado disaster sever-
al years earlier). Board members were mostly local ministers, and fund-
ing initially came from local churches in Paris and from Church World 
Services. While the Red Cross did not provide a great deal of aid to 
renters, IDS did. In comparison to FEMA and the Red Cross, IDS was more 
flexible in the types of aid it could provide and the people to whom it 
could be provided. Aid included such things as insulation, apparel, 
furniture, appliances, and payment of utility bills and/or rent. Al-
though they did not involve themselves in actual house repair and re-
building, IDS worked closely with the Red Cross in this area, providing 
goods and services that the Red Cross could not provide. At the time of 
the survey, IDS anticipated being in operation in Paris until April or 
May of 1983 and expected to expend about $500,000 in aid to victims. 
By November 1, 1982, approximately 85% of the housing units that 
were goi ng to be rebu i 1 t or repa i red had been. Thus, recovery was well 
underway in Paris when data collection began. 
~~~~~~~~ Effects of the Disaster 
Del1!.~9..r:.aP'!:i..£~mpari sons ~~1:..~~_VJ...ct i ms 
The study sample was divided about equally between white and non-
white racial groups, with 49.2% (212) white victims and 50.8% (219) black 
victims. To assess differences between the two groups, seven character-
istics were compared: household income, occupation and education of the 
head of household, household size, household type, marital status of the 
respondent, and age of the respondent (see Appendix A, Tables 1-7 for a 
summary of this data). 
There were statistically significant differences between racial 
groups on all of the cha racteri st i cs exami ned except for age of the 
28 
respondent. The soc i oeconomi c vari ab 1 es--i ncome, occupat ion, and educa-
. tion--all showed black victims doing significantly poorer than white 
victims. The family variables--size, type, and marital status--produced 
more complex results. The major differences in household size appeared 
to be in the categories of two-person households and households with five 
or more members; 37.7% of white households and 20.5% of black households 
contained two persons. Conversely, 10.4% of white households and 25.1% 
of black households had five or more members. In light of this finding, 
it was not surprising to find that the majority of white households did 
not have young chi 1 dren present (61. 3%), wh il e the maj ority of black 
households were "childrearing" (37.9%) or "extended" (14.6%). At the 
time of the tornado, more white victims were married than black victims, 
while more black victims were single, separated, or widowed. There were 
no significant differences between racial groups in terms of respondent 
age, and in general, respondents were concentrated in the 30 to 59 age 
bracket. 
These data indicate that while socioeconomic resources were fewer 
for black households than for white households, black households had 
greater social and economic responsibilities; heads of households re-
ceived less social or economic support from spouses but supported more 
dependents. 
Disaster Impacts and Losses 
Damages to homes of respondents (renters and owners) were estimated 
by the respondents themselves (Appendix A, Tables 8-9). Typically the 
estimates were originally given to them by insurance adjustors, disaster 
personnel, or contractors. About one-half of each group reported struc-
tural damages of 50% or less. Slightly more white victims (37.7%) than 
black (33.3%) had their homes completely destroyed. 
However, in terms of dollar losses due to house damage, there were 
significant differences between racial groups, reflecting their different 
economic conditions; 36.5% of black respondents and 25.3% of white re-
spondents appeared in the lowest category «$5,000 damage). Seven per-
cent of black and 15.7% of white respondents reported losses in excess of 
$36,000. The average amount lost by black and white victims due to resi-
dential damage was $12,600 and $17,500 respectively. (These statistics 
are for owners only.) 
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One hundred thirty-two respondents rented apartments or houses. 
Almost half of the black victims were renters, the majority of whom lived 
in federally subsidized apartment units, whereas only 12.3% of the white 
victims lived in rental housing. 
Percentage of damage to home contents (furnishings, appliances, 
etc.) also showed some relation to racial group (Appendix A, Table 10). 
About 28% of the white victims, as opposed to 20% of the black victims, 
reported total loss of the contents of their homes. 
In terms of dollar losses to contents, again there were significant 
differences between racial groups, with white victims reporting greater 
losses than black victims (Appendix A, Table 11). Low to middle income 
families in both racial groups, but especially blacks, were more likely 
than persons in higher income groups to report high damage levels 
(Appendix A, Table 12). 
Vehicle losses were comparable to losses to house and contents. Of 
all victims interviewed, 29.2% had cars and other vehicles destroyed or 
damaged to the pOint that they could not be used. Comparatively, 37.3% 
of white victims and 22.2% of black victims lost at least one vehicle, 
and white victims lost a greater number of vehicles, with 12.2% of white 
victims and only 2.3% of black victims losing two or more vehicles. In 
terms of monetary loss, white victims had an average loss of $4,400 and 
black victims an average loss of $2,600. 
Respondents were also asked if they lost mementos or personal pos-
sessions that had high personal value. Of the entire sample, 42.7% re-
ported such 10sses--45.8% of white victims and 39.7% of black victims. 
Victims were also asked to subjectively compare their losses to those of 
victims around them. Among white respondents, 72% considered themselves 
better off, 17.1% about the same, and 10.9% worse off than other victims. 
Among bl ack respondents, 54.8% considered themsel ves better off, 27.9% 
about the same, and 17.4% worse off. Even though white victims experi-
enced greater losses in absolute amounts, it appears that black victims 
experienced a greater sense of deprivation. 
Severa 1 categori es were exami ned regardi ng personal i nj ury: deaths 
and injuries to co-resident family members; lnJuries to relatives, 
friends, and neighbors; deaths among primary group members; and the im-
pact of deaths on the emotional well-being of victim families. The 
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literature suggests that both injuries and deaths within the co-residen-
tial family and among relatives, friends, and neighbors tend to have 
negative psychosocial impacts on families (e.b., Bolin, 1984; Gleser et 
a 1., 1981). 
Approximately 21% of the population in the impact zone were injured, 
and of those injured, 18% required hospitalization. Eleven people were 
killed. A little over 12% of white households and 8% of black households 
had at least one family member injured, while only 1.9% of white house-
holds and 1.4% of black households had two or more members injured. 
There were two family members killed in the study sample, and both were 
from black households. 
Since Paris is a small and rather isolated community with a stable 
population, a large proportion of those sampled--about half--had close 
relatives, friends, and neighbors injured or killed in the storm. In 
comparing the number of injuries within primary group categories (Appen-
dix A, Table 13), it appears that differences between racial groups were 
only significant for the number of friends injured, with twice as many 
black victims as whites reporting injuries to friends. 
Although only 11 deaths resulted from the Pari s tornado, a 1 arge 
proportion of those sampled knew and felt close to those killed (Appendix 
A, Table 14), perhaps indicating the closeness of the community. As with 
the injury data, the only significant difference between racial groups 
was for reported loss of friends, significantly more blacks reporting 
such loss. 
In comparing the emotional effects of deaths across racial groups, 
there were no significant differences except for those who had relatives 
ki 11 ed (Appendi x A, Tabl e 1~). Among white vi ctims, those who had rela-
tives killed were less likely than those with no kin deaths to be com-
pletely recovered eight months after the disaster. Contrary to expecta-
tions, black victims showed no similar effect. It may be that in the 
black community, kin deaths foster communal support which in turn may 
facilitate higher recovery rates. On the other hand, white victims may 
be expected to deal with the loss of kin on a more individual basis, 
retarding the recovery process. 
Residential Dislocations 
In Paris, the tornado entered the city from the west, touching down 
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in older nei ghborhoods. I n genera 1, these nei ghborhoods were composed 
primarily of one-family, wood-frame houses. A large percentage of the 
residents were poor, working class families. Since the houses in the 
older neighborhoods were of a more fragile construction, many were 
leveled by the storm. A federally subsidized housing project, also lo-
cated on the west side of town, was hit by the tornado and heavily 
damaged. 
Moving eastward through the northern part of the city, the tornado 
next struck a mobile home park and a middle-class, suburban-type neigh-
borhood. The mobile home park was totally destroyed. Even though the 
houses in the middle class neighborhood were new and typically of brick 
const ruct ion, those in the storm I s direct path were dest royed. Many 
others had their roofs blown away, leaving them uninhabitable. The 
central business district and the south side of the city were not 
touched. The families with destroyed or uninhabitable homes had to find 
immediate emergency shelter and then longer-term temporary housing until 
their homes could be repaired of replaced, or new permanent housing could 
be found. 
Of those sampled, 65.7% had to make a least one residential change 
as a result of the tornado, and white families moved somewhat more often 
than black families. Of white families, 36.3% moved at least twice and 
30.2% moved three or more times prior to establishing a permanent resi-
dence. For black fami 1 i es, 37.9% moved at 1 east twi ce and 20.1% moved 
three or more times. When interviewing took place approximately eight 
months after the storm, 13.5% of the total sample--20% of the black re-
spondents and 7% of white--were still living in temporary housing. The 
relationships by race of several independent variables to the number of 
residential changes were also examined (Appendix A, Table 16). As expec-
ted, those victims experiencing high loss levels moved more often than 
those with moderate damage; at both hi gh and moderate damage 1 eve 1 s, 
white families moved more often than black families. Higher income seems 
to permit families to make more frequent moves to find satisfactory per-
manent housing; for both racial groups, victims with high income moved 
more frequently than those with lower incomes, although in lower income 
levels white families moved slightly more often than blacks. Age was 
also related to the number of residential changes, with young families of 
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both racial groups moving more frequently than older families; younger 
'white families moved more frequently than blacks in the same age cate-
gory. 
An emergency shelter was set up by the Red Cross in an elementary 
schoo 1 on the northeast side of the city, a lthough no one in the sample 
stayed overnight there. This failure to use the shelter may have been 
due to its 1 ocat i on and to the general reluctance of many vi ct i ms to use 
pub 1 i c shelters • Although the shelter was located in the mi dst of the 
middle-class neighborhood affected by the tornado, it was some distance 
from the older northwest neighborhood also damaged. In addition, since 
only part of the city was stricken, emergency shelter could be had at the 
homes of friend and relatives not involved in the disaster. Of the 284 
families who had to leave their homes, 69.7% went to the homes of rela-
tives for emergency shelter (with no significant differences between 
racial groups). In addition, 9.6% of white families and 13.0% of black 
families went to the homes of friends. Others, in both racial groups, 
went to motels, camped, stayed in recreational vehicles, or remained in 
their damaged homes until longer-term housing became available. 
For victims staying with relatives or friends, longer-term housing 
was often an extension of their temporary shelter arrangements. FEMA 
provided compensation for those who housed victims; each victim family 
(regardless of size) staying with relatives or friends was given $250 per 
month with which they could reimburse their hosts for expenses incurred 
during their stay. At the time of interviews, the exact number of victim 
families receiving this assistance was not available, but of those 
sampled, 242 families said that they stayed with relatives or friends at 
some time since the tornado. Among white victims, 57.5% stayed with 
relatives or friends, and 31.1% of those received compensation from FEMA 
for their stay. For black victims, 54.8% stayed with relatives or 
friends, and 50.8% of those received FEMA compensation. For victims 
staying with relatives and friends, 97.2% of whites and 85.1% of blacks 
were satisfied with the amount of aid they received. 
Other families utilized a variety of longer-term housing, such as 
mobile homes, apartments, rental houses, and purchased homes. In compar-
ing longer-term housing arrangements across racial groups, white victims 
purchased homes more frequently than blacks, while black victims tended 
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to rent more than whi tes. Accordi ng to FEMA reports, 391 famil i es were 
eligible for temporary housing assistance and 387 were actually assisted. 
Of these, 299 were placed in houses or apartments, 84 in mobile homes, 
and four in small travel trailers. Since city regulations did not allow 
mobile homes on private lots, two FEMA mobile home parks were established 
(see Bolin, 1982, for a discussion of a similar situation). One park was 
located on the east side of the city in a privately-owned mobile home 
park and the other in destroyed neighborhoods on the northwest side of 
the city. Of the 35 families in the sample that lived in FEMA mobile 
homes, 22.9% were white and 77.1% were black. 
The frequency of res i dent i a 1 changes may be expected to have emo-
tional/psychological effects on families, and several of these effects 
were examined (Appendix A, Table 17). Among white victims, the number of 
postdisaster moves was related to reduced leisure time, continued storm-
related upsets (distress and anxiety), and strained family relationships. 
Among black victims, the frequency of postdisaster moves did not effect 
leisure time, but did have a negative impact on family relationships and 
a particularly strong effect on persistent, continued storm-related up-
sets. In comparing the perceived disruptive effects of residential 
changes between racial groups (Appendix A, Table 18), it is clear that 
black victims felt that their residential changes were significantly more 
disruptive than did white victims. 
While much family disruption was due to housing changes in the pur-
suit of a permanent residence, another source of disruption was the con-
struction work involved in repairing damaged residences. Of those 
sampled, 239 families, or 55.5% said that they had to live in their homes 
while construction work was in progress. While a plurality of families 
found the repair work moderately disruptive, a large number found it ex-
tremely disruptive (Appendix A, Table 19) (differences due to racial 
groups were not significant). However, in comparing the disruption from 
repair work to that due to residential changes, it is clear that residen-
tial change had a much greater impact on families, particularly for 
blacks. 
Reported vi sitation patterns before the tornado and those eight 
months after the tornado were also studied (Appendix A, Table 20). They 
were approximately the same for both racial groups before the tornado, 
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and the tornado and the degree of damage it caused appears to have had no 
~ffect on visitation with kin, close friends, or neighbors. It should be 
noted that in general white respondents appeared to have larger available 
social support networks. For example, whites reported an average of 15 
close friends while blacks averaged nine. While both groups averaged the 
same number of close nei ghbors (four), whi tes had an average of ei ght 
close kin in town, while blacks had six. 
Economic Impacts 
Vi ctims were asked if thei r standard of 1 i vi ng had changed as a 
result of the tornado. In comparing racial groups (Appendix A, Table 
21), 20% more black families than white reported a drop in their standard 
of living. Understandably, when amount of damage was controlled, those 
in both racial groups with high damage levels were more likely than those 
with moderate damage to report a decl i ne, and a hi gher percentage of 
black victims than white victims at both damage levels reported a drop. 
The greatest difference between the racial groups was at the moderate 
damage levels, with almost four times as many blacks as whites reporting 
a decrease. 
Controlling for age of the respondent did not alter the fact that 
the tornado had greater economic impact on black families. A higher 
percentage of black victims than white in both aye categories indicated 
that their standard of living had gone down since the tornado. Although 
a greater percentage of older white victims than younger white victims 
reported such a drop, the difference was not large. A significantly 
greater percentage of young blacks than older blacks reported a drop in 
their standard of living. Thus, among all racial/age groups, it appears 
that the standard of living of young black families was most affected by 
the tornado. 
Respondents were also asked if their economic condition had changed 
since the tornado. Responses show a similar pattern of differences be-
tween racial groups as those regarding the standard of living. Of white 
families, 65.6% felt that their economic situation had returned to its 
pre-storm condition, and 34.4% either weren't sure or said it had 
worsened. By contrast, 49.3% of black families felt that their economic 
condition was the same as before the storm and 50.7% said they were worse 
off. 
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An economic condition that may affect families after a disaster is 
inflation in prices, caused in part by the strong demand put on goods and 
services and in part by exploitation by some businesses. To examine this 
effect, respondents were asked if increased pri ces had affected thei r 
financial recovery from the storm (Appendix A, Table 22). Here again 
black families felt a greater economic impact than white families; almost 
23% more black families felt that their financial recovery had been 
impaired due to rising prices. In addition, using an indicator of in-
creased costs of living, 26.6% more black families than white reported 
that since the tornado, their living expenses had risen. Significantly 
more black families than white also reported an increase in the cost of 
thei r hous i ng, although changes in 1 i vi ng expenses appear to have had 
greater impact on black families than the housing costs. 
Since most industries in Paris are located on its perimeters and the 
central business district was not in the tornado's path, business activi-
ties were not severely disrupted for any length of time. Correspondingly 
most respondents in Paris did not report unemployment due to the storm's 
impact on business. While some victims found themselves forced into 
unemployment after the disaster, others obtained new or additional jobs 
to help cover losses that were not covered by aid and insurance. In 
Paris, the percentage of families getting new or additional jobs was 
small, perhaps due to the recession during the aftermath of the tornado 
and lack of extra job opportunities. 
Impa~~~l..amily~~c_tJ..~~9. 
Disasters may have positive as well as negative effects on family 
relationships and functioning. Families may gain strength from confront-
ing the external challenge; however, they may .also be weakened by the 
constant stress and tension created by a disaster, particularly if the 
family was only weakly bonded prior to the event (Drabek and Key, 1984). 
In addition, the task of restoring losses and damaged property is time 
consuming and can result in less time available for family recreational 
and emotional needs. Several indicators were used to assess family dis-
ruption. These included self-reports of "upsets" with storm related 
events, feelings of pressure due to time constraints, lack of patience 
with others, and strains in family relationships (Appendix A, Table 23). 
At the time of the survey, a clear majority of all respondents, 
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61.3%, were still feeling family disruptions due to the storm; moreover, 
·significantly more black than white families reported continuing "up_ 
sets." Another stress examined was the feeling of temporal pressure to 
"get things back to normal". Again, more black than white victims felt 
this pressure (49.7% versus 45.3%), although the difference between 
racial groups was not as great as with storm-related upsets. Similarly, 
black victims were more likely to report impatience with other family 
members due to overwork caused by the disaster (42.9% versus 32.1%). 
When asked to assess general strains on family relationships caused 
by the tornado, 15.7% more black than white families indicated such 
strains. This effect was further analyzed by damage level and age of 
victim (Appendix A, Table 24). Strained family relationships were clear-
ly related to damage levels for white families, but only slightly related 
for black families. When the effect of age was examined, more black 
families in all age groups reported such strain; and in both racial 
groups, significantly more young than elderly families experienced this 
effect. Other research has simil arly reveal ed that elderly vi ctims seem 
less likely to experience psychosocial disturbances than others (see, for 
example, Kilijanek and Drabek, 1979; Bolin and Klenow, 1983). Thus, 
overall, it is clear that more black than white families were negatively 
affected by the disaster. 
However, if disasters disrupt family relationships, they may also 
have positive effects. Three indicators of possible positive changes 
were examined: perception of strengthened family ties, value changes 
regarding material possessions, and happiness levels (Appendix A, Table 
23. 
When victims were asked if they thought "family ties were strength-
ened" by the disaster, most responded affi rmatively. Similarly, there 
was a feeling that material possessions had become less important as the 
value of personal relationships had been highlighted by the crisis. 
These first two indicators of family strength are embedded in the tradi-
tional American ideology that families should pull together in times of 
need and that "people" should be more important than "things." When 
asked if levels of family happiness had changed since the tornado, a 
minority of white families (24.7%) and a significantly smaller percentage 
of black families (19.6%) said they found family life happier. 
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It appears that the experience of the tornado did have some positive 
impacts, although they were not as pervasive and significant as the nega-
tive ones. In comparing racial groups, it also appears that more black 
than white families were affected negatively, reinforcing the pattern of 
greater victimization of blacks. 
Another impact on families is the disruption of daily routines, in-
cluding loss of leisure time, loss of and change in recreational activi-
ties, and loss and disruption of time due to injuries and psychosocial 
problems (Trainer and Bolin, 1976). As might be expected, 14.9% more 
black than white families experienced such changes in family routines 
(Appendix A, Table 25). When damage levels were controlled, moderate 
damage level families in both racial groups were more likely to have 
reported disruptions than those who experienced higher damage. However, 
the percentage difference was substantially greater for white than black 
families. Among white victims, there was little difference in family 
disruption between age groups; all black age groups reported a higher 
percentage of family disruption than the corresponding white groups, and 
younger black families experienced significantly more disruption than 
older ones. 
Satisfaction with housing is important to family stability and well-
being. Overcrowding in a new living space, displacement from a familiar 
neighborhood, grief over a lost home, and displeasure with new or tempor-
ary housing may cause family tension and conflict. Respondents were 
asked to compare their current housing with pre-tornado housing (Appendix 
A, Table 26). A majority of respondents agreed that their current 
housing was as nice as that before the tornado. However, 13.9% more 
white than black families said they were satisfied with that housing. A 
much smaller percentage (approximately one-third) of both racial groups 
felt that their current housing was better built or safer than their pre-
tornado housing, with slightly more white than black families satisfied. 
Finally, more black than white victims (6.8%) believed that their cur-
rent housing situation was making it difficult to recover. Again in the 
area of housing, it appears that more black than white families were 
negatively impacted by the disaster. Black families were less likely to 
be satisfied with postdisaster housing in comparison to pre-tornado 
housing, less satisfied with housing comfort, less satisfied with its 
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construction and safety, and more likely to feel that housing was a 
hindrance to their recovery. 
The neighborhood is another social context whose disruption may 
affect the emotional well-being of family members. In Paris, several 
entire neighborhoods were disrupted by the disaster. Homes and churches 
were destroyed, and many families were forced to relocate. In addition, 
those families who remained or were able to return to their neighborhoods 
were faced with extensive, disruptive construction and cleanup. Victims 
were asked if this disruption was an impediment to their recovery (Appen-
dix A, Table 27), and the majority indicated it was. When racial groups 
were compared, 19.1% more blacks than whites said they felt this effect. 
When victims were asked to compare the general aesthetics of their pre 
and postdisaster neighborhoods, the majority were not satisfied with the 
change--the differences between racial groups being particularly large; 
thirty-one percent more black than white families felt that current 
nei ghborhoods were not as pl easant as thei r predi saster nei ghborhoods. 
Among blacks, 74% with high damage and 76% with moderate damage found 
their present neighborhood environment less pleasant. There were no 
significant differences in neighborhood satisfaction between age groups 
for either racial group. Again, black families were found on all 
measures to be more severely affected by neighborhood disruption than 
white famil i es. 
Psychosoci al Impacts 
As already demonstrated, disasters can create stress and anxiety in 
residents not directly affected as well as actual victims. Anxieties may 
range from nervousness duri ng i ncl ement weather to deep-rooted phobi as 
affecting sleep and dreams (see, for example, Gleser et al., 1981). When 
respondents were asked if they became nervous with the approach of storm 
clouds, an overwhelming majority (87.7%) said that they did (Appendix A, 
Table 28) with virtually no difference between racial groups. When 
damage levels, age, and family size were considered, the difference 
between black and white families remained minimal (Appendix A, Table 29). 
As may be expected, victims with high damage more often reported nervous-
ness in stormy weather than those with moderate damage; however, the 
percentage difference was slight, particularly among black victims. 
Younger victims also reported a greater incidence of this kind of anxie-
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ty. While the percentage difference among whites was negligible, 9.7% 
more younger blacks than older reported feeling nervous in stormy 
weather. Family size was an additional factor correlating with this 
nervousness; slightly more large than small families were emotionally 
affected by stormy weather. 
Although a large number of respondents reported nervousness, smaller 
percentages were affected by their disaster experiences to the point that 
they experienced bad dreams (35.6%) or sleep disturbances (54.6%). The 
differences between racial groups were small with slightly more blacks 
experiencing these more severe effects. 
To explore the causes of these more severe effects, withi n each 
racial group a number of variables were considered: damage level, age 
group, family size, knowing others killed or injured, having relatives 
injured, having relatives killed, having friends injured, having friends 
killed, having neighbors injured, and having neighbors killed. Overall, 
the differences between racial groups were slight. Among black victims, 
X2 tests of the va ri ab 1 es ment i oned above i ndi cated that several were 
significantly related to experiencing bad dreams: knowing others killed 
or injured; having friends killed; and having neighbors injured. Among 
white victims, factors significantly related to experiencing bad dreams 
were: having high damage levels; being a younger rather than older 
victim; belonging to a larger family; knowing others killed or injured; 
and having neighbors killed. Thus, the only variable related to bad 
dreams common to both racial groups was knowing others killed or injured. 
The incidence of bad dreams among black victims was associated only with 
deaths and injuries of persons who they knew; whereas those of white 
victims were also associated with several demographic factors. 
Several variables were significantly related to sleeplessness among 
black victims: knowing others killed or injured; having friends killed; 
and having neighbors who were injured (the same variables related to bad 
dreams). Among whites the significant variables were: knowing others 
killed or injured; and having neighbors killed. 
Those surveyed were asked to assess the extent to which their chil-
dren had been affected emotionally by the storm (Appendix A, Table 28). 
Most parents agreed (with no significant difference between racial 
groups) that their children were afraid to be away from their parents 
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during stormy weather and that they were nervous in stormy weather. In 
comparing these results with the respondents' self-reports of nervousness 
in stormy weather, there was a slightly higher proportion of parents who 
thought that their children were adversely affected by the disaster than 
there were adults who viewed themselves as affected, possibly demonstra-
ting the added vulnerability of children to such stressors. 
A number of variables possibly related to separation anxiety and 
nervousness in children were examined. Among black victims, separation 
anxiety was positively related to family size, knowing others killed or 
injured, and having a friend killed. Among white victims, the only fac-
tor significantly associated with separation anxiety in children was 
family size. 
In order to determine and compare feelinys of fatalism, a four-
question index was used (Appendix A, Table 30). Three of the items deal 
directly with persons' feelings about fate, and one item, the balancing 
of bad and good, was used as an indicator of optimism. 
In general, black victims were more fatalistic than white victims; 
differences between racial groups were significant for all but the first 
item on the scale. Although these findings support those in other sec-
tions, it is not possible to determine if such feelings can be attribut-
able solely to the tornado experience, because no data assessing levels 
of fatalism were gathered prior to the tornado. It is possible that 
blacks as a group are more fatalistic than whites, irrespective of dis-
aster experiences. 
To further explore levels of fatalism, damage levels were taken into 
account (Appendix A, Table 31). It was expected that victims incurring 
greater losses would exhibit higher levels of fatalism. While true for 
white victims, this relationship did not hold for black victims, but in-
stead ran cont ra ry to expect at ions. Mode rate-damage blacks had hi gher 
fatalism scores than those with greater losses. However, high-loss 
blacks expressed significantly lower levels of optimism. 
Findings: Aid Utilization and Recovery 
A large number of aid programs and services were available to vic-
tims in Paris, including several from national agencies and organizations 
(e.g., FEMA, SBA, Red Cross), and others from the state, local churches, 
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and local civic organizations. The following discussion is limited to 
major, widely available programs. Some programs and aid sources were 
used by so few respondents that sample sizes precluded meaningful analy-
ses. 
The federal government provi ded several servi ces to vi ct ims of the 
tornado, such as a Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) to aid victims in 
applying for available relief programs, Small Business Administration 
loans, Farmers Home Administration loans, Internal Revenue Service assis-
tance, and temporary housing provided by FEMA. Most of these services 
and coordination with other helping agencies were administered through 
the Denton, Texas, office of FEMA. 
The FEMA office in Paris provided temporary housing services and 
took applications for assistance programs after the DAC was closed. The 
temporary housing took several forms: subsidized rental homes and apart-
ments, rent-free mobile homes, and financial compensation to families and 
friends housing disaster victims. Because of this compensation" and be-
cause a sufficient number of rental properties were available in Paris, 
only 88 mobile homes were needed as temporary housing. Of those victims 
interviewed, only 35 utilized these mobile homes. Although FEMA spon-
sored the Individual and Family Grant Program (IFG), the program was ad-
mi ni stered by the Texas Department of Human Resources whi ch shared the 
cost. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers aided in debris removal 
so that rebuilding could be promptly started on family home sites, and 
the Air Force provided services in rebuilding and repairing homes. 
The most wi dely used program admi ni stered by the state was the 
previously mentioned Individual and Family Grant Program (IFG). IFG 
provided grants up to $5,000 to victims who had exhausted all other re-
sources and been turned down for an SBA loan. Although some victims were 
below the poverty line even before their tornado losses, the IFG was in 
tended to cover only expenses incurred as a result of the disaster. The 
State of Texas provided several other forms of assistance. For example, 
the Texas Employment Commission helped process unemployment claim for 
those who were out of work due to the di saster, and the Department of 
Human Resources provided food stamps. 
Four major national volunteer organizations were present in Paris: 
the Ameri can Red Cross, the Mennonite Di saster Servi ce, the Chri st ian 
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Public Service, and the Salvation Army. The Red Cross provided a number 
of forms of ass i stance in Pari sand, among survey respondent s, was the 
most widely used aid source. Duri ng its emergency phase, the Red Cross 
set up a total of fi ve she 1 ters to provi de food and she lte r and ass i st 
with applications for aid. It provided direct assistance to families in 
the form of credit grants with merchants for necessities such as 
clothing, beds, shoes, eating and cooking utensils, and rent; and it 
administered mobile and fixed food services for victims and volunteers. 
As mentioned, the Red Cross found it necessary to enter an Addition-
al Assistance Phase, during which it provided assistance for medical 
bills, home furnishings, appliances, prescriptions, and other supplies. 
It also provided coordination and some funding of materials for home 
repair and rebuilding; construction crews were provided by Mennonite 
Di saster Servi ces and Chri st i an Pub 1 i c Servi ce. In addit ion, the Red 
Cross coordinated services and funds of other church groups and local 
civic organizations. 
Under the auspices of Church World Services, Interfaith Disaster 
Services (IDS) was incorporated in May with funding coming from Church 
World Services and local churches. IDS provided a variety of services 
including the payment of back taxes, payment of delinquent utility bills, 
rent deposits, clothing, furniture, appliances, building materials, food, 
and trees. IDS worked closely with the Red Cross to provide materials 
and furnishings for rebuilding and repair that the Red Cross could not 
provide. The goal of IDS was to take care of those with needs that did 
not qualify for other aid, or those who might have otherwise "fallen 
through cracks." 
As far as could be determined, no crisis counseling programs were 
available in Paris, although it appears that crisis counseling was 
probably an area of great need. Of all those interviewed, 60.1% felt 
that they had experienced emotional strain due to the storm, and of 
these, only 13.1%, or 35 victims received any kind of counseling or 
emotional help. Of the 35 victims who did receive counseling, the 
majority (24 victims) received their counseling from a professional--a 
counselor, a doctor, or a social worker. When the need for counseling 
was compared between racial groups, significantly more white than black 
victims indicated that they had experienced emotional strain. However, 
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both racial groups were equally as likely to actually receive counseling. 
Victims of both racial groups were most likely to go to a professional 
for counseling. Only small percentages went to the clergy or to others. 
Federal Aid 
Two primary federal agencies, FEMA and SBA, were studied. Al-
though FEMA offered a range of services and programs to municipal govern-
ments and related organizations, our focus is on programs available to 
individual families--temporary housing, mobile homes, and compensation to 
family and friends housing victims. Table III-1 presents data on aid 
program user characteristics for each racial group. 
Only a small percentage of the respondents utilized federal aid; 
17.4% used FEMA and 4.4% used SBA. In comparing racial groups, differ-
ences in utilization rates of SBA were minimal; however, significantly 
more black than white families used FEMA aid. Although blacks were as 
likely as whites to obtain SBA loans, the average loan amount to whites 
($19,430) was much higher than that to blacks ($9,400). Still, very few 
persons from either group utilized these loans, most likely reflecting 
the relatively low incomes of respondents, the large number of respon-
dents on fixed incomes and public assistance, and the large number of 
renters (the first two factors make it difficult to qualify for loans.) 
Within both racial groups, significantly more younger than c:Jer 
families utilized FEMA and SBA aid. In addition, more large families 
utilized aid than did small families, although differences were slight. 
For example, for temporary housing, large families were more likely than 
smaller ones to seek help from FEMA rather than to stay with family or 
friends. Thus, in the main, this greater utilization of aid probably 
reflects the greater recovery needs of young and/or large families. 
Utilization of federal aid was cross-tabulated with income, educa-
tion, and occupational status, to assess the influence of socioeconomic 
factors on utilization patterns. Families with moderate incomes in both 
racial groups were somewhat more likely to use FEMA as an aid source than 
were those with high incomes, poss i b 1 y because they had fewe r persona 1 
resou rces to cont ri bute to thei r own recove ry. Among wh i te fami 1 i es, 
those with lower incomes were more likely to get SBA loans, whereas the 
opposite pattern occurs among black families where significantly more 
high income blacks got SBA loans. This difference between racial groups 
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TABLE III-l 
RECIPIENTS OF FEDERAL AID 
THOSE WHO USED: 
FEDERAL AID (FEMA) SBA 
WHITE VI CTIMS 12.7% (27) 4.7% (10) 
n = 212 
BLACK VICTIMS n = 219 21. 9% (48) 4.1% ( 9) 
WHITE VICTIMS 
Under 60 years of age 
n = 131 16.0% (21) 7.6% (10) 
60 Years and Older 
n = 81 7.4% ( 6) 0.0% ( 0) 
BLACK VI CTIMS 
Under 60 years of age 
n = 136 23.5% (32) 5.9% ( 8) 
60 Years and Older 
n = 83 19.3% (16 ) 1. 2% ( 1) 
WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
3 Persons or Less 
n = 158 10.8% (17) 3.8% ( 6) 
4 or More Persons 
n = 54 18.5% ( 10) 7.4% ( 4) 
BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
3 Persons or Less 
n = 133 20.3% (27) 3.0% ( 4) 
4 or More Persons 
n = 86 24.4% (21) 5.8% ( 5) 
WHITE INCOME* 
Moderate Income 
n = 150 15.3% (23) 6.0% ( 9) 
High Income 
n = 62 6.5% ( 4) 1.6% ( 1) 
BLACK INCOME* 
Moderate Income 
n = 209 23.0% (48) 2.9% ( 6) 
High Income 
n = 10 0.0% ( 0) 30.0% ( 3) 
* Income has been categorized as Moderate Income = $0 - 1,299 per 
month and High Income equal to $1,300 per month or higher. 
WHITE VICTIMS: EDUCATION 
12 Yrs. of School or Less 
n = 148 13.5% (20) 4.7% ( 7) 
More than 12 Yrs. of Educ. 
n = 62 11.3% ( 7) 4.8% ( 3) 
BLACK VICTIMS: EDUCATION 
12 Yrs. of School or Less 
n = 190 22.6% (43) 3.2% ( 6) 
More than 12 Yrs. of Educ. 
n = 28 17. 9% ( 5) 10.7% ( 3) 
TABLE 111-1 (Continued) 
THOSE WHO USED: 
FEDERAL AID (FEMA) SBA 
WHITE EMPLOYMENT 
White Collar Worker 
n = 84 8.3% (7) 2.4% ( 2) 
Blue Collar Worker 
n = 116 15.5% (18 ) 6.9% ( 8) 
BLACK EMPLOYMENT 
White Collar Worker 
n = 14 28.6% ( 4) 7.1% ( 1) 
Blue Collar Worker 
n = 170 19.4% (33) 4.7% ( 8) 
WHITE DAMAGE LEVELS* 
Moderate Damage 
n = 132 6.1% ( 8) 0.8% (1) 
High Damage 
n = 80 23.8% (19) 11.3% ( 9) 
BLACK DAMAGE LEVELS* 
Moderate Damage 
n = 146 8.9% (13) 3.4% ( 5) 
High Damage 
n = 73 47.9% (35) 5.5% ( 4) 
* Damage Levels are catagorized as Moderate Damage equal to 0 - 79% 
damage to house and High Damage as more than 80%. 
WHITE VICTIMS: 
DOLLAR LOSSES 
Moderate Losses to House 
(Under $20,000) 
n = 113 10.6% (12) 2.7% ( 3) 
Heavy Losses to House 
($20,000+) 
n = 65 15.4% (10) 9.2% ( 6) 
BLACK VICTIMS: 
DOLLAR LOSSES 
Moderate Losses to House 
(Under $20,000) 
n = 86 11. 6% (10) 1. 2% ( 1) 
Heavy Losses to House 
($20,000+) 
n = 29 24.1% (7) 13.8% ( 4) 
may be due to the relatively large number of black respondents on fixed 
incomes and/or living in rental property. 
Education levels appear to have no significant relationship to 
federal aid utilization in either racial group. However, families with 
heads of household having 12 years of education or less in both racial 
groups were more likely to use FEMA than those with more education, and 
among blacks, those with more than 12 years of education were slightly 
more likely to receive an SBA loan than those with less education. 
As with education levels, occupational status appears to have had no 
significant effect on federal aid utilization in either racial group. 
Among white families, those with blue collar heads of household received 
FEMA and SBA aid more often than those with white collar heads of house-
hold. The opposite pattern held for black families. 
Two independent measures, percent of damage to home and dollar loss 
to home, were used to examine the effects of loss levels on aid receipt. 
Consistently, both black and white families with high levels of loss were 
more likely to use both types of federal aid than those with lower 
losses. As would be expected, those with higher losses were more likely 
to exhaust personal resources in recovery and then to turn to formal 
organizations for additional aid. 
In reviewing the demographic, socioeconomic, and disaster loss 
characteristics in patterns of federal aid utilization, it appears that 
the factor that has the best predictive validity among both racial groups 
is disaster loss levels. Further, among specific characteristics, re-
spondent age among white families appears to have good predictive value 
for the use of federal aid, with young white families more likely to use 
both types of aid. 
Although the use of FEMA mobile homes was discussed previously, 
additional information is pertinent at this point. Of the 35 families 
living in FEMA mobile homes, 22.9% were white and 77.1% were black. 
There were two FEMA mobile home courts. A large court was located in the 
destroyed black neighborhood, and a smaller one was located in a 
destroyed commercial mobile home park at the perimeter of the city. 
Black families were much more likely to live in FEMA trailer courts than 
to have their FEMA mobile home located on a private lot; 62.5% of white 
families compared to 92.6% of black families lived in such courts. Amon9 
47 
white families, only 20% of those living in FEMA courts lived near their 
former homes, while 65.4% of black families did so. The majority of 
respondents in -both racial groups living in FEMA mobile home courts (60% 
of whites and 85% of blacks) felt that the courts were less pleasant than 
their old neighborhoods. For both racial groups, most respondents felt 
that the trailer application form was not difficult to fill out, that the 
wait to actually get the trailer was reasonable, and that no extra or 
unanticipated expenses were incurred. When asked to assess the dis-
ruption to family life caused by being temporarily housed in FEMA 
trailers, 75% of both groups reported that it was very disruptive. 
Victims who received federal aid (FEMA and/or SBA) were asked to 
rate the importance of those aid programs in their economic and emotional 
recovery. Due to the small number of SBA loan recipients among respon-
dents, both aid sources are combined in the following discussion (Table 
1II-2). In all, 53.5%, of the victims receiving federal aid rated aid 
programs very important in their economic recovery, and 40.7% rated them 
important in their emotional recovery. When racial groups were compared, 
differences between groups were not significant, although a slightly 
higher percentage of white than black victims rated aid programs as 
important. 
Other Ai~ Programs 
The utilization of aid from the Red Cross, the Texas Department of 
Human Resources, Interfaith Disaster Services (IDS), and from other mis-
cellaneous sources such as employee, civic, and charitable organizations 
(Lions, Elks, etc.) was examined and compared between racial groups 
(Table 1II-3). 
Of these aid sources, the most widely used was the Red Cross; over 
half of the respondents said that they had received aid from that organi-
zation. Significantly more black than white families had received such 
aid, and it was found that younger and/or larger families in both racial 
groups were also more apt to use the Red Cross. 
Approximately 25% of the respondents recei ved an Individual and 
Family Grant from the Texas Department of Human Resources, with signifi-
cantly more black than white recipients. However, the average grant to 
black families ($2,294) was considerably smaller than that to white 
families ($3,462). The higher recipient rate among blacks reflects their 
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TABLE III-2 
VICTIM ASSESSMENT OF AID IMPORTANCE FOR FAMILY RECOVERY 
FEDERAL AID RECIPIENTS 
VICTIMS n = 86 
WHITE VICTIMS n = 33 
BLACK VICTIMS n = 53 
VICTIMS n = 86 
WHITE VICTIMS n = 33 
BLACK VICTIMS n = 53 
OTHER AID RECIPIENTS 
VICTIMS n = 256 
WHITE VICTIMS n = 108 
BLACK VICTIMS n = 148 
VICTIMS n = 256 
WHITE VICTIMS n = 108 
BLACK VICTIMS n = 148 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
NOT IMPORTANT TO 
MODERATELY IMPORTANT 
VERY 
IMPORTANT 
46.5% (40) 
42.4% (14) 
53.5% (46) 
57.6% (19) 
49.1% (26) 50.9% (27) 
X2 = 0.14 
Si9. = .706 
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 
NOT IMPORTANT TO VERY 
MODERATELY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
59.3% 
57.6% 
60.4% 
(51) 40.7% 
(19) 42.4% 
(32) 39.6% 
X2 = 0.0 
Sig. = .975 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
(35) 
(14) 
(21) 
NOT IMPORTANT TO VERY 
MODERATELY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
56.6% (145) 43.4% (111) 
52.8% ( 57) 47.2% ( 51) 
59.5% (88) 40.5% ( 60) 
X2 = 0.88 
Si9. = .348 
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 
NOT IMPORTANT TO VERY 
MODERATELY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
59.0% (151) 41.0% (105) 
56.5% ( 61) 43.5% ( 47) 
60.8% ( 90) 39.2% ( 58) 
X2 = 0.32 
Si g. = .571 
TABLE II 1-3 
RECIPIENTS OF NONFEDERAL AID 
Percent Who Received Aid 
LOCAL CIVIC*** 
RED CROSS IFG* I NTERFAITH** ORGANIZATION 
WHITE VICTIMS 45.3% ( 96) 17.0% (36) 19.3% (41) 37 .3% (79) 
BLACK VICTIMS 59.4% (130) 32.9% (72) 37.9% (83) 35.6% (78) 
WHITE VICTIMS: AGE 
<60 Yrs. n = 131 48.1% ( 63) 13.7% (18) 19.1% (25) 38.9% ( 51) 
~60 Yrs. n = 81 40.7% ( 33) 22.2% (18) 19.8% (16) 34.6% ( 28) 
BLACK VICTIMS: A6t 
<60 Yrs. n = 136 63.2% 86) 33.8% (46) 41.2% ( 56) 39.7% (54) 
~60 Yrs. n = 83 53.0% 44) 31.3% (26) 32.5% (27) 28.9% (24) 
WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
~3 pers n = 158 42.4% 67) 16.5% (26) 17.1% (27) 33.5% (53) 
~4 pers n = 54 53.7% ( 29) 18.5% (10) 25.9% (14) 48.1% (26) 
BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
~3 pers n = 133 54.1% 72) 29.3% (39) 34.6% (46) 31.6% (42) 
~4 pers n = 86 67.4% 58) 38.4% (33) 43.0% ( 37) 41.9% (36) 
WHITE VICTIMS: INCOME 
Moderate n = 150 52.7% 79) 22.7% (34) 23.3% (35) 40.7% (61) 
High n = 62 27 .4% 17) 3.2% ( 2) 9.7% ( 6) 20.0% (18) 
BLACK VICTIMS: INCOME 
Moderate n = 209 60.3% (126 ) 34.4% (72) 38.3% (80) 35.4% (74) 
High n = 10 40.0% ( 4) 0.0% ( 0) 30.0% ( 3) 40.0% ( 4) 
WHITE VICTIMS: EDUCATION 
High School Grad 
or Less n = 148 48.0% ( 71) 21.6% (32) 21.6% (32) 38.5% ( 57) 
College+ n = 62 40.3%( 25) 6.5% ( 4) 14.5% ( 9) 38.5% (22) 
BLACK VICTIMS: EDUCATION 
High School Grad 
or Less n = 190 58.4% ( 111) 32.6% (62) 37.4% (71 ) 34.2% (65) 
College+ n = 28 64.3% ( 18) 32.1% ( 9) 42.9% (12) 46.4% ( 13) 
(continued) 
TABLE 111-3 (Continued) 
RED CROSS 
WHITE VICTIMS: EMPLOYMENT 
White Collar 
n = 84 34.5% ( 29) 
Blue Collar 
n = 116 51.7% ( 60) 
BLACK VICTIMS: EMPLOYMENT 
White Collar 
n = 14 57.1%( 8) 
Blue Collar 
n = 170 58.8% (100) 
WHITE VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Moderate n = 132 28.0% 37) 
High n = 80 73.8% ( 59) 
BLACK VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Moderate n = 132 50.0% ( 66) 
High n = 73 78.1% ( 57) 
WHITE VICTIMS: LOSS IN DOLLARS 
<$20,000 n = 113 35.4% ( 40) 
t$20,000 n = 65 56.9% ( 37) 
BLACK VICTIMS: LOSS IN DOLLARS 
<$20,000 n = 86 44.2% (38) 
t$20,000 n = 29 65.5% (19) 
*Individual Family Grants 
**Interfaith Disaster Services 
Percent Who Received Aid 
IFG* INTERFAITH** 
3.6% ( 3) 6.0% ( 5) 
24.1% (28) 30.2% (35) 
35.7% ( 5) 21.4% ( 3) 
28.2% (48) 37.1% (63) 
9.1% (12) 11.4% (15) 
30.0% (24) 32.5% (26) 
24.0% (32) 31.4% (42) 
50.7% (37) 50.7% ( 37) 
17.7% (20) 19.5% (22) 
13.8% ( 9) 20.0% (13) 
20.9% (18) 30.2% (26) 
34.5% (10) 48.3% (14) 
***Church, Civic, and Miscellaneous Organizations 
LOCAL CIVIC*** 
ORGANIZATION 
31.0% (26) 
41.4% (48) 
15.7% ( 5) 
32.9% (56) 
25.0% (33) 
57.5% (46) 
28.8% (38) 
49.3% (36) 
24.8% (28) 
53.8% (35) 
19.8% (17) 
58.6% ( 17) 
lower socioeconomic status and their lack of personal resources. 
Of all respondents, 28.8% used Interfaith Disaster Services as an 
aid source, again with significantly greater utilization by black 
families. 
Aid from the mi scellaneous sources was the second most frequently 
used; 36.4% of all respondents reported receiving aid from their employ-
ers or local civic organizations. Unlike the utilization of other aid, 
there were no significant differences between racial groups in the re-
ceipt of local aid. However, large families appeared to be more likely 
to receive local aid than did smaller ones. 
Overall, the most consistent demographic characteristic associated 
with the use of these aid sources was race, with black families signifi-
cantly more likely to use most nonfederal aid sources. Additionally, 
among blacks, large family size was associated with increased utilization 
of the Red Cross, and among whites large family size was similarly asso-
ciated with the use of local aid. 
For all the aid sources considered here, recipients were most likely 
to be middle income, "blue collar" workers. Associations between socio-
economic status and aid were significant for white families for all 
sources except 1 oca 1 aid, and the same general pattern occurred among 
black victims, although associations generally were not statistically 
significant. (This may be due in part to the very small number of high 
income, "white collar" blacks in the sample. Caution should be used in 
interpreting the findings for blacks because of this small number.) 
The association between the educational background of the head of 
household and aid source use is more complex. Among white families, 
those with a high school education or less were more likely to use all 
four aid sources than those with more education. In contrast, among 
blacks, slightly more families with some college used these aid sources 
than those with lower levels of education. 
As with federal aid, families in both racial groups with high damage 
levels were significantly more likely to use state and local aid than 
those with moderate damage. Indeed, severe damage appears to be one of 
the most consistent indicators of probable use of nonfederal aid. When 
damage was estimated in dollar amounts, two associations were significant 
for both racial groups: high dollar losses and the use of both Red Cross 
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and local aid. 
In addition to the Individual and Family Grant Program, the State of 
Texas administered a food stamp program for victims. Of the respondents, 
22.5% received food stamps through this program. There were no signifi-
cant differences between racial groups in receiving this aid, although a 
slightly higher percentage of black families (26%) than white families 
(18.9%) received food stamps. 
Although Mennonite construction aid was widely used by respondents 
(9.5% of the total respondents received Mennonite aid), this aid was of 
considerable importance to poor and older families who did not have the 
financial resources to repair and rebuild their homes otherwise. Among 
whites, 12.3% said they utilized Mennonite labor, while 6.8% of the black 
respondents did so. 
Because three times as many respondents used these four aid sources 
as used federal programs, they were important to victim recovery in 
Paris. Since so few of the respondents obtained SI3A loans (particularly 
the poor and elderly families) many had to rely on aid from nonfederal 
programs in the repair and rebuilding of homes. In addition to major 
repairs and rebuilding, these particular aid sources provided living 
necessities during and after the emergency period, including food, 
clothing, and household items. The provision of such necessities may 
have facilitated long-term recovery by helping to alleviate a sense of 
extreme deprivation which sometimes occur with sudden and heavy losses. 
As with federal aid recipients, recipients of aid from nonfederal 
sources rated the importance of those aid programs in their economic and 
emot i ona 1 recovery. These data are presented in Table I I I -2. Some 43% 
of nonfederal aid recipients rated those aid programs as very important 
in their economic recovery. The difference between racial groups was not 
large, although slightly more white than black families considered them 
very important. A similar pattern occurred with regard to emotional 
recovery, with aid programs being less important to emotional than 
economic recovery. 
In comparing the responses of federal aid recipients with those of 
nonfedera 1 aid, it appea rs that federa 1 aid rec i p i ents rated those p ro-
grams more important in their economic recovery than did other aid re-
cipients. However, with respect to emotional recovery both federal 
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nonfedera1 aid recipients rated aid programs about equally. 
Respondents were asked about the ways that they found out about the 
available disaster aid programs in Paris. Of the 422 respondents who did 
receive information, the most frequently mentioned source of information 
was word of mouth. Approximately 70% of all respondents received in-
format ion in such a manner. The second most often used source of i n-
formation was from the newspapers which 44% of the respondents used. 
There are clear differences between racial groups in the sources of 
aid information. Black families were Significantly more likely than 
white families to learn about aid programs from the disaster assistance 
center and from word of mouth. Among black families, 32.5% learned about 
the aid programs at the DACs, while 21.0% of white families learned about 
them in this way. Since victims from both racial groups were equally as 
likely to go to the DACs, the DACs seem to have been an especially impor-
tant source of information about aid programs for black families. Of the 
black families, 73% received aid program information by word of mouth, 
while 61% white families did likewise. 
White families were significantly more likely than black families to 
learn about aid programs from the media. About 38% of white families and 
21% of black families received their information from television or 
radio. Similarly, about 52% of white families and 41.5% of black 
famil i es reported readi ng about aid programs in the newspapers. On 1y 
sma 11 numbers of respondents used i nformat i on sou rces such as posters, 
clergy, disaster volunteers, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and local 
civic organizations. The differences between racial groups in the use of 
these information sources were minimal. 
Insurance 
For those vi ct i ms who owned thei r own homes, insurance played a 
major role in recouping economic losses suffered in the disaster. Since 
few victims utilized SBA loans, IFG, or other aid sources in the repair 
and rebuilding of their homes, reconstruction in Paris was primar'i1y 
financed by insurance monies. Of the 315 victims interviewed who owned 
thei r homes, 85.7% had household ins urance at the time of the tornado. 
(Failure to have adequate insurance was one of the factors that deter-
mined the extent to which federal and other aid programs were utilized in 
reconstruction of private homes.) 
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TABLE 111-4 
HOUSE INSURANCE: USER CHARACTERISTICS 
HOMEOWNER INSURANCE 
AT TIME OF DISASTER 
WHITE VICTIMS BLACK VICTIMS 
(n = 193) (n = 122) 
Total 88.5% (165) 86.1% (105) 
Age 
Under 60 Years 87 .4% (104) 83.1% 49) 
60 Years and Older 82.4% ( 61) 88.9% 56) 
Family Size 
3 Persons or Less 85.?% (121 ) 87.?% 75) 
4 Or More 86.3% ( 44) 83.31, 30) 
Income 
Moderate 79.1% (10n) 85.1% 97) 
High 100.0% ( 59) 100.0% 8) 
Education 
High School or Less 81.6% (111) 88.2% 90) 
Coll ege + 94.6% ( 53) 75.0% 15) 
Occupation 
White Collar Worker 95.6% 65) 90.0% ( 9) 
Blue Collar Worker 75.8% 75) 87.9% ( 87) 
In Table 111-4, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
insurance users are presented. The characteri st i cs of race, age, and 
family size were not Significantly associated with having household 
insurance (although it is interesting to note that among whites, slightly 
more young than elderly families had insurance, while among blacks, the 
opposite pattern held). Socioeconomic variables, on the other hand, were 
related for white victims; those with higher income, education, and occu-
pational status were more likely to have household insurance. Among 
black families these variables were not significantly associated. How-
ever, again, since so few black families interviewed in Paris were in the 
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TABLE III-5 
INSURANCE ADEQUACY 
Total 
Damage Level 
Moderate 
High 
Age 
Under 60 Years 
60 Years and Older 
Income 
Moderate 
High 
*80% to 100% of losses covered 
VICTIMS EVALUATING COVERAGE 
AS Af)EOUATE* 
WHITE VICTIMS BLACK VICTIMS 
(n = 193) (n = 122) 
60.7% (116) 50.0% (58) 
68.1% ( 81) 57.5% (42) 
48.6% ( 35) 37 .2% (16) 
61.3% 73) 45.5% (25) 
59.7% 43) 54.1% (33) 
50.0% 66) 4R.1% (52) 
84.7% 50) 75.0% ( 6) 
higher socioeconomic stratum, these statistics should not be taken as 
conclusive. Similar to whites, black victims with white collar jobs and 
high income were slightly more likely to have insurance than those with 
blue collar occupations and/or lower income. However, unlike white vic-
tims, blacks with some college were slightly less likely to have insur-
ance than those with less education. 
Although having insurance is important, the adequacy of insurance is 
perhaps a more crucial factor. Table III-~ presents insurance adequacy 
cross-tabulated with several victim characteristics. (Victims who had 
80% or more of thei r losses covered by insurance were categorized as 
having adequate coverage. The table includes only those victims who 
owned their homes at the time of the tornado.) 
Although black families were equally as likely as white families to 
have household insurance, they were significantly less likely to consider 
their coverage adequate. For both racial groups, those with moderate 
damage were significantly more likely than those with high damage to have 
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adequate insurance coverage, and, as might be expected, those with high 
. income were more likely to report adequate insurance than those with 
lower income. The difference between age groups in insurance coverage 
adequacy is minimal. 
By the time of interviewing (eight months after the tornado), 99% of 
all respondents having insurance had settled their claims with their in-
surance companies. Eighty-nine percent believed that their settlements 
were fair and indicated that they had no problems with their insurance 
companies. Among those 31 respondents who were unsatisfied (19 white and 
12 black victims), 35.5% said that they did not have enough coverage 
(the most common complaint), followed by 25.8% who felt they were misled 
by thei r insurance company about thei r coverage needs, and 12.9% who 
believed they had settled prematurely. 
Concerning insurance coverage, there was one significant difference 
between racial groups. White families were much more likely than black 
to have insurance covering additional living expenses (A.L.E.). A.L.E. 
provides di saster vi ctims with di rect payments for expenses encountered 
due to their inability to live in storm-damaged homes. Lacking this 
resource, blacks were much more likely to utilize other aid and to use 
personal resources to pay for temporary housing. 
To measure family recovery, victims were asked to rate their 
families' level of economic and emotional recovery from the disaster, and 
the responses were cross-tabulated with insurance (Table 111-6). 
Among white victims economic recovery was significantly associated 
with having house insurance, while no association was found for black 
families. This difference is likely to be a reflection of the higher 
incidence of inadequate insurance coverage reported by blacks. Emotional 
recovery on the other hand, appears to have been unrelated to insurance. 
Having adequate coverage appears to be a more important factor than 
simply having insurance in explaining the difference between incomplete 
and complete recovery. As indicated in the table, families of both 
racial groups who had adequate insurance were Significantly more likely 
to have completely recovered, both economically and emotionally, eight 
months after the disaster than those with inadequate insurance. 
After major disasters, victims frequently obtain insurance if they 
had none before, or expand existing coverage (Drabek and Key, 1983; 
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TABLE II 1-6 
INSURANCE AND FAMILY RECOVERY 
(Those who owned homes) 
WHITE VICTIMS 
Economic Recovery Index 
Incomplete Recovery 
Complete Recovery 
Emotional Recovery Index 
Incomplete Recovery 
Complete Recovery 
BLACK V I CTI MS 
Economic Recovery Index 
Incomplete Recovery 
Complete Recovery 
Emotional Recovery Index 
Incomplete Recovery 
Complete Recovery 
V I CTI MS WHO HAD 
HOUSE INSURANCE 
APRIL 1979 
77 .9% (74) 
n = 95 
92.9% (91) 
n = 98 
X2 = 7.54 
Si g. = .006 
86.0% (92) 
n = 107 
84.9% (73) 
n = 86 
X2 = 0.0 
Si g. = .992 
84.8% (67) 
n = 79 
88.8% (38) 
n = 43 
X2 = 0.07 
Si g. = .778 
86.1% (62) 
n = 72 
86.0% (43) 
n = 50 
X2 = 0.0 
Sig. = 1.00 
V I CTI MS WHO HAD 
ADEQUATE HOUSE 
INSURANCE 
40.9% (38) 
n = 93 
79.6% (78) 
n = 98 
X2 = 28.41 
Sig. = 0.0 
50.9% (54) 
n = 106 
72 .9% (62) 
n = 85 
X2 = 8.67 
Si g. = .003 
37 .8% (28) 
n = 74 
71.4% (30) 
n = 42 
X2 = 10.79 
Si g. = .001 
40.9% (27) 
n = 66 
62.0% (31) 
n = 50 
X2 = 4.25 
Si g. = .039 
TABLE III-7 
CHANGES IN HOUSE INSURANCE 
(Those who owned homes) 
PERCENT HAVING HOUSE INSURANCE 
A~ril 1982 Currently 
TOTAL 85.7% (n 315 ) 88.9% (n 316) 
WHITE VICTIMS 85.5% (n 193) 89.6% (n 193) 
BLACK VICTIMS 86.1% (n 122) 87.8% (n 11.'3) 
WHITE VICTIMS 
Moderate Damage 85.7% (119 ) 87.5% (120) 
High Damage 85.1% ( 74) 93.2% ( 73) 
BLACK VICTIMS 
Moderate Damage 84.6% ( 78) 87.2% ( 78) 
High Damage 88.6% ( 44) 88.9% ( 45) 
WHITE VICTIMS 
Under 60 Years 87.4% (119) 93.3% ( 119) 
60 Years and Older 82.4% ( 74) 83.8% ( 74) 
BLACK VICTIMS 
Under 60 Years 83.1% ( 59) 84.7% 59) 
60 years and Older 88.9% ( 63) 90.6% 64) 
Bolin, 1982). In general, the survey found a slight increase in insur-
ance coverage after the storm. As indicated in Table 111-7, this pattern 
held across racial groups, damage levels, and age groups. The only 
Significant difference occurred between age groups of white victims. At 
the time of interviewing, younger white families were Significantly more 
likely to have house insurance than older white families. 
Si nce a cons i derab 1 e number of respondents (116) rented apartments 
or homes at the time of the tornado, ins u rance cove rage of household 
contents was considered separately. At the time of the disaster, 64.7% 
of all respondents had insurance on their household contents. Whereas 
the difference between rac i a 1 groups was not sign ifi cant for i nsuri ng 
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homes, it was for insuring household contents. Among white respondents, 
74.1% had insurance on their household contents, compared to 55.7% of 
black families. The tornado prompted more families in both racial groups 
to insure their household contents, with about the same percentage in 
each racial group obtaining new insurance after the storm. Thus, the 
difference between racial groups in insuring contents remained statistic-
ally significant. At the time of interviewing, 80.7% of whites and 61.0% 
of blacks had insurance on contents. 
When having insurance on household contents is cross-tabulated with 
economi c and emoti ona 1 recovery, it appears that havi ng thi s insurance 
did have a positive impact on both dimensions of recovery for both racial 
groups. 
?rimary Group Aid: Kin, Neighbors, and Friends 
Primary groups--friends, neighbors, and kin--are an important source 
of aid, comfort, and support for disaster victims (Bolin, 1983). Typic-
ally, primary group aid is offered without victims having to request it, 
and recipients do not have to go through impersonal, bureaucratic pro-
cedures in order to obtain it. The immediate and relatively uncondition-
al nature of such aid makes it parti cul arly appropri ate for stricken 
families in the emergency period. Data on the extent to which families 
in Paris utilized aid from friends and kin are presented in Table 111-8. 
White families were significantly more likely than black families to 
receive aid from kin (67.9% versus 47.9%). (Kin includes all relations 
by blood or marriage who live outside of the immediate household of the 
respondent.) On the face of it, this fact seems to disagree with pre-
vious findings on black kin groups in America (e.g., Stack, 1974). White 
families were also significantly more likely to receive aid from neigh-
bors (31.1% versus 8.2%) and/or friends (54.7% versus 22.8%). Since 
black victims were of significantly lower socioeconomic status, the 
differences in aid may be attributed to the lack of resources among 
potential black aid givers. Thus, as already mentioned, this lack of 
resources also explains why black victims had to rely on governmental 
aid. 
By age group, younger white victims were significantly more likely 
than older ones to receive aid from all categories of the primary group. 
However, slightly more older than younger black families received aid 
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TABLE IlI-8 
PRIMARY GROUP AID 
THOSE RECEIVING AID FROM: 
RELATIVES NEIGHBORS FRIENDS 
WHITE VICTIMS n = 212 67.9% (144) 31.1% (66) 54.7% (116) 
BLACK VICTIMS n = 219 47.9% (105) 8.2% (18) 22.8% 50) 
WHITE VICTIMS: AGE 
<60 Yrs. n = 131 78.6% (103) 38.2% (50) 68.7% 90) 
~60 Yrs. n = 81 50.6% ( 41) 19.8% (16) 32.1% 90) 
BLACK VICTIMS: AGE 
<60 Yrs. n = 136 46.3% ( 63) 7 .4% (10) 19.9% 27) 
~60 Yrs. n = 83 50.6% ( 42) 9.6% ( 8) 27.7% 23) 
WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
~3 pers n = 158 69.0% (109) 28.5% (45) 55.1% 87) 
~4 pers n = 54 64.8% ( 35) 38.9% (21) 53.7% 29) 
BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
~3 pers n = 133 47 .4% 63) 8.3% (11 ) 24.1% 32) 
~4 pers n = 86 48.8% 42) 8.1% (7) 20.9% 18) 
WHITE VICTIMS: INCOME 
Moderate n = 150 63.3% ( 95) 22.0% (33) 48.7% 73) 
High n = 62 79.0% ( 49) 53.2% (33) 69.4% ( 43) 
BLACK VICTIMS: INCOME 
Moderate n = 209 48.8% (102) 7.7% (16) 23.0% ( 48) 
High n = 10 30.0% ( 3) 20.0% ( 2) 20.0% ( 2) 
WHITE VICTIMS: EDUCATION 
High School Grad 
or Less n = 148 63.5% ( 94) 23.0% (34) 48.0% 71) 
College+ n = 62 77 .4% ( 48) 50.0% (31) 69.4% ( 43) 
BLACK VICTIMS: EDUCATION 
High School Grad 
or Less n = 190 48.9% ( 93) 7.9% (15) 23.2% ( 44) 
College+ n = 28 42.9% ( 12) 10.7% ( 2) 21.4% ( 6) 
(continued) 
TABLE 111-8 (Continued) 
THOSE RECEIVING AID FROM: 
RELATIVES NEIGHBORS FRIENDS 
WHITE VICTIMS: EMPLOYMENT 
White Collar n = 84 
Blue Collar n = 116 
BLACK VICTIMS: EMPLOYMENT 
White Collar n = 14 
Blue Collar n = 170 
77 .4% 65) 
60.3% 70) 
28.6% 4) 
48.8% 83) 
WHITE VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Moderate n = 132 
High n = 80 
59.1% 78) 
82.5% 66) 
BLACK VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Moderate n = 164 37.7% 
Hi gh n = 73 68.5% 
55) 
50) 
WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY INJURED IN STORM 
None n = 186 68.8% (128) 
One or More n = 26 61.5% ( 16) 
BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY INJURED IN STORM 
None n = 201 46.8% 94) 
One or More n = 18 61.1% ( 11) 
45.2% (38) 
22.4% (26) 
7.1% ( 1) 
8.2% (14) 
26.5% (35) 
38.8% (31) 
7.5% (11) 
9.6% ( 7) 
28.5% (53) 
50.0% (13) 
7.0% (14) 
22.2% ( 4) 
61.9% 52) 
49.1% 57) 
28.6% 4) 
22.9% 39) 
48.5% 64) 
65.0% 52) 
15.8% 23) 
37.0% 27) 
55.4% (103) 
50.0% ( 13) 
20.9% 42) 
44.4% 8) 
from tlw three categories. Recei pt of aid from primary group members 
does not appear to be Significantly associated with family size for 
either rdcial group. 
I\nvllY white families, those in the higher socioeconomic categories 
of income, education, and occupational status were consistently signifi-
cantly more likely than others to receive aid from primary group members. 
However, the relationship between socioeconomic status and receipt of aid 
from primary group members among blacks was more complex. For example, 
blacks with lower income or less education were slightly more likely to 
receive aid from family and friends, while those with high incomes or 
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more education were slightly more likely to receive aid from their neigh-
. bors. Black households headed by blue collar workers were more likely to 
receive aid from relatives and neighbors, whereas white collar households 
were more apt to receive aid from friends. 
In both racial groups, families with high losses relied on primary 
group aid more frequently than those with less severe losses. 
Whether or not family members were injured significantly affected 
the receipt of primary group aid. Among white victims, families who 
experienced injuries were more likely to receive aid from neighbors than 
those who had no injuries. Similarly, black families who had sustained 
injuries were more likely than those who had not to receive aid from both 
neighbors and friends. Injuries among disaster victims tend to reduce 
their recovery potential while increasing demands and stresses on their 
families. It is not surprising that injuries may increase the receipt of 
aid and support from those close to the victims' families. 
TABLE III-9 
PRIMARY GROUP AID AND FAMILY RECOVERY 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY INDEX 
COMPLETE INCOMPLETE 
WHITE VICTIMS. RECEIVING: 
Aid from Kin n = 144 54.2% (78) 45.8% 66) 
Aid from Friends n = 116 50.9% (59) 49.1% 57) 
BLACK VICTIMS RECEIVING: 
Aid from Kin n = 105 19.0% (20) 81.0% ( 85) 
Aid from Friends n = 50 22.0% (11 ) 78.0% ( 39) 
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY INDEX 
COMPLETE INCOMPLETE 
WHITE VICTIMS RECEIVING: 
Aid from Kin n = 144 43.8% (63) 56.3% 81) 
Aid from Friends n = 116 42.2% (49) 57.8% 67) 
BLACK VICTIMS RECEIVING: 
Aid from Kin n = 105 28.6% (30) 71.4% ( 75) 
Aid from Friends n = 50 34.0% ( 17) 66.0% ( 33) 
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Respondents' assessments of thei r economi c and emot i ona 1 recovery 
were cross-tabulated with receipt of primary group aid. The results are 
presented in Table 111-9. 
Among white families, there were slight positive relationships 
between receiving aid from kin and friends and subsequent economic re-
covery. In contrast, the relationships between aid from kin and friends 
and economic recovery were negative among black families. The relation-
shi ps between emot i ona 1 recovery and aid from kin and fri ends were nega-
tive for both racial groups, although most relationships were weak--the 
except ion bei ng for that between aid from kin and emot i ona 1 recovery 
among black families. 
Findings: Determinants of Recovery 
Previous research on family recovery (e.g., Bolin, 1976; Bolin, 
1982) has demonstrated that recovery outcomes may be affected by a number 
of factors: victims' predisaster demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics which affect a family's stress response capabilities, as well 
as a complex set of impact and response characteristics. 
Table III-1D demonstrates the influence of several factors on 
economic recovery outcomes. As indicated, at the time of the interviews, 
39.4% of the subjects reported that they were fully recovered economical-
ly. The differences in economic recovery between racial groups were 
statistically significant, with white families more likely to be fully 
recovered than blacks. 
Although older families in both racial groups were more likely than 
younger ones to be fully recovered economi cally, di fferences were not 
large. However, for both racial groups, smaller families were more like-
ly to report economic recovery than larger ones; families with higher in-
comes and lower loss levels were also significantly more likely to report 
such recovery. 
Tab 1 e I II -11 exami nes factors affect i ng 1 eve 1 s of emot i ona 1 re-
covery. Approximately the same percentage of total respondents were 
fully recovered emotionally eight months after the disaster as were fully 
recovered economically. As with economic recovery, white families were 
significantly more likely to be fully recovered emotionally than were 
black families. Similarly, older families in both racial groups were 
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TABLE III-II) 
INFLUENCES ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY INDEX 
COMPLETE INCOMPLETE 
TOTAL n = 431 39.4% (170) 60.6% (261) 
WHITE VICTIMS n = 212 51.4% (l09) 48.6% (103) 
BLACK VICTIMS n = 219 27.9% ( 61) 72 .1% (158) 
X2 = 24.06 
Si9. = 0.0 
WHITE VICTIMS: AGE 
<60 Yrs. n = 131 49.6% 65) 50.4% 66) 
~60 Y rs. n = 81 54.3% ( 44) 45.7% 37) 
X2 = 0.27 
Si9. = .600 
BLACK VICTIMS: AGE 
<60 Yrs. n = 136 26.5% 36) 73.5% (100) 
~60 Yrs. n = 83 30.1% 25) 69.9% ( 58) 
X2 = 0.18 
Si 9. = .668 
WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
~3 pers n = 158 53.2% 84) 46.8% 74) 
~4 pers n = 54 46.3% 25) 53.7% 29) 
X2 = 0.51 
Si9. = .48 
BLACK V I CTI MS : FAMILY SIZE 
~3 pers n = 133 32.3% ( 43) 67.7% 90) 
~4 pers n = 86 20.9% ( 18) 79.1% 68) 
X2 = 2.83 
5i9. = .09 
(continued) 
TABLE 111-10 (Continued) 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY INDEX 
COMPLETE INCOMPLETE 
WHITE VICTIMS: INCOME 
Moderate* n = 150 42.0% ( 63) 58.0% ( 87) 
High** n = 62 74.2% ( 46) 25.8% ( 16) 
X2 = 16.93 
5ig. = .000 
BLACK VICTIMS: INCOME 
Moderate n = 209 26.3% 55) 73.7% (154) 
High n = 10 60.0% ( 6) 40.0% ( 4) 
X2 = 3.84 
5i g. = .05 
WHITE VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Moderate n = 132 64.4% ( 85) 35.6% 47) 
High n = 80 30.0% ( 24) 70.0% ( 56) 
X2 = 22.23 
5ig. = .000 
BLACK VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Moderate n = 146 35.6% 52) 64.4% 94) 
High n = 73 12.3% ( 9) 87.7% 64) 
X2 = 12.()0 
Si g. = .001 
*< $l,OOO/month 
**~ $l,OOO/month 
TABLE III-ll 
INFLUENCES ON EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY INDEX 
COMPLETE INCOMPLETE 
TOTAL n = 431 39.2% (169) 60.8% (262) 
WHITE VICTIMS n = 212 43.9% ( 93) 56.1% (Ug) 
BLACK VICTIMS n = 219 34.7% ( 76) 65.3% (143) 
X2 = 3.42 
Sig. = .06 
WHITE VICTIMS: AGE 
<60 Yrs. n = 131 38.2% ( 50) 61.8% 81) 
~60 Yrs. n = 81 53.1% ( 43) 46.9% ( 38) 
X2 = 3.94 
Si g. = .05 
BLACK VICTIMS: AGE 
<60 Yrs. n = 136 33.1% ( 45) 66.9% 91) 
~60 Yrs. n = 83 37 .3% ( 31) 62.7% 52) 
X? = 0.25 
Si g. = .62 
WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
~3 pers n = 158 48.7% 77) 51.3'/' 81 ) 
~4 pers n = 54 29.6% ( 16) 70.4% ( 38) 
X2 = 5.21 
Si g. = .02 
BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE 
~3 pers n = 133 36.1% ( 48) 63.9% 85) 
~4 pers n = 86 32.6% ( 28) 67 .4% ( 58) 
X2 = 0.15 
Si9. = .69 
(continued) 
TABLE III-II (Continued) 
WHITE VICTIMS: INCOME 
Moderate* n = 150 
High** n = 62 
BLACK VICTIMS: INCOME 
Moderate n = 209 
High n = 10 
WHITE VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Moderate n = 132 
High n = 80 
BLACK VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Moderate n = 146 
High n = 73 
*< $l,OOO/month 
**~ $l,OOO/month 
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 
COMPLETE 
38.7% 58) 
56.5% 35) 
X2 = 4.94 
Sig. = .02 
33.5% ( 70) 
60.0% ( 6) 
X2 = 1.90 
Si9. = .16 
53.0% ( 70) 
28.8% ( 23) 
X2 = 10.96 
Si g. = .001 
40.4% ( 59) 
23.3% ( 17) 
X2 = 5.56 
Sig. = .01 
INDEX 
INCOMPLETE 
61.3% ( 92) 
43.5% ( 27) 
66.5% (139) 
40.0% ( 4) 
47.0% 62) 
71.3% ( 57) 
59.6% ( 87) 
76.7% ( 56) 
TABLE 111-12 
AID ADEQUACY 
THOSE REPORTING TOTAL AID AS ADEQUATE* 
WHITE VICTIMS BLACK V I CTI MS 
TOTAL 61.1% (124) 30.5% (62) 
DAMAGE: Moderate 63.6% ( 82) 33.6% (45) 
High 56.8% ( 42) 24.6% (17) 
AGE: <60 Yrs. n = 136 64.0% ( 80) 24.2% (30) 
~60 Yrs. n = 83 56.4% ( 44) 40.5% (32) 
INCOME: Moderate 51.1% 72) 30.1% (58) 
High 83.9% 52) 40.0% ( 4) 
FAMILY SIZE: ~3 persons 60.9% 92) 34.9% (44) 
~4 persons 61.5% 32) 23.4% (18) 
25 Missing Cases 
*Adequacy is defined as at least 80% of incurred losses being covered by 
aid from all sources. 
more likely to report emotional recovery. Small family size also 
appeared to positively influence emotional recovery among white families, 
but had a minimal influence among blacks. 
Income and damage levels had similar affects on emotional recovery 
in both racial groups. Those with high incomes were Significantly more 
likely to be emotionally recovered, although the association is weak 
among black families. Families with moderate incomes in both racial 
groups were significantly more likely than those with high incomes to be 
fully emotionally recovered--contradicting the findings of previous re-
search (Bolin, 1982). 
The effects of background factors on aid adequacy are presented in 
Table III-12. Victims were asked to assess the percentage of all thei r 
losses covered by formal aid sources and insurance. Aid adequacy was 
di chotomi zed into adequate (80% or more of the losses covered) and i n-
adequate (less than 80% covered). Only 45.8% of all respondents indica-
ted that they recei ved adequate aid. Differences between rac i a 1 groups 
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were significant, with half the percentage of blacks compared to whites 
reporting having received adequate aid. 
As may be expected, famil i es in both rac i a 1 groups with mode rate 
damage were slightly more likely to receive adequate aid than those with 
higher loss levels. Among white families, the association between age 
and aid adequacy was not significant; however, among blacks the associa-
tion was statistically significant, with more older families saying that 
they received adequate aid. In addition, in both racial groups, families 
with high incomes were more likely than those with lower incomes to have 
received adequate aid. Family size had a minimal effect among white 
families, but among blacks, smaller families were more likely to report 
receiving adequate aid. 
Table III-13 cross-tabulates the number of formal aid sources used 
TABLE I II-13 
NUMBER OF AID SOURCES AND FAMILY RECOVERY 
Number of Aid Sources 
WHITE VICTIMS: ~3 sources n=152 
>3 sources n=60 
BLACK V I CTI t~S: ~3 sources 
>3 sources 
Number of Aid Sources 
WHITE VICTIMS: 
BLACK V I CTI MS : 
~3 sources 
>3 sources 
~3 sources 
>3 sources 
n=139 
n=80 
n=152 
n=60 
n=139 
n=80 
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ECONOMIC RECOVERY INDEX 
COMPLETE INCOMPLETE 
64.5% (98) 
18.3% (11) 
38.8% (54) 
8.8% ( 7) 
X2 = 34.84 
5ig. = .000 
X2 = 21.42 
Sig. = .000 
35.5% (54) 
81.7% (49) 
61.2% (85) 
91.3% (73) 
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY INDEX 
COMPLETE INCOMPLETE 
51.3% (78) 
25.0% (15) 
43.9% (61) 
18.8% (15) 
X2 = 11 .05 
Sig. = .001 
X2 = 13.07 
S;g. = .000 
48.7% (74) 
75.0% (45) 
56.1% (78) 
81.3% (65) 
and i ndi ces of economi c and emot i ona 1 recove ry, and i ndi cates that the 
number of aid sources was negatively related to both economic and emo-
tional recovery for both racial groups. The reason for this phenomenon, 
also reported in other recovery research (Bolin, 1982), is that utilizing 
a number of aid sources reflects a family's difficulty in recovering and 
inability to get sufficient aid from a single source. 
Multivariate Analyses of Recovery 
In order to consider a number of factors in terms of their simul-
taneous and interactive effects on recovery, two different multivariate 
analyses of the Paris data were conducted. First, black victim and white 
victim recovery was compared utilizing discriminant function analysis--a 
stat i st i ca 1 techni que that deri ves mathemat i ca 1 axes (di sc ri mi nant func-
tions) that maximize differences between previously designated criterion 
groups for a dependent variable (Cooley and Lohnes, 1971). The functions 
represent linear combinations of independent variables that best measure 
the differences between groups in the dependent variables (Snedecor and 
Coch ran, 1976). 
This study considers two dependent variables for each of the two 
Paris sUbsamples--economic and emotional recovery among black and white 
victims. Questions concerning these variables used a 5 point (0-4) self 
rating scale, where 0 represented no recovery and 4 meant complete re-
covery. These scales were collapsed into three categories for this 
analysis: complete recovery (4), intermediate recovery (3), and low re-
covery (0-2). The aim of this type of analysis is to determine a set of 
independent variables which prove to be the best discriminators among the 
three levels of recovery for each dimension (emotional and economic) for 
each racial group. A number of independent variables were selected for 
study based upon a review of previous research and upon a stepwise pro-
cedure in the statistical program used for the analysis that identifies 
important discriminators. 
Table 111-14 presents the standardized discriminant function co-
efficients for black victims regarding levels of economic recovery. The 
relative size of the coefficients indicates their individual contribution 
to each of the two discriminant functions. Correspondingly, each dis-
criminant function may be verbally characterized by the pattern of varia-
bles that contribute the most to it (in this case, those with coeffi-
71 
TABLE II 1-14 
STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF BLACK VICTIMS 
VARIABLE LABEL 
Interfaith Aid 
Current Housing is Poor 
Lived in FEMA Trailer 
Red Cross Aid 
Total Number of Housing Changes 
I FG Aid 
Percent Losses That Were Insured 
Primary Group Aided Economic Recovery 
Primary Group Aided Emotional Recovery 
Temporary Shelter With Family/Friend 
Weather Anxieties 
Number of Minor Children 
Percent of variance explained 
FUNCTION 1 
.723 
-.994 
.266 
3.021 
-.843 
4.875 
.734 
-.962 
.461 
.549 
.134 
.217 
81.78% 
TABLE I II-15 
STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR EMOTIONAL RECOVERY OF BLACK VICTIMS 
VARIABLE LABEL 
Loss of Mementos 
Interfaith Aid 
Visitation Frequency With Relatives 
Percent of Losses Insured 
Number of Close Relatives 
Primary Group Aided Emotional Recovery 
"I Have Little Influence Over Events" 
Experienced Emotional Strains 
Family Life Is Still Disrupted 
Sleep Disturbances 
Storm Anxieties 
Percent of variance explained 
FUNCTION 1 
.026 
.453 
.281 
.284 
- .172 
.546 
.264 
-.621 
-.357 
-.510 
-.822 
73.16% 
FUNCTION 2 
.153 
.343 
.643 
-.221 
- .073 
.781 
.174 
-.123 
.944 
.0083 
-.516 
-.537 
18.22% 
FUNCTION 2 
-.560 
4.245 
3.998 
.095 
.703 
.120 
-.802 
.078 
.008 
- .072 
.432 
26.84% 
cients of .500 or more). Thus function 1 may be characterized as a 
combination of recovery aid and housing factors. Aid from the Red Cross, 
family grants (IFG), and Interfaith Disaster Services all contribute 
strongly. Significant housing factors include the number of postdisaster 
residential changes (negative score), poor current housing conditions 
(negative score) and obtaining temporary shelter from friends or rela-
tives (positive score). 
Function 2 includes several other variables that are significantly 
associated--two having a psychosocial dimension: whether the primary 
group aided in emotional recovery and whether victims had anxieties over 
bad weather (negative score). In addition, having lived in a FEMA 
trailer contributes positively to function 2, while the number of depen-
dent children contributes negatively. This latter factor is the only 
demographic variable identified as contributing to a function determining 
black emotional recovery. It suggests that having a larger number of 
dependents in a household inhibits or slows economic recovery from disas-
ter. 
Looking at the proportion of variance in economic recovery accounted 
for by the two functions, the aid and housing function (#1) accounts for 
the greatest amount (81.78%), although Function 2 also explains a statis-
tically significant amount of variance (18.22%). 
Table 111-15 presents the discriminant function coefficients for 
emotional recovery of black victims. Function 1 may be described by four 
key psychosocial variables: primary group aid in emotional recovery, 
having storm related emotional strains (negative score), experiencing 
storm related sleep disturbances (negative score) and anxieties over 
weather phenomena (negative score). Function 2 may be described as a 
combination of psychosocial disruption variables and aid and social 
support variables. In the former, two negative variables stand out: the 
loss of mementos in the disaster and a belief in the lack of personal 
control over life events (a measure of fatalism). The aid variable that 
most strongly contributes is help received from Interfaith Disaster 
Services. The social support variables most strongly associated include 
visitation frequencies and the number of close relatives in town. Of the 
two discriminant functions, function 1 accounts for most of explained 
variance (73.16%), although Function 2 also accounts for a statistically 
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TABLE II 1-16 
STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF WHITE VICTIMS 
VARIABLE LABEL 
Total Losses 
Losses Relative to Other Victims 
Loss of Mementos 
Temporary Shelter With Kin 
Red Cross Aid 
SBA Loan 
IFG Aid 
Percent of Loss Covered by Aid/lnsur. 
Number of Close Relatives 
Received Aid from Friends 
FUNCTION 1 
- .775 
-.599 
-.506 
-.280 
-.613 
1.523 
.671 
.155 
-.373 
-.070 
Primary Group Aid in Economic Recovery -.161 
Increases in Cost of Living -.591 
Percent of variance explained 78.41% 
TABLE 111-17 
STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR EMOTIONAL RECOVERY OF WHITE VICTIMS 
VARIABLE LABEL 
Number of Close Friends 
Household Member Injured 
Knew Others Killed or Injured 
Percent Losses Insured 
Received Aid from Relatives 
Experienced Emotional Strains 
Poor Current Housing Situation 
Family Is Still Disrupted 
Sleep Disturbances 
Storm Anxieties 
Respondent's Age 
Percent of variance explained 
FUNCTION 1 
.508 
-.759 
-.254 
.224 
.218 
-.026 
-.576 
-.683 
-.193 
-.299 
.458 
73.23% 
FUNCTION 2 
-.154 
.357 
.222 
-.453 
8.730 
5.075 
3.588 
.611 
-.176 
.501 
.722 
.099 
32.59% 
FUNCTION 2 
.186 
.287 
.017 
.480 
.372 
-.542 
.395 
.060 
-.652 
-.580 
.288 
26.77% 
significant amount (26.84%). 
Tables III-16 and III-17 present economic and emotional recovery 
discriminant function scores for white victims. For their economic re-
covery, function 1 may be described by several disaster loss variables 
all of which contribute negatively: total losses (in terms of percent of 
home and possessions destroyed), losses relative to those around victims 
(an indicator of relative deprivation), the loss of mementos and personal 
possessions, and increased costs of living. Function 2 consists entirely 
of aid variables that contribute positively: IFG, SBA, and Red Cross aid 
as well as the percent of losses that the victim was able to cover by aid 
and insurance. Additionally, aid from friends and the victim's evalua-
tion of the role of primary group aid in economic recovery both contri-
bute significantly. Function 1 accounts for approximately twice the 
explained variance as function 2 (67.41% versus 32.59%). 
For emotional recovery of white families, function 1, which explains 
73.23% of the variance, is best described by four psychosocial/social 
support factors: the number of close friends victims had in town, the 
number of household members injured (negative score), poor housing condi-
tions at the time of the interview (negative score), and continuing 
storm-related family disruptions (negative score). Function 2, which 
accounts for 26.77% of the variance, is characterized by three negative 
psychosocial impact variables: emotional strains from the disaster, 
storm-related sleep disturbances, and anxieties during threatening 
weather. No demographic factors contribute at the .5 or higher level for 
either function, although respondentJs age does load relatively strongly 
on function 1. Past research has shown the positive effect of age on 
emotional recovery (Bolin and Klenow, 1983). 
The ability of the derived functions to separate the recovery group 
centroids (mean scores for the groups) was also examined. Table 111-18 
presents the group centroids for the discriminant scores on economic re-
covery (both for black and white victims) and Table 111-19 does the same 
for emotional recovery. For each table the relative size of the differ-
ence between reported values of the centroids is an indicator of how well 
the functions separate the levels of recovery of victims. 
To test for the statistical significance of the differences between 
recovery group means (centroids), a series of comparisons using an F test 
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TABLE III-18 
GROUP CENTROIDS FOR DISCRIMINANT SCORES ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
(White scores in parentheses) 
RECOVERY GROUP CENTROIDS FUNCTION 1 CENTROIDS FUNCTION 2 
Low Recovery 1.582 ( -1.482) .415 (-.723) 
Intermediate Recovery -.142 (-.527) -.447 (1.252) 
Complete Recovery -1.40 (.965 ) .625 (-.226) 
TABLE II 1-19 
GROUP CENTROIDS FOR DISCRIMINANT SCORES ON EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 
(White scores in parentheses) 
RECOVERY GROUP CENTROIDS FUNCTION 1 CENTROIDS 
Low Recovery -1.354 (1.413) .453 
Intermediate Recovery -.049 (- .531) - .607 
Complete Recovery .858 (-.575) .387 
TABLE III-20 
F STATISTIC SIGNIFICANCE TEST BETWEEN GROUP MEANS 
FOR EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 
(White victim statistics in parentheses) 
FUNCTION 
( .017) 
(-.741) 
( .532) 
2 
RECOVERY GROUP 
Intermediate Recovery 
Complete Recovery 
LOW RECOVERY INTERMEDIATE RECOVERY 
2.96* (4.34*) 
4.99* (4.80*) 2.57* (1.95*) 
*p < .05 
TABLE III-21 
F STATISTIC SIGNIFICANCE TEST BETWEEN GROUP MEANS 
FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
(White victim statistics in parentheses) 
RECOVERY GROUP 
Intermediate Recovery 
Complete Recovery 
*p < .05 
LOW RECOVERY 
3.23 (2.40) 
5.39* (4.30) 
INTERMEDIATE RECOVERY 
2.23* (2.93) 
were run for both subsamples on each of the two recovery measures (Tables 
111-20 and 111-21). In all instances statistically significant differ-
ences between group means were found for both sets of victims. This in-
di cates that the di scri mi nant funct ions di st i ngui sh we 11 among recove ry 
levels for both subsamples on each of the dependent variables (economic 
and emotional recovery). 
To summarize, the variables that proved to be the best predictors of 
economic recovery were, as might be expected, aid received. It is inter-
esting to note that primary group aid appeared as a negative factor in 
economic recovery, suggesting that the primary group in this instance did 
not functionally aid economic recovery. While the variables selected as 
good discriminators of white economic recovery levels were similar to 
those selected for blacks, some important differences did appear. SBA 
loans figured prominently in white recovery but not for blacks, reflec-
ting the inability of blacks to qualify for such loans. Other research 
(e.g., Bolin, 1982) has shown low interest SBA loans to be an important 
factor permitting families to rebuild homes and resettle promptly. Both 
the elderly and the poor (including blacks) are typically not able to 
qualify for such loans, hence their typically slower rates of economic 
recovery. 
Another important difference between the two subsamples is that for 
whites, primary group aid contributed positively to one economic recovery 
function, while for blacks the same coefficient was negative. This 
suggests that differences existed in the ability of the respective social 
support groups to provi de aid that cont ri buted to economi c recove ry. 
Again, this undoubtedly reflects the socioeconomic differences between 
the two groups. However, it bears noting that for neither black nor 
white victims did the stepwise selection of independent variables pick 
any socioeconomic status variables as important discriminators of levels 
of economic recovery. 
For black victims, emotional recovery was found to be determined by 
a combination of social support and psychosocial impact variables, the 
latter having negative discriminant function scores. This role of social 
support (buffering the effects of a stressor, such as a disaster) is well 
documented in social support literature (see, for example, Kahn and 
Antonucci, 1980). In this study, the support of family and kin was found 
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particularly important in black emotional recovery. Although psycho-
social impact variables were also related to the emotional recovery of 
white victims, whites differed from blacks in that fewer social support 
items were selected as discriminators for white emotional recovery. 
Negative effects of having family injured in the disaster and knowing 
others killed or injured were found among white but not black victims. 
Tables 111-18 and 111-19 also demonstrate possible differences be-
tween black and white recovery. The test of significance for group mean 
differences (Tables I II -20 and I I 1-21) show that fo r both blacks and 
whites, the functions are successful in obtaining Significantly different 
recovery group means. Within each racial category the functions also 
discriminate well between the three recovery levels of both emotional and 
economi c recove ry. Thi s suggests that the selected va ri ab 1 es and the 
functions derived from them constitute a good set of factors determining 
both dimensions of recovery for each racial group. 
Thus, this analysis illustrates that differences exist between the 
two racial groups ~~~ ~_~ the factors that can predict recovery levels. 
Those differences were not found to di rectly i nvol ve demographi c or 
socioeconomic differences, but rather differences in losses, psychosocial 
impacts, aid received, and social support. 
Modeling the Recovery Process 
The preceding tabular and discriminant analyses illustrate a number 
of differences between blacks and whites in terms of their aid utiliza-
tion and their overall disaster recovery. In this section, a multi-
variate model of the recovery process is presented and tested. In it, 
race and the utilization of aid programs will be considered as part of a 
network of variables acting in concert to determine recovery outcomes of 
disaster victims. 
As noted in Chapter II, numerous models of the family recovery pro-
cess have been developed, beginning with Hill's (1949) A,B,C,-X schema. 
Conta i ned in any such model must be the not i on of process: a system in 
an initial state is disrupted by an event, precipitating changes in the 
organizational features of the system as it adjusts to the disruption; 
subsequently, the system recovers from the disruptions and establishes 
more normal organizational patterns over a period of time. 
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In terms of family recovery, the "initial state" includes such fac-
-tors as the family's demographic and socioeconomic characteristics prior 
to the disaster. The "disruptive event" is, of course, the disaster and 
is generally measured by such impact indicators as losses to home and 
contents, physical injuries and/or death, psychological/mental health 
impacts, and disruptions of normal interaction patterns of the family. 
"Changes in organizational features" include the activities that families 
engage in to acquire aid, to make insurance claims, to begin rebuilding 
homes, and to re-establish normal living patterns. "Recovery" refers to 
the family's evaluation of the outcomes of the complex social processes 
initiated by the disaster. 
This general outline was followed to develop a model of family 
recovery for Paris as well as the sites described in Chapters V and VI. 
The model is deri ved in part from the previ ous work of both authors 
(Bolin, 1982; Bolton, 1979), although there are important differences. 
It should also be noted that the model as applied in Paris differs in 
some ways from that applied to the Kauai and Coalinga sites: the latter 
studies include a measure of unemployment which the Paris model does not, 
whereas the Paris model includes family size as an independent variable, 
a variable not found to be useful in the other studies. Because path 
analysis was used to describe the processes at these three different 
sites, we have attempted to simplify the models somewhat by looking at a 
single measure of recovery--economic recovery. Of course, as we have 
noted, there are other important dimensions of recovery, but for the sake 
of parsimony these are not included as part of the multiple regression 
analysis. In this chapter as well as Chapter V, separate regressions are 
done for each ethnic sample, and then path models are developed and pre-
sented to facilitate easy visual comparison of the determinants of 
economic recovery for the different groups. 
The model has three levels of variables, arranged in chronological 
sequence from predi saster factors to recovery outcome. The antecedent 
variables include general background characteristics of victims as well 
as disaster impact. The mediating variables (those chronologically after 
impact, but antecedent to and determining recovery) include the various 
response strategies that victims used. The dependent variable is econom-
ic recovery. 
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TABLE III-22 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF PATH MODEL OF FAMILY RECOVERY 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION OF MEASUREMENT 
Family Size Numbers of related persons in household 
SES Standardized index of head of household's 
income, education, occupation 
% of Damage Percent of home destroyed by tornado 
Age Head of household's age in years 
Marital Status Marital status of respondent 
(married/nonmarried) 
Use of Disaster Assistance Number of aid sources used (0-5) (FEMA, 
SBA, Red Cross, IFG, IDS) 
Insurance Adequacy Percent of losses covered by insurance 
Aid Adequacy Percent of losses covered by formal aid 
Primary Group Aid Whether respondent received aid from kin 
and/or friends 
Household Moves Total number of post-disaster residential 
changes made 
Economic Recovery Five point self assessment scale of extent 
of victim's economic recovery 
For Paris, the independent variables selected are family size, 
socioeconomic status, percent of damage to the home, respondent age, and 
marital status (the latter being a measure of primary social support and 
coded as married/not married). The mediating variables are use of formal 
disaster assistance, primary group aid, insurance adequacy, formal aid 
adequacy, and number of household moves. The dependent variable for all 
models is economic recovery, as perceived by the victim. The operational 
measurement of all variables is described in Table 111-22 and a general 
schematic of the model is illustrated in Figure III-i. 
Multiple regression was used to assess the fit of the proposed model 
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FIGURE III-l 
MODEL OF FAMILY RECOVERY 
(arrows indicate causal flow) 
Use of 
Disaster 
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Impact + 8 months 
----------------~) 
with the Paris data. Tables 111-23 and 111-24 present the results of the 
analyses in terms standardized coefficients or beta weights. These co-
efficients permit comparison of the strengths of association for theore-
tically specified relationships of variables. This, in turn, allows the 
identification of causally significant relationships within a complex web 
of variables (Figures 111-2 and 1II-3). Table 111-23 presents findings 
from data on white victims in Paris, while 111-24 does the same for black 
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DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Use of 
Disaster 
Assistance 
Primary 
Group 
Aid 
Insurance 
Adequacy 
Aid 
Adequacy 
Household 
Moves 
Economic 
Recovery 
TABLE II 1-23 
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
OF THE PATH MODEL OF FAMILY RECOVERY 
WHITE SAMPLE, PARIS (n = 212) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Famil y Si ze 
SES 
% of Damage 
Age 
Marita 1 Status 
Family Si ze 
SES 
% of Damage 
Age 
Marital Status 
Family Size 
SES 
% Damage 
Age 
Marital Status 
Family Size 
SES 
% Damage 
Age 
t4arita 1 Status 
Famil y Si ze 
SES 
% Damage 
Age 
Mari ta 1 Status 
Family Size 
SES 
% Damage 
Age 
Marital Status 
Use of Disaster 
PATH 
COEFFICIENT 
-.13* 
.14* 
.22* 
-.25* 
.04 
-.01 
.11 
.06 
-.04 
-.14* 
-.06 
.21* 
.28* 
.17* 
.02 
-.21* 
.34* 
.22* 
-.09 
.03 
.21* 
-.19* 
.10 
.14* 
.02 
-.21* 
.29* 
.07 
-.08 
.03 
Assistance .37* 
Primary Group Aid -.09 
Insurance Adequacy .30* 
Aid Adequacy .36* 
Household Moves -.03 
EXPLAINED 
VARIANCE (R2) 
.21 
.09 
.24 
.29 
.19 
.39 
*Significant at .05 level. 
ERROR 
VARIANCE 
.79 
.91 
.76 
.71 
.81 
.61 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Use of 
Disaster 
Assistance 
Primary 
Group 
Aid 
Insurance 
Adequacy 
Aid 
Adequacy 
Household 
Moves 
Economic 
Recovery 
TABLE II 1-24 
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
OF THE PATH MODEL OF FAMILY RECOVERY 
BLACK SAMPLE, PARIS (n = 212) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Family Size 
SES 
% of Damage 
Age 
Marital Status 
Family Size 
SES 
% of Damage 
Age 
Marita 1 Status 
Family Size 
SES 
% Damage 
Age 
Marital Status 
Family Size 
SES 
% Damage 
Age 
Marital Status 
Famil y Si ze 
SES 
% Damage 
Age 
Marital Status 
Family Size 
SES 
% Damage 
Age 
Marital Status 
Use of Disaster 
PATH 
COEFFICIENT 
-.12 
.10 
.23* 
-.20* 
.16* 
-.33 
.09 
.14* 
-.17* 
-.18* 
-.04 
.38* 
.24* 
-.17* 
.04 
-.29* 
.30* 
.06 
-.19* 
.01 
.19* 
-.28* 
.04 
- .29* 
.09 
-.41* 
.34* 
.12 
-.09 
.03 
Assistance .20* 
Primary Group Aid -.25* 
Insurance Adequacy .19* 
Aid Adequacy .24* 
Household Moves -.19* 
EXPLAINED 
VARIANCE (R2) 
.23 
.24 
.31 
.34 
.30 
.44 
*Significant at .05 level. 
ERROR 
VARIANCE 
.77 
.76 
.69 
.66 
.70 
.56 
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victims (see Tables V-22 to V-26 for a comparative analysis of the other 
ethnic groups included in this report). 
For each dependent variable in Tables 111-23 and 24, there are sig-
nificant convergences and divergences between blacks and whites. The use 
of disaster assistance for both groups is determined by disaster losses 
(% of damage) and age. Higher losses increase the likelihood of members 
of either group using formal aid, while, for both groups, older victims 
were less likely to use such aid. For blacks but not whites, marital 
status was pos it i ve ly assoc i ated with us i ng ass i stance. On the other 
hand, larger white families were less likely to use formal aid, while 
those with higher socioeconomic status were more likely to do so. 
Neither of these factors were found important in affecting aid receipt 
for blacks. 
Primary group aid for whites was determined by only one factor, 
marital status. Married whites were less likely to receive inf~rmal aid, 
indicating that marriage may function as an intrafamily social support. 
The same was found to hold for black victims. In addition, older blacks 
and those with larger families were less likely to receive informal 
support than other blacks. Damage 1 eve 1 s, however, were found to be 
positively associated with receiving primary group aid; blacks with high 
losses were likely to turn to the primary group for assistance. 
Insurance adequacy is determined by the same variables for both 
subsamples, but not always in the same way. Persons with higher socio-
economic status and higher losses were more likely to assess their insur-
ance coverage as adequate. The fact that higher losses are pos it i ve ly 
associated with insurance adequacy reflects the fact that those with high 
losses tended to have thei r homes "written off" by thei r insurers and 
thus were able to build completely new homes with their insurance (see 
Bolin, 1982, for additional discussion). The divergence between the two 
groups comes with the variable "aye"; older whites were more likely to 
have adequate insurance compared to other whites while the reverse held 
for black victims. 
Two of the determinants of aid adequacy were the same for both 
groups. For both, large families were more likely to report having re-
ceived inadequate aid, reflecting the greater needs of such families. 
Likewise, and perhaps ironically, families of higher socioeconomic status 
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were more likely to report receiving adequate aid. The data also indi-
cate that older blacks were less likely to receive adequate aid than 
other blacks, and that whites with higher losses were more likely to 
report aid as adequate than those less severely affected (perhaps reflec-
ting a similar dynamic to that noted for insurance adequacy). 
The number of household moves was determined by the same three 
variables for both groups. Generally family size was positively related 
with number of household moves while socioeconomic status was negatively 
associated, indicating that larger families were more likely to change 
residences while those with higher socioeconomic status were more likely 
to estab 1 i sh a permanent res i dence soon a fter the disaster. Age was 
positively associated with the number of household moves for white vic-
tims, but negatively for blacks. 
Looking at overall economic recovery as measured eight months after 
the disaster, the two samples are similar, but with a few divergences. 
For both blacks and whites, recovery is negatively associated with family 
size and positively associated with social class, disaster assistance, 
and the adequacy of aid and insurance payments received. However, as 
shown earlier, it was found that blacks were much less likely to have re-
ceived adequate aid compared to whites. Given that the dependent varia-
ble is economic recovery, it is not surprising that socioeconomic and aid 
factors contributed heavily to variation in the dependent variable. The 
important divergences between black and white victim recovery are associ-
ated with the black mOdel. The number of postdisaster moves was found to 
contribute negatively to recovery as was primary group aid. While, as 
shown earlier, primary group aid contributed positively to the emotional 
recovery of blacks, it was found to be negatively associated with econom-
ic recovery in the path model. This possibly suggests that in some 
portion of the sample, primary group aid was used as an inadequate sub-
stitute for formal aid, and thus had a negative association with economic 
recovery. In some instances it was the failure to qualify for aid 
sources that forced victims to rely on the primary group for recovery 
resources. Lastly, having to make relatively frequent postdisaster resi-
dential changes had a negative effect on black economic recovery, 
suggesting that the expenses involved prevented rapid economic recovery. 
Overall, the two models of economic recovery show similar causal 
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patterns, suggesting that di sasters create stresses on vi ctim famil i es 
that are generally uniform across social categories and that responses to 
those stresses are somewhat similar. The final chapter examines conver-
gences and divergences in patterns of aid utilization and family recovery 
for all of the sites studied. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FLOODING IN UTAH 
Introduction 
----.--
This chapter presents an analysis of the Utah flooding of 1983, 
focusing on a small sample of victim families as well as a survey of 
organizations involved in aid and recovery. The disaster presented a 
unique opportunity to examine the relief and aid operations of a well 
established religious organization. 
Because the Mormon Church (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints [LOS]) is a dominant and affluent institution in Utah with a 
history of self-reliance among its members, research on the Utah floods 
differed from the victim surveys described in other chapters. The nature 
of the disaster itself also prompted deviation from the "standard" 
surveys; because flooding and mudslides occurred in numerous, sometimes 
isolated areas around the state, research was focused on the hardest hit 
Wasatch Front communities in Davis County north of Salt Lake City. In 
Davis County, 13 homes were destroyed and 40 sustained major damage. The 
studies reported in other chapters of this book involve far greater 
numbers of homes and higher levels of damage. In order to study recovery 
and aid, a significant number of subjects must have experienced losses 
sufficient to create a condition from which to recover. Because the 
number of victims in Davis County was small, it was decided to focus in-
depth on some of the harder hit fami 1 i es. That info rmat i on was supp 1 e-
mented by an examination of the role of the LOS Church ~ ~ ~ more 
traditional disaster aid organizations. 
The Wasatch Front communities of Bountiful and Farmington were 
selected as the sites to be examined. Although a case study approach 
does not result in statistically significant conclusions, the experiences 
of victims and the organizational activities in these communities seemed 
reasonably representative of other flooded areas in the state. In addi-
tion, the opportunity to examine unique social and religious forces 
outweighed the need for statistical precision. Therefore, before de-
scribing methods and findings, a general description of the social and 
cultural features of the LOS Church in Utah is presented. 
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I;' 
The Mormon Church 
.--------------
The LDS Church is intricately bound to the social structure, econom-
ics, and politics of Utah. The population of Utah is approximately 75% 
Mormon, and the church itself is rapidly expanding as a result of nation-
al and international missionary efforts (Campbell and Campbell, 1978). 
Additionally, the emphasis on large families as part of church doctrine 
results in an inevitable increase in church membership (Skolnick et al., 
1978) • 
The features of the church most affecting disaster recovery are its 
structure and its involvement with the family and local communities. The 
complex hierarchical organization of the Mormon Church essentially re-
quires all males to be active within the priesthood. There are two 
orders of priests (higher and lower), and each order contains a number of 
ranks whi ch each pri est ascends accordi ng to the amounts and types of 
church activities he pursues (Kephart, 1980). 
The church is organized and administered both vertically· and hori-
zontally (O'dea, 1957). Horizontally, the key organizational entities, 
and those that figured most prominently in disaster response, are stakes 
and wards. Wards are a basic geographical unit consisting of, on the 
average, around 600 persons in a contiguous area. Each ward is adminis-
tered by a bishop. All Mormons must belong to a ward (Kephart, 1980). 
The bishop, through reports of subordinates, is kept informed of possible 
needs or problems among ward families. Groups of wards are organized 
. into a larger structural unit known as a stake. Each stake is di rected 
by a president who in turn appoints ward bishops. Presidents, like 
bishops, manage their respective domains and attend to emerging problems 
(0' dea, 1957). 
While the church has an elaborate hierarchy, a feature more salient 
to this research is the church's participatory nature. Starting at age 
twelve, Mormons begins taking an active role in ward and stake activities 
as well as in the symbolically significant temple ceremonies. Families 
in wards are periodically visited by traveling teachers of the church as 
well as their bishops. 
There are annual and semiannual conferences and visits by the 
apostles ••• There are weekly social events and Mormon holiday 
celebrations ••• There are a host of subsidiary organizations: 
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women's relief society, young men's and young women's mutual im-
provement associations, scout troops, and Sunday school union, the 
Genealogical Society, the church welfare plan, and so on (Kephart, 
1980, p.220). 
All participation is voluntary, but participation rates are nevertheless 
high, creating an important social cohesiveness amony members and main-
taining an organizational structure in which large numbers of members can 
be mobilized in response to any untoward event. 
A major focus of church doctri ne is the strength and stabi 1 ity of 
the fami ly. LOS members tend to have 1 arger than average fami 1 i es and 
also tend to maintain active kinship networks well beyond the nuclear 
family, although three generation families are not more frequent than 
among non-LOS membe rs (Campbe 11 and Campbe 11, 1981). F ami 1 i es a re en-
couraged to meet once a week (Monday night) for a "family home evening" 
(Campbell and Campbell, 1981), and on such evenings to engage in various 
recreational activities (Kephart, 1980). 
Mormon famil i es typi ca 11y gi ve 10% of thei r income to support the 
church ("tithiny"). In addition, once a month families are asked to 
forgo a meal and donate the money they saved to the church welfare sys-
tem. The church is therefore able to maintain stores in which Mormons 
may obtain foodstuffs and other items if they cannot provide them for 
themselves. Thus, although self-sufficiency is stressed (O'dea, 1957), 
the LOS church provides a support system for those who cannot provide for 
themselves. 
This brief overview of the cultural and organizational features of 
the church illustrates the structures and networks that provide indivi-
duals and families with support and social cohesiveness. These features 
resulted in somewhat unique response strategies when the Utah floodiny 
commenced. 
Resea rch _Q.es i gn 
Eleven victim families in Davis County were interviewed in depth. 
Three lived in Farmington and eight lived in Bountiful. In addition, ten 
officials from disaster relief and emergency organizations were inter-
vi ewed--two representing the LOS Church, one representing the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), one representing the State of Utah's 
91 
Department of Social Services' Individual Family Grant program (IFG), one 
representing Davis County Emergency Services, two representing the Salt 
Lake Area Chapter of the American Red Cross, one representing the Gover-
nor's Task Force on Flood Relief, and two representing the Salt Lake Area 
Chamber of Commerce's Flood Recovery Committee. 
Inst ruments 
Two in-depth interview schedules were constructed. One was adminis-
tered to victim families, the other to organization officials. The 
victim interview schedule contained 104 questions, the organization 
schedule, 25. All questions on both interview schedules were open ended 
and designed to provide the maximum opportunity for respondent and inter-
viewer to pursue issues in depth. All interviews were recorded on cas-
sette tapes, transcribed, and their content subsequently analyzed. 
Victim interviews asked basic family demographic characteristics: 
age and sex composition of families, family size, family type, residen-
t i a 1 hi story, and income, educat ion, occupat ion, marita 1 status, and 
religious affiliation of heads of household and respondents. A second 
series of questions asked victims to describe their flood experience--
including events leading to and following the disaster, injuries, deaths, 
family disruptions resulting from residential dislocations, temporary 
housing, and repair work. That section also included questions relating 
to employment and effects of the floods on work patterns. A third series 
of questions asked victims to describe the percentage and dollar amounts 
of property losses to home, home contents, and vehicles. A fourth set 
asked about the amount and types of aid received from formal disaster 
relief organizations and from primary group members. In addition, vic-
tims were asked to describe how important each type of aid was to their 
emotional and economic recovery and how the they felt about accepting 
such aid. A fifth series asked about home insurance coverage and the 
percent and amount of aid and insurance recei ved from insurance and 
disaster relief organizations. A final set of questions dealt with the 
disaster's effects on health, family cohesion, day-to-day activities, 
neighborhood, community, family members' emotional well being and feel-
ings of optimism and pesslmlsm. In general, to permit comparisons, 
questions asked of the Utah respondents directly paralleled the questions 
used at the other sites. 
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Di saster re 1 i ef organi zat ion i ntervi ew schedul es obtained i nforma-
tion on the chronology of operations, services provided (including types 
of services, number of victims reached, and dollar amount of operations), 
the organization's outreach to victims, staffing, funding, community 
interest, coordination with other organizations, program assessment, and 
plans for program activities in the future. 
SampJ i ng 
The representativeness of the sample relative to any larger group 
cannot be statistically determined. The interviews were conducted simply 
to gain insight into the effects of a strong, pervasive church organiza-
tion on communities experiencing disaster. Potential respondents were 
selected from computer lists of victims supplied by the city manager 
offices of Farmington and Bountiful. Victims with moderate to total 
property losses were selected at random and contacted by telephone to set 
up interview appointments. None of the persons contacted refused an 
interview, and all of the appointments resulted in complete interviews. 
In th ree instances more than one adult was present fo r the i nte rvi ew; 
however, i ntervi ews were conducted so that in each of these instances, 
there was a single respondent who was designated as a representative of 
the family. 
Those relief organizations typically present in disasters and those 
referred by other organization officials were selected for interview. 
Officials interviewed were those in charge of the disaster relief func-
tion for the Salt Lake-Davis County area for their respective organiza-
tions. They were contacted by telephone to set up interviews one to two 
weeks prior to the actual field visit. 
Interviewing and An~ 
The project's research associate, an experienced interviewer, con-
ducted all interviews. Interviews with both officials and family re-
spondents were conducted duri ng the 1 ast two weeks of September 1983, 
approximately three months following the floods and mud slides; they took 
approximately two to three hours to complete. 
The cassette tapes of the i ntervi ews were t ransc ri bed, and the 
transcriptions were coded by preselected variables to provide summary 
statistics and descriptions. In addition, content was analyzed according 
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to subjects mentioned by respondents in order to identify and develop 
salient issues for further examination. 
!.98~J!.!.a~£~~~~ __ A Summary of Events 
In recent times, Utah's climate has lacked moisture; it is an arid 
1 and with dry soil s. Events 1 eadi ng to the extens i ve fl oods and mud 
slides in the spring of 1983 began in the previous September. At that 
time, northern Utah experienced an unusually heavy rainfall that satura-
ted the Wasatch Mountains and did not dry before the winter snowfall 
began. Duri ng the wi nter, up to ei ght feet of snow accumul ated on the 
peaks. Most of the principle cities of Utah, containing 90% of the 
population of the state, lie at the base of the Wasatch Front. In the 
spring, the mountains' snow usually melts slowly into the dry soil. 
However, a late thaw brought rapid melting on top of the already satura-
ted soil. Consequently, heavy runoff and dislodged mud and rock poured 
into the drainage canyons and continued on toward the cities below. 
Flooding occurred along the Wasatch Front from the beginning of 
Apri 1 through the end of July. The fi rst major fl ood began on Apri 1 12 
in Thistle, a small town located about 60 miles south of Salt Lake City. 
Mud slides washed out roads and created a dam across the canyon in which 
Thistle was located. Flood waters filled the canyon to depths of up to 
185 feet deep, and, by April 30, the 22 families living in Thistle had 
all been evacuated and relocated. They were still displaced by Thistle 
Lake at the time of interviewing. The lake and flooding in counties 
south of Salt Lake City not only displaced families, but also cut off 
hundreds of coal miners from their jobs. 
The next major flood took place during the last week of May in Salt 
Lake City and directly to the north in Davis County (discussed below). 
As flood waters came down the mountains to the east of Salt Lake City, a 
major city storm sewer became jammed with debris. To save residences and 
businesses, flood waters were redirected to the Jordan River through two 
sandbag can a 1 s erected on city st reets. One two mi 1 e-l ong canal was 
located thirteen blocks south of Temple Square. Another mile-long canal 
was erected on State St reet in the heart of the cent ra 1 bus i ness di s-
t ri ct. 
The last major flood occurred near Delta, Utah, when the D.M.A.D. 
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Dam broke on July 23. Two small towns, Oasis and Deseret, and other 
parts of Millard County were evacuated. 
It is estimated that over 5,000 famil ies were affected in some 
fashion by the spring and summer floods in Utah. Of the 29 counties in 
Utah, 22 received federal disaster declarations. All 22 were eligible 
for public assistance, and eleven were declared eligible for individual 
assistance as well. The first federal declaration came on April 30, and 
counties were added to this declaration through July as the flooding 
continued. Disaster Assistance Centers were set up in Spanish Fork, 
Ogden, Salt Lake City, Farmington, and Delta. The centers were supported 
by a state-wide hotline that could be used to apply for assistance. 
Because of their dense population and the severity of their flooding 
and mud slides, three communities in Davis County just north of Salt Lake 
City--Bountiful, Centerville, and Farmington--were considered the hardest 
hit in Utah. They have a combined population of approximately 45,000 in 
a county of 146,000. 
At the time of interviewing, the director of emergency services in 
Davis County estimated public damage at approximately $15,000,000 and 
pri vate los ses at $8,250,000. Damage to pri vate res i dences included 13 
homes totally destroyed, 40 homes with major damage, and 375 homes with 
minor damage. There were no deaths or serious injuries due to the flood-
ing. Utility services were affected for short periods of time, and the 
water supply was affected for several weeks. In various areas water had 
to be shipped in or boiled. 
The problems for Davis County began in the last week of May when an 
unusually cool spring ended abruptly with temperatures climbing into the 
nineties. Small creeks originating in mountain canyons suddenly over-
flowed and threatened nearby homes. Persons living along the creeks used 
sandbags to protect thei r homes, and geol ogi sts began flyi ng over the 
canyons twice a day, looking for cracks and changes in the snow. In 
addition, on-site "technical committees" (groups of technicians monitor-
ing streams) watched the creeks around the clock, reporting changes in 
water color and level. On May 28, Davis County Emergency Services acti-
vated a 24-hour staff. 
Major flooding began on May 29 in Centerville and Farmington. 
Basements of homes were flooded, and roads, bridges and culverts sus-
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tained damage. In the early evening of May 30, Memorial Day, a major 
mud, rock, and debris slide came down Rudd Creek into Farmington. It 
gathered a great amount of speed with its plunge, and when it reached the 
town, it knocked homes from foundations, and partially smashed or de-
stroyed them. With only the actual mud slide to warn them, residents had 
little time to evacuate. 
Later that night and early into the next morning, Bountiful was hit 
with major floods and slides from three canyons. The most severe mud 
s 1 i de came from Stone Creek; water enteri ng the town eroded roads and 
culverts and eventually formed a 30-foot high wave of mud and water. The 
s 1 i de of rock and debri s cut a gorge 50 feet deep and 150 feet wi de in 
some areas. As it came down the creek, it smashed some homes, fi 11 ed 
others with mud, and knocked down a power station, cutting off power and 
communication in Bountiful. Some victims were warned to evacuate by 
neighbors and friends, some were warned by the police, and others re-
ceived no warning. They were awakened by mud smashing into their homes. 
A total of approximately 200 to 300 people were evacuated from the 
three affected cities (Committee on Natural Disaster, 1984). One evacua-
tion center was set up at Farmington Junior High School. The location of 
evacuation centers in Bountiful had to be changed several times to avoid 
fl ood paths and 1 ack of ut i 1 i ty servi ce--a center fi na 11 y bei ng estab-
lished at Woods Cross High School in a city adjacent to Bountiful. Less 
than half of the evacuees stayed overnight at the centers. LDS bishops 
were present at the centers to relocate victims to emergency housing in 
the homes of church ward members. In addition, residents of two nursing 
home facilities were temporarily evacuated to a Council on Aging Center. 
At these centers, the Red Cross provided necessities and set up mass 
feeding operations. 
After the initial emergency period, debris removal and cleanup by 
public agencies and the LDS Church began. The cleanup of private homes 
was, for the most part, accomplished by volunteer LDS work crews. At the 
same time, disaster relief organizations began operations to provide 
victims with longer-term assistance. The federal government provided 
support for temporary housing, household necessities, and furniture 
through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and low interest 
loans through the Small Business Administration. Individual Family 
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Grants were made available through Utah's Department of Social Services. 
The American Red Cross provided emergency assistance and then entered 
into its Additional Assistance Phase to provide support for major repair 
and rebuilding of private homes. 
A number of new disaster relief groups emerged to provide stricken 
families with assistance not available from other organizations. The LDS 
Church provided several types of aid, including money, labor, household 
necessities, and emotional support. The governor of Utah organized a 
Task Force on Flood Relief to coordinate the activities of the various 
disaster relief organizations providing assistance to victims state 
wide. 
The response to the disaster, both organizationally and in terms of 
volunteers, was the result of planning and monitoring by federal, state, 
county, and local organizations that began a number of months prior to 
the actual flooding. The potential for flooding in the Wasatch Front has 
been recognized for at least 15 years (Committee on Natural Disasters, 
1984). Thi s awareness has 1 ed to numerous preparedness act i vi ties and 
the designation of a full-time flood control director in Salt Lake 
County. 
Contingency plans were in place, and flooding potential had received 
wide media publicity for several months prior to the actual flooding. 
Thus equipment, materials, and personnel (both voluntary and paid) were 
ready and eas il y mobil i zed in Sa lt Lake City and the cit i es of Da vi s 
county (Committee on Natural Disaster, 1984). The Mormon Church, as will 
be seen, was of key importance in mobil i zi ng vol unteers for both emer-
gency period activities (sandbagging, etc.) and for clean-up in the 
aftermath. The church not only used its organization of wards and stakes 
to mobilize volunteers, it also developed an active media campaign. 
It was this preplanning of hazard response by organizations at all 
levels as well as the ready recruitment and management of volunteers that 
restricted the potentially devastating damage of the floods and mud 
flows in Utah. 
Findings: Effects on and Responses of Victims 
Demographic Characteristics 
The 11 victim families were interviewed in-depth in September 1983. 
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The majority of respondents (seven) fell between the ages of 30 and 59. 
One respondent was under 30, and three were in thei r 60s. All of the 
respondents were married, except for one who had been divorced just prior 
to the flood. 
All of the respondent families could be described as having middle 
socioeconomic status, although monthly take-home income for the families 
ranged from $200 to $2,500, with a median income of $1,780. The low 
income of $200 could be attributed to loss of employment rather than to 
persistent low socioeconomic status. The head of that household had some 
co 11 ege educat i on and normally was emp 1 oyed at a hi gher occupat i ona 1 
level. Income loss related to the disaster was not a problem for any of 
the respondent famil i es except for one el derly head of househol d who 
chose early retirement in order to have time to rebuild his home. In 
three households, one spouse was employed, and in two households, both 
spouses were employed. Of the six households without employed members, 
four heads of the households were retired, one was disabled, and one 
unemployed. 
All heads of household had at least a high school education with 
eight having some college, a college degree, or post-graduate education. 
In terms of occupation or former occupation of the heads of household, 
three held professional positions, four were in managerial positions, two 
were in skilled services and sales, and two in unskilled services and 
labor. 
Six of the respondent families had at least one child under 18 year 
old in the household, while the other five families contained only 
adults. Family sizes ranged from two to nine members. Four families had 
two members, four had three or four members, and three families had over 
four members. 
The cities of Bountiful and Farmington are predominantly Mormon. 
Ni ne of the respondents were members of The Church of Jesus Chri st of 
Latter-Day Saints (LOS), and all of the LOS respondents were active in 
their church and considered religion very important in their lives. One 
elderly man was not active in the church but still considered religion 
somewhat important. 
l~~~~~~~~esponse 
Material losses experienced by victims were divided into four types: 
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housing damage, home content losses, losses of personal possessions, and 
. damage or loss of motor vehicles. Respondents estimated the percentage 
of damage to the structure of their homes and yards and the dollar amount 
needed to repair or replace them. Typically, estimates were based on 
estimates already prepared for disaster relief agencies. All of the 
respondent families owned their homes, and several had paid-up mortgages. 
They had lived in their homes anywhere from two to 43 years, with a mean 
of 15 years. Similarly, they had lived in their communities from ten to 
53 years, with an average of 24 years. 
Regarding estimated home and yard damage, one family lost less than 
50%; six families lost from 50% to 90%; and four families had their homes 
completely destroyed. Dollar losses to houses and yards ranged from 
$13,000 to $125,000, with a mean of $54,000. Three families had less 
than $20,000 damage, three families had $20,000 to $50,000 in losses, and 
five families sustained over $50,000 in damage. 
Structural losses may have been more severe than one might normally 
expect from mud slides and flooding of this type due to housing styles in 
the Davis County area. Except for the four houses that were totally 
destroyed, damage was limited to yards and basements. However, in that 
area it is fashionable to entirely finish basements into bedrooms, family 
rooms, and work rooms. The homes of all of the families interviewed had 
completely finished and furnished basements, and damage restricted to the 
basement, therefore, resulted in significant losses. 
Damage to respondents' home contents and furnishings were lower than 
that reported to home structures--both proportionally and in absolute 
doll ars. Three fami 1 i es lost 1 ess than 50% of thei r contents; seven 
lost from 50% to 99%; and one family lost 100%. Dollar losses ranged 
from $2,000 to $50,000, with a mean of $19,000. Three families had less 
than $5,000 in losses; four families had $5,000 to $25,000; and four 
families sustained losses of over $25,000. 
Loss of motor vehicles was substantial. Almost half of the respon-
dents reported cars or motorcycles so severely damaged they could not be 
used, and losses ranged from one to four vehicles per household. Dollar 
losses ranged from $100 to $6,000, with a mean of $1,660. 
Respondents were asked about the loss of mementos or personal pos-
sessions--losses that were particularly upsetting. Since it is difficult 
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to place dollar values on losses of this type, respondents were not asked 
to est i mate va 1 ue, but rather to discuss the los s. Although all respon-
dents reported losses of this type, the kinds of items mentioned varied 
greatly. Interviewees typically mentioned antiques, photographs, geneal-
ogies, travel souvenirs, family heirlooms, awards, musical instruments, 
and valuables, such as furs, jewelry, and art. Many respondents thought 
of these items as irreplaceable pieces of their lives. For example, one 
elderly man spoke of his loss saying, 
And I had my mother's--she's been dead since 1945--1 had her kitchen 
table down there and three chairs. They were battered up. Sure, 
they were old. I have no family left. I'm the only one left in my 
entire family ••• So that was important to me. 
Others mentioned the loss of lawns, flowers, shrubs, and trees. One 
woman described her yard and the years of work and effort put into it: 
We had a beautiful stream in our backyard ••• The house was okay, 
but it was actually the lot, why we bought it. And my husband had 
spent four years lining the creek with rocks--just beautiful--even 
the streambed. (We) made little waterfalls and things and had all 
these trees ••• Everything--those stone-lined things I told you 
about--they went the first day ••• And we kept losing the banks all 
that week, and our trees kept falling in. 
All but one of the families managed to save their pets. The mother 
of that family described how the loss affected her teenaged son: 
My youngest son really hasn't shown any emotion at all ••• When we 
got home he was so worried about the dog, and everyday he'd call the 
dog pound. And I kept sayi ng, 'She's run away. • • She was areal 
good dog. Somebody probably found her.' He was there. He found 
her ••• He'd just look at the dog and walk off and then come back 
and look, just to make sure it was her. 
Although respondents felt a sense of loss for sentimental, personal 
possessions, they also clearly valued their families' safety over the 
loss of "material things." In describing her feelings, one mother of a 
large family said, "When we drove down the street and had all of our 
children ••• I just knew in my mind that our house was gone ••• We were 
so thankful that we escaped with our lives and our children that at that 
point we made the decision that the rest didn't matter." 
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Respondents were asked to compare thei r losses to those of other 
. persons in the area who were affected by the flooding. Seven respondents 
felt "worse off", four felt "better off", but none felt that their losses 
were the "same" as others. Of the four respondents who felt "better 
off," two were the only ones among those interviewed who had flood insur-
ance. Interesti ngly, another woman who felt "better off" had her home 
totally destroyed. She explained, 
Well, some of the homes were. covered with mud in basements, 
and so they lost a lot of things, and it was such a terrible mess. 
Then they have to muck it out, clean it, and restructure it. So in 
some ways I'm better off starting out new--with everything new. I 
even feel guilty at times because I didn't have mud in my home. 
'personal Injuries 
In Davis County, there were no deaths and only minor injuries re-
lated to the disaster, and none of the respondents knew anyone who was 
injured. Therefore, this group of respondents did not have to deal with 
the psychological and social effects of death and injury and their atten-
dant family disruption. However, many of those interviewed recounted 
experi ences that came very close to resulting in death and i nj ury. In 
Farmington, where the mud slide occurred in the evening, one woman talked 
about her fears of what coul d have happened if it had occurred 1 ater. 
Her children and a grandchild were staying in the house while she was 
vacationing. "Well ," she said, 
when we went digging in our bedroom, we found the rocks that broke 
in through our bedroom ••• ripped the headboard off our bed, and 
that's where they (her daughter and son-in-law) would have been 
sleeping. The baby's bassinet was just bits and pieces of 
wicker ••• if it hit at night, we'd lost them all. 
Another elderly man described his escape from his house which was hit by 
a mud avalanche: 
The only means of escape was across that bridge in the front of the 
house here. There's no other doors or exit that we could get out. 
The mud was a·1 ready gushi ng in every room of the house. •• My wi fe 
slipped and fell ••• and I had to reach down and grab her. we 
struggled our way on out to the street ••• by some miracle that 
bridge withstood that terrific impact that hit it. 
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~~~~~~~ti~~_~~~~ocation. Psycnological Impacts 
The cities of Bountiful, Centerville, and Farmington lie at the base 
of the Wasatch Mounta ins. Flood waters of me lted snow came down those 
mountains, picking up mud, trees, rocks, and other debris. The waters 
followed the paths of normally gentle creeks into the cities where homes 
lined those creeks. The extent of damage to individual homes depended on 
proxi mity to the fl ood path, 1 ocat ion re 1 at i ve to path bends, and the 
amount and type of debris being carried. Therefore, there was great 
variation in the damage sustained by individual homes. Some homes had 
water in the basements, others were inundated with mud, whil estill 
others were knocked from their foundations. 
In most instances, affected nei ghborhoods were evacuated for the 
night because the situation was unpredictable. Afterwards, a good number 
of famil i es we re 1 eft with uni nhabitab 1 e homes because of st ructura 1 
damage and/or the mess created by the mUd. Many fami 1 i es had to fi nd 
emergency shelter, and some had to find longer-term temporary housing 
until their homes could be cleaned, repaired, replaced, or new permanent 
housing could be obtained. 
A 11 of those i ntervi ewed had to 1 eave thei r homes for at 1 east one 
ni ght. Temporary residenti al changes ranged from one to seven moves, 
with most families moving two or three times. The typical progression of 
moves was a first night's emergency stay in a shelter or the home of 
family or friends, a short stay with family or friends, and then a longer 
stay in private, temporary housing. At the time of the interviews, 
(approximately five months after the flood), five families were still not 
living in permanent housing. Four of those had their homes totally 
destroyed and had not started building new homes. The other family had 
their home nearly destroyed and was in the process of rebuilding it. 
Nine families lived in temporary housing for at least two months. 
Two families moved back to their damaged homes almost immediately follow-
ing the flood, even though living conditions were uncomfortable; mud 
remained in the lower levels of the homes, and some utilities were not in 
service. One of these respondents did not want to leave his home un-
attended, and the other wanted to live on site so that repair work could 
be continuous. 
Emergency shelters were set up by the Red Cross and LDS Stake 
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Houses. Three respondent families made use of these shelters from one to 
three nights. Two (both LOS members) went to LOS Stake Houses, and one 
non-LOS member went to the evacuation center. All of the respondents had 
the problem of not knowing where to go once they evacuated their homes, 
whether they left of their own accord or were officially evacuated. Of 
the three who went to emergency shelters, two said that they stumbled on 
them, and the other said he was given the information by a policeman 
directing traffic. Other respondents said that the police would not let 
them stop for information. Most drove around making their way through 
roadblocks and flooded streets until they could reach the homes of 
friends or relatives. Of the eight families that did not use public 
emergency shelters, two went to the homes of friends and six stayed with 
relatives. 
In the course of their moves, nine families ultimately ended up 
staying with relatives, usually their parents or children, and two 
stayed with friends. These stays ranged from several days to six weeks. 
Seven respondents reported that thei r fami 1 i es had to sp 1 it up at some 
time during their moves while longer-term housing was being secured. 
Of the nine families that had to find this type of housing, one stayed 
with parents, three rented apartments, and five rented houses. 
Subsidies for longer-term temporary housing were available to victim 
families through FEMA. Of the nine who needed long-term housing, one did 
not qualify because the family stayed with relatives. Three families had 
their rent partially subsidized by FEMA, and initially, four families 
received full subsidies from FEMA. However, one of those families had 
their subsidy withdrawn by FEMA after two months. That respondent re-
ported that FEMA told them that because their destroyed home had a paid-
up mortgage, the family could afford to pay their own rent. The respon-
dent said he felt "betrayed," because a temporary house had been rented 
and financial plans for rebuilding had been made based on FEMA's promised 
support. One family refused temporary housing support even though they 
qualified for it. That respondent explained, "Because the government had 
its own problems. mean, they're trying to take care of a lot of 
people. We thought by doing that, that we could help other people, and 
then if we needed the help, we could call them." 
For two principle reasons, FEMA did not bring in mobile homes for 
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temporary housing in Davis county. First, only a small percentage of 
county residents were affected by the flooding, and second, sufficient 
rental housing was available in the area to meet the needs of victims. 
As was discussed in Chapter II, the frequency of residential changes 
and the fact of living in temporary housing have both been found to have 
emotional/psychosocial effects on families (see, for example, Gleser et 
al., 1981). Respondents were asked to discuss the disruptions that their 
families experienced in making residential changes. Of the ten families 
who made sign ifi cant changes (one couple was away from thei rhome fo r 
only one night), six said that the disruption was extreme and four said 
that it was moderate. The number of res i dent i a 1 changes di d not appear 
to be associated with each respondent's assessment of disruption. 
The most frequently mentioned disruption was families' having to 
split-up and stay in different places. This was particularly difficult 
because they felt they were in a crisis and wanted to be together to 
support one another. Another frequently mentioned disruption involved 
the loss of belongings necessary for day to day life; victims were ex-
pected to carryon routine activities without those essential belongings. 
Other disruptions were caused by the work involved in moving, the diffi-
culty of making friends in new areas, and the anxiety of having unattend-
ed homes and property. 
Respondents were also asked to assess and discuss the disruptions 
caused by living in long-term temporary housing. These circumstances did 
not appear to be as disruptive as the residential changes. Of the nine 
families who lived in temporary housing, two said that the disruption was 
extreme, four said it was moderate, and three said that is was slight. 
The most frequently mentioned positive aspect of temporary housing 
was the privacy it afforded families in crisis. One woman explained, 
I just could not have lived with other people because we were upset 
as it was. And, when you go in with other people, you feel like 
company, and it's disruptive in itself, for them and you ••• I 
would have died if I hadn't of had a place to go to be alone. 
Other positive aspects mentioned were proximity to the damaged home, 
safety in the new locale, and the ability to keep belongings and family 
together. 
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The negat i ve aspects of temporary hous i ng that we re ment i oned i n-
. cluded the loss of and difficulty in managing belongings, and the sense 
of impermanence and never feeling "settled in." A young woman (the only 
one to find long-term housing with relatives), although appreciative of 
her parents' help, described what it was like to live with them: 
"You don't go back home, after living 18 years away, with three kids 
and a big dog ••• It's little things that really get to you. 
Mother would come home [and say], 'Where is this, I never put that 
there' ••• I wanted to be good. I was again the little child." 
Because on ly the basement 1 eve 1 s of many homes we re damaged, six 
families were able to live in upper levels while repair work was in 
progress. All, however, found that situation disruptive. One common 
probl em was a desi re to restore such homes as soon as possi bl e; the 
families seemed to feel that only then could normalcy be restored to 
their lives. One man described the effects on him and his wife: "Terri-
ble, terrible, we couldn't sleep, just could not sleep. We sat here, 
we'd getup, listen, we'd go to bed ••• in an hour or two we was wide 
awake, couldn't sleep, and so we'd get up ••• It went on like that for 
weeks." Another man explained that his zeal to finish repairs resulted 
in mistakes and delays. "It's been a pain," he said, 
because I'm not a carpenter ••• I wish that I would've taken time. 
Like I just worked here day after day, and I got more and more 
frustrated. I got working on something all day long, and then I'd 
find out that I should have done something else first, because I was 
going to screw up what I'd just done. 
Other common frustrations included the constant dirt and the necessity of 
the family having to live in cramped quarters. 
Respondents were asked to di scuss di saster impacts on aspects of 
their social lives including changes in visiting patterns with relatives 
and friends, changes in leisure and recreational activities, and changes 
in neighborhood relationships. 
Of the 11 respondents, eight reported that visiting patterns had not 
changed as a resu 1 t of the di saster experi ence, one reported increased 
visits, and two reported decreased visits. Most of those reporting no 
change attributed the stability of those patterns to the LDS Church. In 
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order to remain active in the church, members are obliged to participate 
in church activities and routines. Therefore, even though victims were 
undergoing dramatic disruptions in other aspects of their lives, obliga-
tions to and activities within the church provided stability. 
In contrast to this stability, eight respondents reported that their 
family's leisure and recreational activities were severely curtailed, 
while the remainder reported that they had not changed. Of those report-
ing negative impacts, most attributed the curtailment to limits on time 
and economic resources; families concentrated their efforts on repairing 
and rebuilding homes and had little time or money available for vaca-
tions, sports, club activities, or nights out. Most said that they "just 
worked." One young man felt that limiting all of his time to working on 
his home may have been a mistake: 
That would be what I'd do differently, if I had to do it again. I'd 
do as much as I could for awhile then go and have a leisure activi-
ty ••• I think that was the frustrating thing [misSing leisure 
activities] ••• Then instead of doing it [working on the house] 
because it was important to me, I was doing it because I had to, and 
then I would get mad. 
Most of the respondents felt that the di saster experi ence had a 
positive impact on neighborhood relationships. Nine felt that relation-
ships had become closer, one felt that they had become strained, and one 
said they remained the same. The closer relationships appear to be the 
result of neighborhoods working together to protect property and lives. 
One woman explained that since her family is not LOS, they did not know 
their neighbors prior to the flooding: 
We feel better about it. We know people now, whereas we didn't know 
them before ••• by us not being active in their church ••• I never 
could get the people straight. I didn't know who lived where, and 
so now we do know. It's amazing. 
For those who shared LOS membership, relations became even closer. One 
woman church member reported, 
And, even though we lived there for some time and we were all good 
friends, we weren't that close. But now we're really close, like 
sisters and brothers, practically, and we look out for each other. 
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Victims families experienced considerable economic hardship due to 
. the fl oodi ng. Because Davi s County was not des i gnated as a flood a rea, 
National Flood Insurance could not be obtained, and few families had 
private insurance covering floods. Most families depended on public and 
private aid to cover losses, as well as their own incomes and savings. 
Two of the families interviewed had obtained flood insurance from Lloyd's 
of London. However, their insurance did not cover all of their structur-
al losses nor did it cover any home content losses. 
None of the respondent fami 1 i es had members lose thei r jobs as a 
result of the flooding. However, one elderly man retired early so that 
he could devote his time to rebuilding his home. In two other cases, a 
construction worker chose not to pursue jobs, and a physician closed his 
office for a short time so that they could work on their homes. In these 
situations, the families lost considerable income. Two female spouses 
quit work for short periods of time so that they could tend to thei r 
homes. One was compensated for the time by her employer, and the other 
was not. Only one member of the respondent families obtained an addi-
tional job to help cover losses. 
Respondents were asked to di scuss the impact of the di saster on 
several areas of family functioning: disruption of family routines, 
family stresses and strengths, and lasting effects still present at the 
time of interviewing (approximately three months after the flooct). 
As discussed above, the majority of respondent families experienced 
disruptions resulting from residential changes, temporary housing, and 
repair and rebuilding of homes. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
these disruptions, along with property losses, would affect family func-
tioning. All of the respondents reported that their families' day-to-day 
routines were disrupted, and only one respondent felt that they had 
returned to normal at the time of the interview. There was great variety 
in reported disruption of family routines, with many disruptions center-
ing on time and financial constraints resulting from the flood. Other 
disruptions mentioned included the sense of living out of boxes, hassles 
with aid officials, the time spent traveling to the damaged home, chil-
dren's loss of playmates, and the suspension of leisure and family ac-
t i vit i es. 
The disaster experience appears to have strengthened family ties for 
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the majority of respondent families. Seven reported closer family ties, 
three said that the disaster had no affect on family relationships, and 
one said that relationships had worsened. A young woman explained how 
the loss of their home strengthened her family relationships: 
It's been something very positive in our life. It's reaffirmed our 
love for one another ••• We know that we're important to each other 
and more important than house or other things ••• I think it's nice 
to have a point in your life where you decide what is important. I 
don't think a lot of people ever face that ••• We know basically 
what we want, what happiness is, so other things, we'll get through 
them. We'll figure this out. We'll work on it. 
Most respondents spoke of closer family relationships occurring in 
the long run, while recognizing that the experience did cause tension 
among family members at times. Typically, arguments centered on what to 
do about the situation and on what work should be done and who should do 
it to repair and rebuild homes. One woman complained that it was diffi-
cult to make her teenagers understand that they had to give up some 
recreational activities in order to help with the clean up and repair. 
Another young respondent described the tension between him and his preg-
nant wife: 
I wanted to get the house done for her, so she could get back in, 
but she wanted me to spend more time with her, so I'd get frus-
trated ••• and she'd get frustrated because I wouldn't take time 
for her ••• I kind of felt sorry for myself because I was here 
doing it all by myself ••• And I forgot that she COUldn't be 
here. And as I saw the house, 1itt1e-by-1itt1e, improving, she 
never saw it improve. 
Respondents were asked if their families were still feeling effects 
of the flood at the time of interviewing. All of the respondents men-
tioned negative residual impacts. The most frequently mentioned negative 
impact was that family life was still not back to norma1--work still had 
to be done on repairing and rebuilding their homes. Other frequently 
mentioned impacts were inadequate housing, waiting for city drainage and 
street repairs to complete yard repairs, financial problems, debris and 
dirt in homes, lost possessions, and lingering emotional effects. A 
woman described the day-to-day effect of lost possessions: "Of course, 
we feel the impact. Every time go to get something, I realize that I 
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don't have it anymore. And that comes up almost daily. That's going to 
be hard for a long time, yes." 
Residents were also asked to discuss several types of psychological/ 
emotional impacts on their families, including: emotional strain, storm 
anxieties, disaster impacts on children, and feelings of optimism/pessi-
mism about the future. 
All of the respondents reported that they experienced emotional 
strain at times following the flood, and all but one respondent reported 
emotional strain at the time of interviewing. Three respondents received 
formal counseling for disaster-related strain, two at a mental health 
center and one from a private psychologist. All three had terminated 
counseling by the time of interviewing, but they still complained of 
emotional strain. 
When asked to discuss what they personally did to reduce such 
strain, the majority of respondents mentioned "work." One man explained 
how working on his damaged property helped: 
You work. let's put it this way, your yard is full of mud, your 
basement's full of mud. And I suppose that your goal, your 
immediate goal is to get the damn mud out to the streets, where 
somebody will haul it off ••• Your long range goal is to put it 
back like it was before ••• And the closer you get to reaching that 
particular goal, the less emotional strain you have. 
Other strain-reducing techniques mentioned were not thinking about the 
disaster experience, getting away from the house and the work, and parti-
cipating in sports and religious activities. Only two respondents men-
tioned talking over their problems with family and friends. 
Ei ght fami 1 i es had returned or were p 1 anni ng to return to thei r 
former homes or home sites; all expressed concern for personal or proper-
ty safety. Two said that they wanted to sell their homes, and that if 
they could not sell them by the following spring, they would not live in 
their homes during the spring thaw. One woman explained, 
I will not be able to be here in the spring. I'll either have to be 
on vacation or moved. I couldn't sit here and listen and wait 
again. Now I know what the neighbors have felt for all these years. 
I can't go through it again. 
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Although others made the decision to remain in their homes, they did 
admit to anxieties about having their homes damaged again or their fami-
lies injured. Three families had their homes totally destroyed and their 
property bought by the city as a site for construction of a remedial 
catch basin. Understandably, those persons said they would not have 
wanted to rebuild on their former home sites. 
Only two respondents reported anxieties during rain storms. How-
ever, fi ve res pondents sa i d that they st ill had n i ghtma res about the 
flood. Some dreamed of cleaning homes and shoveling mud. Others had 
more emotional dreams. A woman described her recurring nightmares: 
They told me the mud was coming and I'd holler at the kids to come 
on, and you know how kids are, 'just a minute, I'm coming,' and they 
wouldn't come. The mud was and they wasn't ••• I'd be trying to 
pull them out, and they kept sinking, and I couldn't get them out of 
the mud. 
Four respondents had only adult children. However, three reported 
that their adult children were still feeling the effects of the flood, 
even though they were not directly involved. The effects were manifested 
primarily in emotion and anger over the loss of family home and posses-
sions. Of the six respondents who had minor children, two said that the 
fl ood had no 1 i ngeri ng effects on thei r chi 1 dren, two were not sure if 
thei r chil dren had been affected, and two thought that thei r chil dren 
were still feeling its effects. One woman said of her teenage children 
They don't want people asking them about it. They just want to be 
normal Joes ••• They don't like that label (mud slide victims) ••• 
Adults enjoy that, some really enjoy it, but teenagers don't want to 
be victims ••• They don't want to stand out. 
Respondents were asked to di scuss thei r fami ly' s future--whether 
they were optimistic or pessimistic. Eight felt optimistic, two felt 
pessimistic, and one held mixed feelings. The most common sources of 
optimism were that they were actively restoring their homes, that they 
were taking precautions against future damage, and that they had confi-
dence in their ability to handle another disaster. One woman felt that 
things could only get better: 
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When you're at the bottom of the barrel, the only way out is up. 
They've got to get better, they can't get worse ••• I think that if 
you're stuck in one place, and you're stuck there permanently, 
that's your own fault. I think if you want to get out of something, 
you can work at it. 
Both of the respondents who felt pessimistic about their future were 
elderly. One thought her home would be flooded again with the next 
spring thaw. The other had problems in several other aspects of her 
life, and the loss of her home was the additional life event that made 
her feel hopeless about the future. 
Findings: Aid Utilization and Recovery 
A number of aid programs and services were available to victim 
families in Davis County. National level agencies and organizations 
included the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Small 
Business Administration (SBA), and the Red Cross. At the state level, 
Individual Family Grants were administered through the State of Utah's 
Department of Social Services. The LDS Church provided aid and services 
primarily at the ward and stake levels. Local community and emergent 
flood organizations included Chambers of Commerce, service groups, the 
Governor's Task Force on Flood Relief, churches, merchants, and employ-
ers. 
Respondents were asked how they found out about the available disas-
ter aid programs, and a majority of respondents said that they were 
informed by the LDS Church. When reviewing cases for LDS aid, ward 
bishops and stake presidents typically informed victims about the 
presence and location of the Disaster Assistance Center. Most respon-
dents also received information about available aid through the media; 
newspapers appeared to be the most frequently consulted source. Other 
information sources mentioned were kin, friends, insurance agents, and 
officials at the evacuation centers. 
FEMA set up a Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) at Farmington Junior 
High School for victims in Davis County. Major disaster agencies and 
organizations, including FEMA, SBA, IFG, Internal Revenue Service, and 
the Red Cross, had tables at the DAC. LDS was not present formally; 
although respondents reported that ward bi shops were present and gi vi ng 
informal advice and information to their ward members. 
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All of the respondents reported that they went to the DAC in Farm-
i ngton at 1 east once. Seven sa i d that they had no prob 1 ems gett i ng to 
the DAC, nor did they have any problems understanding available programs 
or applying for aid. The four who did have problems most frequently 
mentioned confusion about exactly who was eligible to apply for programs 
(e.g., how could an individual apply for a Small Business Loan?), ques-
tions about family resources and losses that could not be immediately 
answered, disappointment over the amount and types of aid available, and 
frustration over the impersonal, routinized way that agencies dealt with 
victims. 
Formal Aid 
Although many organizations were involved in providing aid to vic-
tims, only the most frequently mentioned organizations are considered 
here. These were FEMA, SBA, IFG, LDS, American Red Cross, and local 
community and service organizations. Respondents were asked to list the 
organizations from which they received aid and to describe the types of 
aid they recei ved. They were al so asked if they found any of the pro-
grams unsatisfactory. 
FEMA provided two types of aid to victim families: financial sup-
port for temporary housing and aid to meet individual needs. Subsidies 
for temporary housing for up to one year were provided for those who 
qualified financially and needed rental housing until their homes were 
repaired or rebuilt. The amount of support was based on family size and 
need. No support was gi ven to those who chose to stay with fami ly or 
friendS. Available rental housing in the area was utilized, and it was 
not necessary to bring in trailers. 
Aid to meet individua"1 needs included money to begin the process of 
cleaning and repairing homes. This included providing necessities such 
as cleaning supplies, electrical supplies, hot water heaters, and fur-
naces. In addition, furniture packages were loaned with the option to 
buy at minimal cost. 
Nine respondents received aid from FEMA. The type of aid most 
frequent ly recei ved was tempo ra ry hous i ng (seven res pondent s). Three 
respondents received furniture, three received water heater repair or 
replacement, two received living kits (mops, brooms, plates, utensils, 
etc.), one received a refrigerator, one received bedding, and one re-
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ceived electrical fixtures. 
Two respondents found FEMA unsati s factory. One respondent who was 
handicapped was offered support for temporary housing, but FEMA made no 
effort to assist her in locating such housing--a task she was unable to 
perform herself. She therefore felt she had no choice but to live with 
her parents unti 1 her own home was repai red. FEMA gave her no other 
assistance. Another respondent felt "betrayed" by FEMA. FEMA approved 
support for temporary housing for her family for one year, but then 
withdrew from the agreement after only two months. According to the 
respondent, no explanation for this action was offered by FEMA officials. 
For families who could qualify, SBA offered low-interest loans up to 
$50,000 to repair and rebuild homes. At the time of the interviews, 
eight respondent families qualified for loans, but only two families had 
decided to accept them--one for a small amount and one for the maximum 
amount. Two others were sti 11 not sure if they woul d borrow the money. 
Of all of the formal aid programs, SBA was most frequently criticized by 
respondents. The three families who did not qualify for loans wanted 
them and thought that they had been treated unfairly. They complained 
that SBA was inflexible and had not considered the special circumstances 
of thei r cases. The six famil i es who qual ifi ed fo r loans but had not 
accepted them at the time of the interview felt that interest rates were 
too high, and that they could not afford the loan on top of continuing 
mortgage payments. Other problems included required detailed inventories 
which were difficult to compile, the temporary status of caseworkers that 
resulted in having to deal with someone new at each contact, and the 
long waiting period before receiving any money. One young woman ex-
plained her frustrations: 
You know, they want down to a bobby pin what was lost in order to 
get any financial assistance or anything and you can't do that. 
They want you to rebuild and get back in so that they can spend less 
money on you, but they won't give you any money so that you can do 
that until you answer their questions, which you can't answer ••• 
They could've even come over and look ••• The place is a total 
wreck. 'We don't live like this normally, sir. We need some help. 
Whi 1 e shari ng the cost with the federal government, the State of 
Utah, through its Department of Social Services, administered the Family 
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Grant Program. Grants up to $5,000 were awarded to victim families, 
cont i ngent upon needs and fi nanc i a 1 resources. IFG is a program of 1 ast 
resort; victims must have exhausted other resources and programs to be 
eligible for a grant. Thus, to receive IFG aid, victims first had to 
apply for an SBA loan. If they received a loan or were turned down for a 
loan, they were eligible for a grant. However, if they did not accept a 
loan after qualifying for it, they were disqualified. 
At the time of interviewing, only one respondent had received a 
grant, three were initially disqualified, and three were disqualified 
after refusing SBA loans. Four applied for grants but never heard about 
the disposition of their applications. Not being able to get information 
on the status of applications was the major criticism leveled against the 
IFG program. 
LOS provided aid to victims through the organizational lines already 
mentioned. Each ward was expected to take care of its own members affec-
ted by the disaster. If this proved too burdensome, the bishop' could go 
to the stake president for assistance, and the president in turn could 
appeal on up the church organizational ladder. No new committees were 
organized to deal specifically with the disaster, and at the time of 
interviewing, no extraordinary funds had been allotted from general 
church funds for di saster re 1 i ef. LOS admi ni strat i on made recommenda-
tions to bishops and presidents concerning disaster relief, but no speci-
fic directives were handed down. Aid and services were available to both 
members and nonmembers of the church. 
All of the respondent families received aid from the LOS Church. Of 
the programs considered here, LOS provided the greatest variety of aid. 
Before the actual mudslides, it provided large work crews to sandbag and 
protect homes; duri ng the eme rgency, it provi ded vi ct i ms wi th shelter, 
food, clothing, and other necessities; and afterwards, it was particular-
ly important in providing work crews to help remove mud and clean homes. 
In fact, all of the respondents, except for those with totally destroyed 
houses, had LOS crews clean and remove mud from their homes. In de-
scribing the mud removal and cleaning process, one woman said, 
One Sunday, right after all of this happened, to get the mud out 
they had a bucket brigade ••• They just kept shoveling the mud 
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right into the buckets ••• and they were throwing it out of the 
family room downstairs window. 
Another man said, 
They came and first it was the teenage kids that came and they 
squirted it down ••• and then the women came and scrubbed it up, 
and then the men came down and disinfected it free. In about a day 
and a half it was fully done. 
These work crews also helped victims to salvage and store their posses-
sions. 
In aiding victims to recover losses, LOS provided building materi-
als, repair labor, money, other items (such as grass, sprinkler systems, 
carpeting) as well as emotional support. Most of the respondents whose 
homes were not totally destroyed received some help from LOS in repairing 
their homes; however, there was great variation in the amount and type of 
help received. Labor ranged from small jobs to major repairs, but the 
amount and type of work received was not associated with the amount of 
damage sustained. 
LOS offered to rebuild the homes of the four respondents whose homes 
were totally destroyed. Church aid was to include both materials and 
volunteer labor, but at the time of interviewing no planning or work had 
begun on any of the homes. 
Most of the respondents were grateful for the hel p that they re-
ceived from LOS. Without this aid, much of the cleaning and repair work 
a 1 ready done wou 1 d not have been accompli shed. Howeve r, not all were 
completely satisfied. A few respondents felt that the volunteer workers 
were not sensitive to doing the work the way the owner wanted it done. 
One woman said that she felt like a "prisoner" of the volunteers. Volun-
teers kept comi ng to hel p and she never had time to rest. LOS had 
promi sed he 1 pin repa i ri ng the i r home to one non-LOS f ami 1 y but neve r 
fulfilled it promise. The respondent for that family was angry and 
disappointed: 
They were there for awhile, but then they continued to say how their 
building program was so good and everything ••• it (the disaster) 
got low keyed and everybody started putting their homes back to-
gether. then we could ask for something and somebody else would 
get it, but we wouldn't. 
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The Red Cross provi ded many types of aid to di saster vi ct i ms in 
Davis County. Particularly important were mass feedings, emergency 
shelters, and aid to individual families. Only five respondents received 
aid from the Red Cross. Types of aid included food, clothing, cleaning 
supplies, furniture, and bedding. Red Cross aid was most important 
during the emergency period; it did not provide significant aid during 
recovery once the critical emergency had passed. 
Community, service, and church groups (non-LOS) also organized 
relief funds for disaster victims. In some cases, those organizations 
had funds and therefore acted to disburse the money to victims; in other 
cases, they organized efforts to solicit funds for victims. Six respon-
dents received aid from such organizations. Types of aid received in-
cluded clothing, children's toys, money, furniture, and yard items. In 
addit ion, employe rs helped two of the famil i es by provi di ng 1 abor for 
sandbagging and clearing property. Five respondents received aid from 
local merchants in the form of free merchandise and discounts. 
Respondents were asked to discuss the importance of aid programs in 
terms of both thei r economic and emotional recovery from the flood. For 
economic recovery, five respondents said that aid received was not im-
portant, one said that it was somewhat important, and five said that it 
was very important. For emotional recovery, six mentioned that none of 
the aid programs were important, two said that they were somewhat im-
portant, and three said that they were very important. Therefore, in 
both cases, aid programs were helpful to only about half of the respon-
dents. 
Respondents were also asked to discuss their feelings about getting 
help from aid organizations. When asked about receiving aid from federal 
and state agencies, five respondents said that they felt all right about 
receiving such aid, but six felt that it was difficult to do so. Those 
who thought it was acceptable typically said that the aid was justified 
because they had contributed to the service by paying taxes. Those who 
had difficulty in accepting the aid usually referred to their upbringing 
and belief in an ethic of "pride and independence." Respondents found it 
even more difficult to accept aid from LOS than from the federal govern-
ment. One thought it was acceptable, while the remainder had difficulty 
accepting LOS aid. As with taxes, contributions are routinely made to 
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LOS services through tithing. However, as church members, most respon-
dents were used to giving and found it difficult to receive. Four re-
spondents thought that it was reasonable to accept aid from local com-
munity and service organizations, while seven mentioned that they had 
difficulty in accepting such aid. 
One large LOS family lost everything in the flood, and the male 
spouse lost his job shortly thereafter. In explaining her positive 
feelings about accepting aid, the female spouse of that family said: 
People should be able to get aid ••• If they (LDS) can help you to 
rebuild and put you back where you were, then you're gOing to be a 
contributor. If you don't, you're going to be on welfare or some-
thing ••• They'd spend a lot more money on our family with seven 
children than they would to help us rebuild. 
But most respondents accepted aid with reticence. Thei r church and 
families had taught them to "help themselves"; to ask others for help was 
difficult and embarrassing. One young man explained what it was like to 
apply for aid: 
It was the hardest thing, because I love independence. I don't like 
to be dependent on anybody ••• I hated going to those meetings. It 
was offensive to me to fill out the papers. It was kind of like 
going on welfare or something like that •• It was kind of embarrass-
ing to sit down at the tables, and I hated it. 
The femal e spouse of an elderly coupl e that had accepted cl othi ng 
from a local merchant explained her feelings in shopping for the 
clothing: "We just looked like a poor, old, decrepit couple--you know--
walking through that store. We were so downhearted, and we'd never taken 
anything from anybody, and to shop like that was horrible." 
Informal Aid: Kin, Neighbors, and Friends 
The primary group is frequently an important source of aid and 
emotional support in helping families to recover from disaster. It is 
particularly important in a Mormon community where the church teaches, 
"When in need, first look to yourself. If the need is beyond your scope, 
then look to your family. If the need is beyond thei r scope, then look 
to the Church." 
The social context of primary group aid is different from that of 
formal aid. Typically it is offered without the recipient having to 
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request it. It is usually immediately forthcoming after a crises, in 
contrast to the lengthy waiting periods involved in acquiring formal aid. 
Additionally, one does no have to qualify for it, and no red tape is 
involved. 
All respondents, except for one, had relatives in the Davis County/ 
Salt Lake City area, and those with relatives received a wide variety of 
assistance from them. The type of aid most frequently given was shelter; 
nine families stayed with relatives at some time after the flood. Emo-
tional support from relatives was also important for those families who 
were interviewed, with eight receiving such support. Six families were 
given money by relatives; five received labor assistance; five received 
food, clothing, and household necessities; and three received help with 
child care. 
All of the respondents received aid from friends and neighbors as 
well. The most frequently received aid was labor. At the onset of the 
fl ood, fri ends and nei ghbors worked together to protect thei r- homes by 
sandbagging and removing possessions to safe locations. After the flood-
i ng subs i ded, they he 1 ped each other clean and repa i r homes and ya rds. 
All respondents received help with the cleanup work. 
Emotional support from friends and neighbors was also important, 
with eight respondents receiving such support. In talking about her 
feelings, one woman said, "Oh yes, they just stand and cry with you, just 
as easily as they help you financially. They feel helpless, but it's 
just nice to know that people are concerned." 
Six families received food, clothing, and household necessities 
from friends and neighbors; two received money; two received storage room 
for their salvaged possessions; and one received shelter. 
One woman discussed the role of friends and neighbors in her 
family's recovery: 
Friends, we always thought we had a lot of friends, but it turns out 
there's a lot more really close friends than we thought. They sent 
us home to bed at nights because we were just wrung out, and they 
stayed here all night long. And they ran themselves down. There 
was a lot of them that had bad backs, bad this, bad that, run 
down ••• but they stuck it out here. 
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When asked to discuss the importance of aid from kin, friends, and 
neighbors in their recovery, respondents rated such aid slightly more 
important than the formal aid programs in economic recovery. Four said 
that it was not important to their economic recovery, while the remainder 
said that it was important. As might be expected, respondents rated the 
support received from primary groups as much more important to emotional 
recovery than that received from formal organizations. Furthermore, it 
was readily apparent that the respondents were more comfortable accepting 
aid from primary group members than from formal organizations. Seven 
respondents thought it was proper to accept aid from relatives and 
friends, while the others found it difficult. One woman explained that 
she could not take money from her parents: 
I've sneaked some money back in Oadls bill drawer ••• I really feel 
like I should repay in some way, but I also know that, myself, I 
don't want to have people hurry and repay me for acts that I've 
done. But I've never had the money to give, so money is my hardest 
thing. 
Another woman felt that family and friends should help each other: 
Like I say, I'd rather be on the giving end rather than the receiv-
ing end, but I mean that's what family and friends are for. If you 
can't help emotionally and with stuff when somebody needs you, to me 
that isn't a friend or a family. 
Another felt that accepting help bonded people together: 
It's a greater love because they have been able to share something 
with you, and therefore, the bond between you is greater ••• So you 
have to allow that ••• If you say, 'No, no, we won't take that,' 
then you've stopped something very sweet between you. 
Economic and Emotional Recovery 
At the time of interviewing, five months after the flood, repairs 
and rebuilding were not complete for any of the respondent families. For 
those who had to make repairs, most had begun the work with their own 
fi nanci a 1 and 1 abor resources. However, the comp 1 et i on of these repa irs 
would require financial and labor assistance from SBA, IFG, and LOS. For 
those four fami 1 i es whose homes were tota 11 y dest royed, no p 1 ann i n9 or 
rebuilding had begun. Two had received commitments for aid from SBA and 
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LOS, but two were still not sure how they would finance rebuilding or if 
rebuilding would be possible. It appeared that because flood insurance 
coverage was lacking, repair and rebuilding would progress slowly in 
Davis County. 
Respondents were asked to estimate the total amount of financial and 
labor aid committed to them by insurance and formal aid programs (addi-
tional aid commitments may have been received after the interview 
period). Three respondent families received no aid commitments, three 
received less than $10,000, two received from $10,000 to $25,000, and 
three received over $25,000. The average amount of aid received by the 
eleven respondent families was approximately $17,000. Thus the percent-
age of losses covered by aid and insurance seems to have been generally 
low. Six respondents expected to recover less than one-fourth of thei r 
losses, four from 26% to 75%, and one 87%. 
When asked to assess thei r famil i es' recovery, no respondent felt 
that they had completely recovered, either economically or emotionally, 
from their losses. In assessing economic recovery, eight said that they 
were not at all recovered, while the remainder indicated only partial 
recovery. Emotional recovery progressed somewhat more rapidly. Only one 
respondent said that no progress had been made emotionally, and of the 
others, six said that they were somewhat recovered, and four said that 
they were mostly recovered. 
Findings: Response of Aid Organizations in Utah 
Because of the pervasi veness of the LDS Church and its anci 11 ary 
organizations in Utah, it was expected that their presence would affect 
the response strategies of traditional disaster aid organizations. 
Federal, state, and private disaster relief organizations established 
operations in Utah with preplanned and tested procedures for dealing with 
disasters. In contrast, the LOS Church entered the emergency with estab-
lished operations and procedures for dealing with families in need. 
The following discussion covers the major organizations involved in 
the flood response--LOS Church, FEMA, Individual Family Grants, American 
Red Cross, Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce, Flood Recovery Committee, 
and Governor's Task Force on Flood Relief--and reviews major issues 
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resulting from the interactions between the LDS aid system and the other 
disaster-specific systems. 
LDS and its Program 
The presence of LDS affects the everyday lives of most families in 
the Salt Lake City area, whether they are members of the church or not. 
As already noted, LDS is well organized to respond to the social and 
financial problems of its members, and LDS disaster assistance followed 
those traditional lines of response. No new groups or committees were 
formed to deal specifically with disaster assistance. 
Also as al ready noted, the church provided a variety of types of 
aid before, during, and after the floods. Although statistics were not 
available specifically for Davis County, LOS estimated the number of 
persons who provided labor and the number of man-hours expended in pre-
vention and cleanup of the flooded areas in Utah during the emergency 
period from April 12 to June 4, 1983: 
Individuals Donating Time or Equipment 
Donated Labor Hours 
Donated Equipment Hours 
97,125 persons 
824,327 hours 
80,730 hours 
Besides providing building materials and general work crews, LOS 
provided skilled workers, such as electricians and plumbers, to repair 
homp.s. Also, depending on the victim family's financial resources and 
losses sustained, LDS provided money and specific items, such as carpet-
ing, furniture, household goods, and windows. In cases where the church 
offered to help in rebuilding homes with volunteer labor and materials, 
the rebuilding was typically a joint effort, with the victim families 
providing whatever financing and labor they could, and LOS providing the 
rema i nder. Repa i rand rebu il di ng ass i stance was offered to church mem-
bers and nonmembers alike, and volunteer labor and equipment was likewise 
donated by both members and nonmembers. 
Beyond the ward and stake level of the church, the highest level is 
the general authority which is headed by a full-time executive adminis-
trator who is a member of the LDS priesthood. However, as discussed, the 
response of the church began, as tradition and organization dictated, at 
the lowest level (the ward). The general authority did make procedural 
recommendations to the stakes and wards, but no orders or directions were 
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passed down. Each ward was expected to provide the necessary assistance 
to both members and nonmembers alike, and the stake was to assist if 
local financial and labor resources were depleted. Typically, a un-
affected ward took on the complete responsibility for aiding one family 
in an affected ward. In no way could church response be considered 
uniform across wards. The quantity and type of assistance given to 
individual victim families was dependent on ward resources and bishop 
decisions. 
The outpouring of volunteer labor may be attributed to the basic 
teaching of LOS which emphasizes the moral responsibility and obligation 
of individuals to aid those in need. LOS members are taught to respond 
to a call to service from their leaders, no matter how menial the task. 
Thus, this service is both a personal response and an organized church 
response; the organizational structure is in place to call one worker or 
a group of workers for a job, and personal responsibility ensures that 
those called will comply. 
The chu rch has two pri ma ry sou rces of income. Each family tithes 
(contributes 10% of its income) and additionally makes fast offerings--
that is, once a month they abstain from food and drink for two meals and 
make a donation to the care of the poor and needy. The money used to 
assist victim families came from such fast offerings made at the ward and 
stake levels. Although funds were set aside at the general church level 
to aid victims, no ward or stake had requested general church assistance 
by the time of interviewing. 
Because traditional lines of response were used to assist families, 
there was little need to publicize available LOS services. (However, 
some respondent families reported that they had read articles in news-
papers stating that the church planned to help families recover.) The 
church used its organization of home teachers and visiting teachers to 
seek out needy fami 1 i es; each ward has mal e home teachers and femal e 
visiting teachers who have the responsibility of watching over each 
family in that ward. Periodically and as necessary, the teachers visit 
families in their homes. Among other responsibilities, during these 
visits teachers assess family problems and needs and then report back to 
the bishop. He in turn talks with the family head, and together they 
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decide what can be done about the family's needs and what the church's 
involvement will be. 
Although outreach during the disaster was handled through this 
system, church officials believed that in many cases the system was 
altered; families went directly to the bishop, and members reported the 
needs of other members and nonmembers in the ward bypassing the home 
teachers. In addition, bishops were available at the DACs, although not 
in official capacity, to advise and support their members. In some of 
the affected wards, an LDS survey was made of damaged homes. 
When asked to evaluate their response, LDS Social Service officials 
identified three problem areas. First, there was clearly a need to set 
up communi cat i on between church and pub 1 i c offi cia 1 s and to des i gnate 
respective domains of responsibility before a disaster occurs in order to 
avoi d confusi on and confl i ct between these groups. Second, there was a 
need to establish an emergency communication system among key church and 
community leaders so that telephones could be bypassed in an emergency. 
Third, although some wards and stakes tried to form new committees to 
deal specifically with the emergency, officials believed that those wards 
following traditional lines of response were more successful; they wanted 
to impress on their wards the importance of following those traditional 
procedures in an emergency. 
Overall, the LDS officials assessed thei r response as successful. 
Large numbers of volunteers were organized and used effectively, and many 
individual families received assistance in cleanup and recovery. The 
officials felt that church efforts had brought community members, both 
LDS and non-LDS, closer together. 
Federal Aid 
Of the 29 counties in Utah, 22 were declared disaster areas by a 
federal disaster declaration that extended from April 12 to June 30, 
1983. Twenty-two counties were declared eligible for public assistance 
and 11 for individual assistance; Davis County was eligible for both. At 
this time, five Disaster Assistance Centers were set up--in Spanish Fork, 
Ogden, Farmington (Davis County), Salt Lake City, and Delta--and a tele-
phone hotline was established to take applications for individual assis-
tance. Ultimately, about 1200 applications for individual assistance 
were received. 
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As mentioned, services provided by the federal government to indivi-
dual families were small business loans (SBA), temporary housing, amended 
tax returns, and farm home loans. By mid-July (two weeks prior to the 
application deadline), approximately 400 applications for SBA loans had 
been taken and 11 accepted. At the same time, FEMA had taken in 458 
applications for temporary housing assistance, and 258 had been accepted. 
There was extensive media coverage publicizing the particulars of 
federal assistance. Announcements were made in all newspapers and on all 
television and radio stations through May, June, and July. Flyers were 
distributed prior to the opening of the DACs, and public meetings were 
held explaining the kinds of assistance available to victims. 
FEMA estimated that 5,000 families were affected in some way by the 
flood. Yet despite the extensive publicity, only one-quarter of these 
families applied for assistance. Federal and state representatives 
believed that the poor response was due in part to LOS emphasis on family 
self-sufficiency. 
In addition to providing aid to families, FEMA compiled computer 
lists of all applications and verifications and made the lists available 
to other helping organizations, such as the Red Cross and the Governor's 
Task Force. This cooperation eliminated victims having to make separate 
application to different organizations and, likewise, those organizations 
having to make separate verifications. 
Indi vidual Fami l~~ran!2.~ 
The Individual Family Grant Program was administered by the State of 
Utah th rough its Department of Soc i a 1 Se rvi ces. As already noted, IFG is 
an aid program of last resort. Depending on losses, needs, resources, 
and other aid, families were eligible for grants up to $5,000.00 that 
could be used for a variety of purposes--repairs, rebuilding, necessi-
ties, ext ra t rave 1 expenses to and from work, funera 1 expens es. At the 
time of the interviews, 684 applications had been submitted for grants 
statewide; 189 had been approved, 59 withdrawn, 207 denied, and the 
remainder pending. 
When the federal government conducted an assessment of the damage 
due to the first flood in April 1983, a technical assistant also arrived 
to train the designated grant program coordinator. That person and her 
staff were already employed by Utah's Department of Social Services, and 
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no new people were hired to administer the program. The coordinator had 
the authority to utilize people from any of the Social Services district 
offices. These personnel were experienced in taking applications and 
verifying information for eligibility. The total staff numbered about 
30. 
Training was done quickly, under the pressure of time. After the 
coordinator was trained, she trained additional staff and they in turn 
trained others as new disasters developed. Typically, those taking aid 
applications were trained the day prior to the opening of each DAC. 
Verifiers spent one day in the field with a trained verifier and the next 
day began working alone. 
Although the day-to-day operations of the program were overseen by 
the coordinator, a state administrative panel, consisting of the coordi-
nator and supervisory level personnel from the state offices and divi-
sions, made decisions on grant awards and their dollar amounts. The 
State of Utah funded 25% of the program and the federal government 
covered 75%. A total of $400,000 was committed to the program, and 
$167,000 was expended at the time of interviewing. Because IFG partici-
pated in the DACs and the hot 1 i ne, out reach was s i mil a r to that of the 
federal programs previously discussed; it utilized the media and public 
meetings to advertise its services. 
In an interview, the coordinator of IFG discussed her feelings about 
the strengths and weaknesses of the program. With the probabi 1 ity of 
floods the following spring (1984), she felt there was a clear need for 
advanced and more detailed training for prospective staff members. Also, 
new staff members needed to be hired to alleviate work pressure created 
by existing social services assistance programs. In order to improve 
cooperation and coordination with FEMA, the coordinator felt that the 
administrative offices of the IFG program should be located with the 
federal di saster offi ceo For the 1983 fl oods, the programs were located 
in two different cities. Along with lesser changes in administration, 
the coordinator felt strongly that the management structure of the pro-
gram had to be changed. Duri ng the 1983 di sasters, the Department of 
Social Services administered the program, while the state's Emergency 
Management Servi ces managed the program. The coordi nator felt that the 
separation between administration and management was cumbersome and 
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ineffective. She wanted the Department of Social Services to have com-
plete control of the program with the possibility of a liaison arrange-
ment wi th Emergency Management Servi ces. In 1 i ght of the Department of 
Social Services inexperience in administering the IFG program, the co-
ordinator felt that it moved quickly and efficiently. She also felt that 
cooperation within the department and with federal personnel was success-
ful. 
American Red Cross 
The American Red Cross is specifically organized to respond to 
emergencies. At the time of flooding, the Red Cross in Salt Lake was 
being reorganized from a divisional to a key resource structure, thereby 
putting the entire state under the jurisdiction of the Salt Lake Area 
Chapter. 
The Red Cross provided two categories of aid to victims in Utah--
emergency and additional assistance. Emergency assistance consisted of 
providing mass feedings to victims and workers, sheltering vittims, and 
providing emergency care to victims. 
The Red Cross served 55,000 emergency meals to victims and work 
crews--a large number to sandbagging volunteers who were redirecting 
flood paths to city streets in the Salt Lake City area. Food was also 
provided in emergency shelters set up to house evacuees. 
These shelters were established around tile the state as needed. In 
Davis County several shelters were opened, closed, and reopened as flood 
waters and mud slides threatened various parts of the county. Approxi-
mately 1,700 persons utilized the shelters in Utah, with about 700 stay-
ing for at least one night. Typically, LDS bishops met their affected 
ward members at the shelters and arranged to place them in the homes of 
other members. 
In Davis and Salt Lake Counties, emergency assistance to individual 
families (including food, shelter, clothing, bedding, household supplies, 
furniture, nursing care, minor home repair, and small appliance repair) 
did not begin until about one week after the flood. Approximately 537 
families throughout the state received such assistance. 
The second major category of assistance provided by the Red Cross 
was "additional assistance"--aid in rebuilding or making major repairs to 
destroyed or damaged homes. At the time of interviewing, the Red Cross 
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had entered its additional assistance phase but had helped only two 
families with this kind of aid. The Red Cross was in the process of 
working with LOS to come up with a rebuilding plan for destroyed homes. 
Red Cross officials said that they expected to pay for building materials 
and LOS to provide the labor to reconstruct homes, and that there was the 
additional possibility that LOS would provide both labor and materials 
for their affected members. However, no final plan had been developed. 
The Salt Lake Area Chapter responded to the fl oods wit h mi ni rna 1 
assistance from national Red Cross staff. Initially, three national 
staff personnel worked to set up the assistance centers and to develop 
public relations programs. Twelve local staff members (approximately 
half paid and half volunteer) worked on the flood relief effort. The 
staff was supported by 550 additional persons with little or no previous 
Red Cross experi ence who vol unteered for the fl ood effort. There was 
inadequate time to train these volunteers, and those who did receive 
training were generally used in supervisory positions. 
There were no guidelines for the interorganizational relationship 
between the Red Cross and LOS. Apparently the relationship differed from 
flood site to flood site, and it was most often the Red Cross that had to 
change its procedures accordi ngly. In some areas, LOS provided most of 
the emergency assistance with the Red Cross supporting their efforts. In 
Oavis County, Red Cross officials seemed more satisfied than in some 
other areas with their relationship with LOS. In contrast, the Red Cross 
and FEMA have a long record of mutual cooperation in disasters, and 
according to officials, that tradition was maintained in Utah. 
The Red Cross is funded by donations, and thousands of dollars of 
donations were received, both at the local and national levels, specifi-
cally for the Utah flood effort. By September 1983, the Red Cross had 
expended approximately $160,000 on mass care and family service in Utah. 
The Red Cross was present at all of the OACs, providing information 
and service to victims. Similarly, they were represented on the Gover-
nor's Task Force in reviewing individual assistance cases. Their ser-
vices were publicized in the newspapers and on television and radio 
during and after the flooding. 
Victims had to initiate contact with the Red Cross to receive assis-
tance. Thei r res i dence was then verifi ed using the Red Cross's damage 
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assessment, a caseworker was sent to evaluate needs, and the disbursal of 
aid was made based on that evaluation. In addition, FEMA's computer list 
of victims was used to assist in the verification and evaluation of 
victim needs. For the most part, the Red Cross saw the same victims as 
FEMA; Red Cross officials estimated that 95% of the victims they helped 
came through the OACs or sought help from FEMA. 
Red Cross as was well as FEMA and IFG officials were disappointed 
with the small number of vi ctims that sought thei r hel p. One Red Cross 
official said, "I think we could have met other needs, but they didn't 
choose to come and seek assistance from us. We can't go and bat them over 
the head and tell them we want to give you something, so we didn't." 
The small victim response was attributed to the "independent nature" 
of the people, their reluctance to ask for help, and the LOS promise to 
return members' homes to their pre-flood condition. 
In discussing their agency's weaknesses and strengths, Red Cross 
officials expressed the need for a pool of trained volunteers to draw 
upon in an emergency. In Utah, they worked with local churches and local 
service groups to find and organize volunteers, and they were constrained 
by inexperience and pressing time. In the future they intend to seek a 
clarification of emergency roles and procedures relative to the county, 
city, and LOS church. 
The Red Cross's greatest strengths were its abil ity to provide 
immediate emergency service and its ability to amass money and volunteers 
to support those services. They felt that the cooperation within their 
chapter and with other helping agencies, as well as their ability to do 
an effective job without significant support and direction from national 
Red Cross personnel indicated the soundness of their organization. 
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce Flood Recovery Committee 
The Flood Recovery Committee of the Chamber of Commerce was repre-
sentative of the many organizations in the Salt Lake area that emerged to 
give aid to disaster victims. Although the Chamber of Commerce is an 
organization of business people, no Flood Recovery Committee funds were 
used to aid businesses, all money going instead to aid fami Iy recovery. 
Having no initial formal guidelines, the Chamber was flexible in the 
types of services it was able to provide. It primarily became involved 
in replacing furnaces, landscaping, and clothing. Central to its effort 
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was its attempt to ensure that needy fami 1 i es who mi ght have otherwi se 
"fallen through the cracks" of the traditional disaster aid system re-
ceived help. Thus Chamber officials directed their efforts toward fami-
lies who could not qualify for aid from other organizations or who needed 
things that the other agencies could not provide. 
Services were not limited to Salt Lake City residents but were 
offered to victims all over Utah. At the time of interviewing, only a 
few families had received aid from the Chamber. Officials felt that they 
would deal with more cases once rebuilding was further along and public 
decisions were made on the disposal of damaged properties. 
Chamber officials felt that they were "invited" into the role of 
providing recovery aid to flood victims by business people and individual 
citizens. Initially, they received donations both from local and nation-
al businesses and individuals, usually with the stipulation that the 
Chamber di st ri bute the funds di rect ly, independent of government and 
traditional disaster organizations. 
In June 1983, the Chamber decided to organize a formal committee on 
flood recovery. Shortly thereafter, the Chamber employed a part-time 
volunteer coordinator, whose job was to contact victim families, bring 
their needs to the Chambers' committee, and to provide funds and services 
to those accepted for aid. 
I n it i a 1 fundi ng for the COlllillit tee came from a 1 a rge donat i on by a 
1 oca 1 bank and vari ous sma 11 donat ions at bot h the 1 oca 1 and nat i ona 1 
levels. Subsequently, the committee mounted a large media campaign to 
solicit additional donations for its fund. It also received many dona-
tions in the form of goods and servi ces. Interesti ngly, because the 
Chamber is an organization of businesses, it could request from members 
specific types of materials or labor that its flood clients needed. For 
example, if a client needed a yard landscaped, the Chamber called on one 
of its member landscape architects to donate his services. 
Along with its media campaign to solicit donations, the Chamber 
advertised its services and requested victims to contact them. It also 
received the names of victims in several other ways. In some instances, 
friends and neighbors of victims gave the names of victims to the 
Chamber. Additionally, the Chamber was a member of the Governor's Task 
Force on Flood Relief, which also referred names of victims to the vari-
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ous helping agencies. The Chamber, as well as the Task Force, verified 
the needs of the prospective clients through FEMA's computer list of 
vi ct i ms. 
As with the other helping organizations, the Chamber was disappoint-
ed in the number of victims seeking their aid. Obviously, the Chamber 
had a great deal of resources at its disposal, but apparently few victims 
were willing to ask for its help. The Chamber attributed this lack of 
interest to the "pioneer spirit" of the people in the area and their 
reluctance to ask for help--especially from the federal government. 
Thus, because victims were asked to apply first to FEMA and to get on 
their computer list before applying for aid from other organizations, 
such as the Chamber, the number of persons requesting aid was greatly 
decreased. The coordinator felt that it would be advantageous for the 
Chamber to compile its own list of victims in order to bypass FEMA, that 
there were victims who would use the Chamber's help, if it were not for 
this obstacle. 
The Chambe r i ndi cated that it wanted to do mo re preparat i on and 
pl anni ng in advance of another emergency in order to better assume a 
helping role in organizing the community and responding to victim needs. 
At the time of interviewing, it was corresponding with other Chambers 
across the country concerning emergency preparedness. Therefore, it 
appears that the Salt Lake Chamber wanted to make disaster relief a 
permanent function. 
Governor's Task Force on Flood Relief 
With both traditional and emergent organizations as well as LDS 
providing aid to flood victims, there was a need to coordinate relief 
efforts--both to ensure that all victims received help and to avoid 
dup 1 i cat i on of aid. The Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce fi rst began 
organizing the various groups in the beginning of June 1983. Within a 
few days of the announcement of the Chamber's effort, the Governor of 
Utah announced that his office would coordinate the various helping 
organizations. The Chamber of Commerce gave up their effort and became a 
member of the Governor's Task Force. 
Although the Governor's office's primary function was to coordinate 
the work of the other aid organizations--FEMA, IFG, American Red Cross, 
Thistle Relief Fund, Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce, Salvation Army, 
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area churches, and LDS (which participated in an advisory capacity)--and 
to ensure again that victims who might otherwise have been ineligible for 
aid from the traditional aid organizations received help. The Task Force 
met periodically to review cases and figure out which organization could 
best help in a given case. In reviewing cases, the organizations also 
had the opportunity to "compare notes" and avoid duplication of services. 
The Governor's office did receive approximately $8,000 in unsolici-
ted donations for victims, but at the time of interviewing, none had been 
allocated • All cases under revi ew had been passed to the other member 
organizations. The Governor's representative on the Task Force suggested 
that donations to the Governor's office would be held until the following 
year in the event of further flooding. The actual administrative and 
coordinating activities of the Task Force were funded by the Governor's 
office and not by donations. 
The Task Force did not publicize its services. In most cases, 
victims or their acquaintances contacted the Task Force, and in a few 
instances FEMA referred cases that did not qualify for its services. 
However, before the Task Force would review a case, the victim had to 
first apply to FEMA and be placed on its victim list. 
Again, as with the other helping agencies, the Task Force was dis-
appointed in the number of victims requesting its help, and again the 
small numbers were dttributed to LDS emphasis on self reliance. 
In discussing potential improvements, the Task Force coordinator 
stressed the importance of improving communication and cooperation among 
disaster organizations and emergency personnel and clarifying procedures 
and domains of authority. She also stressed the need to improve public 
relations so that people in the community would know who to contact to 
meet particular needs. The coordinator felt that a basic strength of the 
Governor's Office and Task Force was its ability to work with federal 
disaster personnel to provide emergency assistance to victim families. 
Issues in the Response of Aid ~rganizations 
During the interviews with the major aid organizations, a number of 
issues emerged--severa1 particularly dealing with the interaction between 
LDS and the other relief organizations. Specific issues centered around 
the initiation of the aid process, emergent disaster relief organiza-
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tions, domains of authority, community response, and emergency and longer 
term recovery response. 
Initiation of Aid 
In order to receive aid from disaster relief organizations, victims 
had to apply for it--they had to "ask for help." All of the officials 
interviewed noted that affected residents were reluctant to make such a 
plea. Some attributed this to the general character or "pioneer spirit" 
of the people, others to the LOS tenet of self-rel iance. These same 
officials expressed disappointment in the small number of victims apply-
ing for their services, believing that there were many people who needed 
help but were not asking for it. FEMA estimated that they received 
applications from only one-quarter of the victims in Davis County. FEMA 
serviced those who applied for its aid and closed its field operation by 
September. Other disaster relief organizations, particularly the new, 
emergent ones, cont i nued to so 1 i cit donat ions and to seek out vi ct i ms, 
even though they recognized that there were few willing recipients. In 
addition, although they recognized victim reluctance to apply for aid 
(particularly from the federal government), each of the disaster relief 
organizations still required potential clients to begin the aid process 
by applying to FEMA so that those victims would be on FEMA's computer 
list. (Since most of the disaster relief organizations, except for the 
American Red Cross, did not have their own verifiers, they took advantage 
of FEMA's system.) Thus, this procedure probably discouraged some per-
sons from applying to other sources of aid. However, only one official, 
the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce coordinator, mentioned a need for 
establishing a list outside of FEMA. 
Despite their reluctance, many victims did apply to FEMA for aid. 
Still, some felt initial guilt and humiliation, while others were easily 
rebuffed by personal questions and impersonal bureaucratic procedures. 
Some members of the Chamber of Commerce and the Governor's Task Force 
mistakenly believed that their groups saved victims the "humiliation" of 
waiting in DAC lines. In fact, victims had to queue up at the centers 
before applying to either group. 
Many of the officials of the disaster relief organizations assumed 
that LOS would take care of the victims not reached by disaster organiza-
tions. This assumption was not supported in actual practice for several 
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reasons. Although the LDS outreach system of home teachers and visiting 
teachers was effective with victims reluctant to request official help, 
it seems to have been i neffect i ve in reachi ng nonmembers and i nact i ve 
members who were not integrated into the pre-existing system. Ostensi-
bly, emergency protection and cleanup crews were provided by the church 
without having to be specifically requested, but more expensive and time 
consuming repair and rebuilding work had to be requested from ward 
bi shops by vi ct ims. Thus, the LDS out reach system di d not complete 1 y 
mitigate the problem of victim reluctance to request aid. Moreover, as 
the interview data show, respondents were less willing to request aid 
from the church than from the government. Since LDS aid was not uniform-
ly provided, victim visibility, initiative, and personal beliefs were 
apparently important in determining aid from the church. Official aid 
programs, of course, did not rely on such individual traits in providing 
aid. 
Despite the extensive publ icity and outreach efforts of all the 
organizations, each official interviewed, including those representing 
LDS, believed that there were victims "out there" who had not been 
reached. The interview data indicated that respondents expected that 
only small amounts of thei r losses coul d be recovered through aid from 
organizations including LDS. Thus, it appears that overcoming victim 
reluctance to solicit aid may be critically necessary in disaster areas 
where victims are not culturally predisposed to do so. 
Emergent Disaster Relief Organizations 
In Utah, many new disaster relief organizations (or new committees 
within established organizations) emerged following the floods. The ones 
most often mentioned during interviewing were the Thistle Relief Fund, 
the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce Flood Recovery Committee, the 
Governor's Task Force on Flood Relief, the Salt Lake City Bank Associa-
tion, and the Bountiful Chamber of Commerce. Apparently, other service 
organizations and churches also initiated their own projects. Most of 
these organizations formed after receiving unsolicited donations given 
with the stipulation that the aid go directly to victims and not to 
official disaster relief organizations. It was not clear to the organi-
zation officials interviewed why such stipulations were attached to 
donations. Apparently, because no central organization was established 
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specifically to accept donations for the flood victims of Utah, potential 
contributors feared their donations would be mixed with resources to be 
used for other philanthropic interests. Hence, the new organizations 
accepted the donations and set up operations for dispensing that aid. 
Most of these organizations publicly solicited additional donations, but 
their funds were minimal compared to those of the larger relief organiza-
tions and LOS. Typi cally, these emergent groups were staffed by vol un-
teers and did not have enough funding or expertise to employ caseworkers 
to verify needs. Thus, they also relied on FEMA for these services and 
could not provide aid to victims who had not applied for federal aid. 
The emergent organizations all shared the goal of trying to insure 
that victims in need did not "fall through the cracks" of the traditional 
aid system. They also sought to provide services that would not be 
offered by others. These goals, along with a concern for avoiding dupli-
cation of aid, underlay the effort to coordinate the activities of the 
new organizations with those of the traditional ones. As noted, that 
effort resulted in the formation of the Governor's Task Force on Flood 
Relief--a group that itself aided few victims directly (the Department of 
Social Services representative on the Task Force complained that she had 
to sit through the review of a few individual cases by the Task Force, 
while she had hundreds of cases to be reviewed on her own desk). 
The Task Force did not seem to be very successful in meeti ng its 
goal of providing aid to "hard luck" cases. Its dependence on FEMA for 
verification of need, made it almost impossible to reach victims who were 
not being cared for by the formal aid programs. In addition, the Task 
Force's attempt at eliminating duplication of aid to individual victims 
was somewhat thwarted by LOS. Although LDS sat on the Task Force in an 
advisory capacity, its representatives refused to give specific informa-
tion about the aid they extended to victims, and it was therefore im-
possible for the Task Force to know if aid had been duplicated. Thus it 
appears that the coordinating activities of the Task Force could have 
been more successful if 1) there had been a central receiving site for 
donations, 2) the coordinating group had had its own verification system, 
and 3) the LDS church had cooperated more fully. 
Each of the emergent organi zat ion offi ci a 1 s i ntervi ewed expressed 
the desire to perpetuate their own disaster relief activities. In 
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September, individual organizations were making plans to improve opera-
tions and to hold over funds for the next disaster. However, little 
attention was being paid to improving interorganizational cooperation. 
Domains of Authority 
On the face of it, LDS cooperated with federal and local govern-
ments. LDS administration advised stakes and wards that local govern-
ments were in charge of emergency operations, and the church made every 
public effort to cooperate with emergency and relief personnel. However, 
LDS is historically a very independent organization, and this ethos 
brought about complications and rivalries concerning domains of authori-
ty. 
Each of the disaster relief organization officials interviewed, 
while grateful for the many contributions of LDS during the disaster 
effort, mentioned the need for better cooperation and coordination with 
the church. The Governor's Task Force and the IFG officials felt that 
their services were hindered by the unwillingness of LDS to share infor-
mation on specific individuals. The Red Cross mentioned conflicts with 
LDS over leadership in every flooded area. In some areas LDS took charge 
of emergency services and the Red Cross supported their efforts; in other 
areas, these roles were reversed. But in all areas, LDS appears to have 
decided how leadership and support would be organized, and the Red Cross 
followed. This occasionally made relationships between the two organiza-
tions difficult. By September, the Red Cross was still unsure of what 
its role would be in the major repair and rebuilding of homes, because 
LDS had not finalized its own plans. It is not surprising that the Red 
Cross saw a need to coordinate emergency and long-term recovery activi-
ties with LDS prior to the occurrence of another disaster in Utah. 
During the emergency in Bountiful, Davis County Emergency Management 
Services and LDS officials also had conflicts over manpower, emergency 
facilities, and emergency operations. Respondents in Bountiful com-
plained that Civil Defense (Emergency Management Services) neither warned 
them nor directed evacuation. According to the officials interviewed, 
this inadequate response probably resulted from confusion over spheres of 
authority. 
The LDS Church certainly aided emergency and relief organizations in 
Utah by providing emergency manpower and aid to victims. However, by 
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maintaining its separate, independent operations, it was also disruptive 
during certain phases of the emergency and during the period of aid and 
recovery. Therefore, it appears that an emergency preparedness plan is 
needed in Utah whi ch inc 1 udes not on ly 1 i nes of aut hori ty among the 
va ri ous gove rnments, agenc i es, and organi zat ions i nvo 1 ved in di saster 
response, but also takes into account the involvement and cooperation of 
the LDS Church. It is not at all clear that such a plan is possible--
particularly because the church's response begins at the lowest levels 
(the wards) where decisions and actions can vary widely. 
Comlll.un i ty Re~ponse 
A significant benefit that LDS brought to the disaster situation was 
a sense of community. People indicated that they cared about each other 
and worked together, whether by ward or neighborhood, to save their own 
and each other's property. Local work groups were formed to perform the 
heavy 1 abor of fi rst sandbaggi ng and then c 1 eani ng mud and water from 
homes; and after cleanup, neighbors and ward members were available to 
help with emotional problems. Victims reported that there were always 
people present who would discuss problems or check to see how they were 
doing. Several women gave parties for victims to which guests brought 
gifts, such as towels, sheets, blankets, and other household necessities. 
Local merchants offered gifts, discounts, and wholesale prices to vic-
tims. Many disaster relief organizations noted that they had more volun-
teers and donations than willing recipients. 
Despite personal tragedies, victims were expected to maintain their 
LDS obligations. Some of the victims interviewed felt that maintaining 
these obligations gave a sense of continuity in their lives, even though 
other aspects had been disrupted. Participating in the church also 
allowed them to maintain social contacts and thus provided diversion from 
the work brought on by the disaster. 
As mentioned, this sense of community was fostered by the ideology 
of the LDS Church. Members are taught to help others; when a ward bishop 
requests help, members are expected to respond, regardless of the task, 
and a portion of members' tithings go to an elaborate welfare system that 
provides aid to needy members. Moreover, those members are encouraged to 
become i nvo 1 ved in nei ghborhood and communi ty proj ect s. Although peop 1 e 
everywhere may "pull together" in an emergency, the sense of community 
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displayed in Utah was definitely an outgrowth of the local culture; 
church organization was essential in developing the sense of community 
which facilitated a strong collective response to the emergency. In a 
sense it may be said that a therapeutic community (Barton, 1970) was in 
place prior to the actual emergency. 
Emergency Versus Longer-term Response 
From the interviews with both victims and officials, the immediate 
emergency response seems to have been more successful than the longer-
term recovery involving major repairs and rebuilding. As indicated 
above, respondents said they expected to recover only small percentages 
of their losses through the available aid programs. 
At the time of the interviews, this perception seemed to be correct. 
Although immediate emergency response by federal, state, and local groups 
had been effective, most victims did not have flood insurance, and feder-
al loans and state grants covered only small percentages of losses for 
victims who were eligible. The limited resources of smaller disaster 
relief organizations did not permit them to enter into major repairs and 
rebuilding activities. And, although the Red Cross did enter into an 
Additional Assistance Phase, its efforts appeared to be deadlocked in 
negotiations with LOS over the rebuilding process. 
As discussed, the LOS Church was also certainly an asset during the 
emergency period. It was able to recruit and organize large numbers of 
volunteers to sandbag streets and private homes. Through its network of 
church members, it provided emergency and longer-term temporary housing. 
Teams of church members removed mud and water; scrubbed walls, floors, 
furniture, and rugs; cleaned lawns; and performed a myriad other jobs 
that would have been overwhelming for an individual family. But in 
comparison to these LOS successes during the emergency period, in later 
months help with major repairs and rebuilding was much slower in coming. 
All of the families interviewed whose homes had been totally destroyed 
were relying on LOS to supply materials and perform a major portion of 
the work. However, at the time of this study several months after the 
disaster, no plans had been developed for the work. Rebuilding handled 
by the church was expected to i nvo 1 ve vo 1 unteer 1 aborers, cont ractors, 
plumbers, electricians, and other workers, and would most likely be done 
on a part-time basis. Given that volunteer interest would no doubt fall 
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off in the months after the disaster, it appeared that rebuilding would 
be a slow and frustrating process. Unfortunately, this study did not 
encompass that period of rebuilding. It was clear, however, that long-
term recovery was not proceeding as well as the initial emergency re-
sponse, and, moreover, that the reluctance of victims to seek aid from 
formal sources resulted in significant delays and indecision regarding 
rebuilding despite the sheer amount of aid available. 
138 
CHAPTER V 
KAUAI, HAWAII AFTER HURRICANE IWA 
This chapter and the next report on two disasters that struck sever-
al months after the Paris, Texas, tornado. Both the sites examined 
(Kauai, Hawaii and Coalinga, California) were surveyed by the same re-
searcher, so there is an opportunity to review them comparatively. Some 
of differences and similarities will be pointed out in the discussions of 
each disaster, and, in addition, the quantitative data for the two 
studies are presented side by side to facilitate further comparison. 
Between October of 1982 and April of 1983, the authors monitored all 
United States disasters for the purpose of selecting sites in which to 
study further the use of disaster assistance. Eventually it was decided 
to use communities affected by Hurricane Iwa, which had hit the Hawaiian 
Islands in November, 1982. The researchers had some reservations about 
the site, based on perceived logistical problems and the complexity of 
the ethnic make-up of the communities. Both features turned out to be 
manageable, and the site has offered several interesting features to the 
overall study. 
The di saster had major consequences for the bui It envi ronment and 
the daily economic and social activities of the affected area. The event 
and the official response to it are described here only briefly. This 
chapter is mainly about findings from our survey of the disaster victims 
several months after the event. Detailed reports on the physical effects 
and governmental response activities are available elsewhere. 
The Disaster and the Community 
Tropical Storm Iwa was identified on November 18, 1982, at 2:00 a.m. 
and upgraded to hurricane status at 5:00 p.m. on November 22, 1982, as it 
moved northward 500 miles southwest of Honolulu. A hurricane watch was 
issued at ll:OO a.m. on the 22nd; Iwa was considered to be of moderate 
intensity. Hurricane warnings (generally announced when sustained winds 
are expected to reach about 75 mph in 24 hours' time) were posted at 8:00 
a.m. on the 23rd. 
Most of the severe damage caused by heavy wave action happened in 
the 24 hours following the warning. The islands of Oahu, Kauai, and 
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Niihau were battered by swell waves throughout the day of the 23rd. At 
its closest, the eye of the hurricane was 30 miles to the northwest of 
Kauai. Winds gusted to 85 mph, and sustained winds of 65 mph were re-
corded. Winds of approximately 65-70 mph were felt in coastline areas 
and diminished to about 50 mph 1.5 miles inland. Very little rain (less 
than three inches) preceded or accompanied the storm. 
While portions of Oahu sustained damage, the Islands of Kauai and 
Niihau were the most severely damaged. Kauai lies 95 miles northwest of 
Oahu at the northwestern edge of the major island chain. The island is 
32 miles in diameter and has a population of approximately 40,000. 
Although under the political jurisdiction of Kauai County, the small 
island of Niihau (population 260) is privately owned and not accessible 
to the public. To increase manageability of the field efforts, only the 
is 1 and of Kaua i, wh i ch is tota 11 y subsumed by the County of Kaua i, was 
selected as the study area. Oahu, and thus Honolulu, was excluded from 
consideration. 
Impacts of Hurricane Iwa 
Prior to Hurricane Iwa, only one other hurricane had passed through 
the Hawaiian Islands in modern times. Only August 6, 1959, Hurricane Dot 
came into direct contact with the islands, causing an estimated $5.7 
million in damage, mostly on Kauai. At most, two additional hurricanes 
are known to have approached the islands in the past 150 years. Direct 
impacts have been relatively rare, with most tropical storms turning west 
before reaching the islands. 
Fl oodi ng, rather than hi gh wi nds, has posed a more frequent threat 
on Kauai. Caused by tsunamis and intense rains, and an occasional high 
surf, most flooding has been in poorly drained, low-lying areas and along 
the shorelines. The March, 1957 tsunami produced damages totaling $1.5 
million on Kauai. Hurricane Iwa was the most costly disaster to hit the 
island in recorded history. Most of the damage was caused by swell waves 
and, to a lesser extent, violent winds. Wind damage was sporadic and was 
island-wide. The most extensive wave-related damage occurred along a 20-
mile stretch on the southwest shore, including 1,170 acres between the 
communities of Kekaha and Poipu Beach. 
Extensive property damage along the southwest shoreline extended up 
to 600 feet inland. The acceleration of the storm as it moved through 
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the i sl ands and the act i on of hi gh wi nds and waves over shallow reefs 
were responsible for creating coastal flooding.* Impacts were 
especially severe where land protruded into the sea, since wave action 
converged at these points. Property damage was notably higher in these 
areas due to thei r proximity to the ocean and the appea 1 to i ndi vi dua 1 
builders and developers. 
Residential damage varied widely.** It ranged from the total 
destruction of beach front homes and apartments, to minor losses from 
water damage to household furnishings and wind damage to roofs and win-
dows. Much of the wind-induced damage was caused by flying debris and 
the inadequate attachment of roof materi a 1 s. Where wi nd produced more 
substantial destruction, rainfall damaged the interior of homes. t~ajor 
damage from high winds was primarily limited to older wood frame resi-
dences with corrugated metal roofs and to buildings without foundations. 
There was substantial flooding up to 150 yards inland.*** In many 
cases, it was difficult to distinguish between the effects of wind and 
the effects of wave action along the shoreline. 
Damage reports varied from report to report, and across time as 
estimates were revised. (See Appendix B, Table 1 for estimate of damage. 
These figures, drawn from a variety of sources, may have changed since 
they were initially compiled from documents available. However, they 
give an indication of the magnitude of losses and damage related to the 
hurricane.) 
Disaster Assistance 
On Kaua i, the State Ci vil Defense had respons i bil ity for coordi-
nat i ng evacuat ion, immedi ate ass i stance and the se rvi ces of the Red 
*The debris line mapped by the Kauai County Planning Department 
exceeded the 100-year floodline and the 100-year wave level by 30U yards. 
Due to the infrequency of hurricane events in the area, flood-lines 
established by FEMA are based on tsunami studies and do not take into 
account the effects of storm surge associated with hurricanes. 
**Residences are commonly of wood frame construction, set on a 
concrete foundation, and have roofs of metal sheeting. 
***Many sections of beach road and shoreline residences were trans-
ported off their foundations and carried inland up to lUO yards, causing 
further damage to inland homes. 
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Cross, the Salvation Army, and the Armed Services (including National 
Guard and Coast Guard). The Presidential Declaration of the event as a 
maj or di saster was made on November 25th, thereby mobil i zi ng federal 
resources to assist the state. Official Disaster Assistance Centers 
(DACs)**** were established in three locations--Lihue, Kaloa, and 
Kilauea--on December 2, 1982. 
In the three days fo 11 owi ng, 1,622 persons regi stered at the DACs. 
The Kaloa center processed the greatest number of applications and had 
the most return applicants. This was due either to the more severe 
damage in that district, or to the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
inhabitants. Although the DACs closed on December 16, 1982, offices 
representing some of the assistance agencies (e.g., Salvation Army, FEMA) 
opened in Waimea and Lihue and were still open at the time of our inter-
viewing eight months after the disaster. 
Ihe Coml!!.un i ty 
When Kauai is described as a "community", the entire "island is 
included. Persons 1 ive a a variety of settings, from fairly densely 
developed resort and vi 11 age centers, to somewhat more i sol ated sets of 
dwellings clumped around agricultural or scenic areas, to scattered 
individual dwellings. However, the inhabitants of Kauai, and in particu-
lar those in the southeast sector of the island, can be considered as a 
community with respect to the impact of Hurricane Iwa and the response to 
it. When not on Kauai, these residents seem more typically to represent 
themselves as "from Kauai," and not from the particular sub-jurisdiction 
in which they might live within the County and Island of Kauai. 
Kauai is typically reached by airplane, so the setting must be 
considered somewhat inaccessible, particularly to persons of lower socio-
economic levels. Portions of the western half of the island are virtual-
ly uninhabited due to the ruggedness of the terrain. The east and south 
coasts have resort developments scattered along them near the ocean, and 
a variety of agricultural pursuits are located inland. Sugar cane has 
been a main industry there for many years. Lihue, the country seat, is 
****Established by FEMA, DACs are typically opened within a week of 
a federally declared disaster. Representatives of disaster assistance 
agencies are present to provide information on available aid, eligibility 
requirements, and the application process. 
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the major commercial district and contains the various state and local 
government offices. 
A few general popul at i on characteri st i cs (taken for the most pa rt 
from 1980 census fi gures) are presented here to provi de an idea of the 
general demographic character of the community. These figures represent, 
of course, conditions prior to the disaster. Two-thirds of the island's 
population inhabits the three southern districts of Waimea (8,593), Koloa 
(8,734), and Lihue (8,590). Predominant ethnic groups include Japanese 
(25%), Filipino (26%), Caucasian (29%), and Hawaiian (15%). Although 
most residents can speak English, about 29% of all residents five years 
of age and older speak a language other than English at home. Japanese-
origin residents tend to be considerably older than the other residents 
(median age, 43), while Hawaiian residents are substantially younger 
(median age, 21). Hawaiian and Filipino families are likely to have a 
greater number of persons per family (4.29 and 4.30) than the average 
(3.62) • 
The median age of Kauai residents is 29.8 years. About 32% are 
under the age of 25 and 11% are at least 65 years of age. Of all fami-
lies 84% consist of married couples, and 45% consist of married couples 
with children under 18 years of age. Over 1/4 of all residents 15 years 
of age and older are Single. The median income of households ($19,066) 
and families ($20,882) was slightly less than that ot the state as a 
whole ($20,473 and $22,751, respectively). About 9% were living below 
the poverty line compared to about 10% for the entire state. A relative-
ly small portion (3%) was unemployed. Major employers include retail and 
wholesale trade (22%), public administration/government (16%), agri-
culture (10%), and construction (7%). About 64% of all Kauai residents 
25 years or older are high school graduates compared to 74% for the 
state. 
There are proportionately more year-round single family housing 
units on Kauai than in the state overall (81% vs. 60%). Over one-half of 
all year round units are owner occupied. The vacancy rate (21%) for 
rentals was over double that of the rest of the state (10%). The state 
as a whole has over four times the number of structures with five or more 
units than does Kauai (which has under 9%). At the time of the census 
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interview, about 22% of the residents had lived at their current dwelling 
less than a year. 
The Study Method 
For the most part, the study was similar to the Paris, Texas, survey 
descri bed in Chapter II 1. The i ntervi ewi ng arrangements and sampl i ng 
will be discussed here briefly. 
Interviewing 
The interview schedule contained 175 items and took an average of an 
hour to complete, with the interviewer reading the items and recording 
the responses. Most of the items were of a closed-response choice for-
mat, including Likert-type items. It was designed with two specific 
purposes in mind: the continued refinement of a model of family re-
covery, and a detailed analysis of formal and informal sources of assis-
tance following a disaster. 
A full-time field director stayed in the community throughout the 
survey. This permitted daily monitoring of progress and the replacement 
of interviewers when necessary. Interviewers were recruited and trained 
on site by this person. Although there are trade-offs for using local 
interviewers (respondents may be reticent to provide certain types of 
information) in the types of communities studied, the project benefited 
in ways beyond the economy uf this arrangement. Local interviewers, many 
of whom had first-hand experiences of the disaster, or had served as 
postdisaster volunteers, had a great deal of information to share about 
the events surrounding the disaster. This information was especially 
useful in locating respondents who had been displaced by the disaster. 
Locals also seemed to be better accepted by older, long-time resi-
dents. For example, on Kauai, many islanders have typically maintained 
some distance from mainland culture and institutions. This has been due, 
in part, to a distrust of outsiders and partly to an upsurge in attempts 
to increase self-sufficiency and cultural pride. A small proportion of 
residents were non-English speaking, and a number spoke English as a 
second language. The interviewer was instructed to conduct the interview 
in the language preferred by the respondent. The language barrier was 
not considered great enough on Kauai to translate the interview schedule 
into any of the other languages used. 
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The need for some degree of bilingual capability in order to assure 
understanding of various items in the schedule was most evident with the 
more recent Filipino immigrants and elderly Japanese. Seven of the 17 
Kauai interviewers were bilingual; three Japanese, two part-Hawaiian, and 
two Filipino. They were permitted to do what translating was necessary. 
This was not considered to be of great concern for the bulk of the items, 
which were purely descriptive in nature ("What percent. ? How 
often ••• ? How many ••• ?). Admittedly, reliability of the Likert-
type att itude items was compromi sed to some extent by thi s somewhat ad 
hoc translating arrangement, but the method was necessary; the costs of 
three or four different language translations for relatively small num-
bers of respondents would have been prohibitive. 
Sampling 
Of the five districts on Kauai, the three southernmost districts--
Kaloa, Lihue, and Waimea--were included in the survey. The site was 
restricted to these adjacent districts primarily to cut transportation 
costs and to reduce administrative efforts. The districts chosen are 
representative of the island as a whole and include an urban area (county 
seat) as well as a tourist community and several more rural outlying 
communities, both inland and coastal. Thus the sample is most appropri-
ately characterized as representative of victims in three districts of 
Kauai. 
Samples were drawn from each of the three districts separately and 
were proportionate to the number of damaged units within each district. 
A larger sample was drawn than in Coalinga, due to the complexity of the 
ethnic group characteristics, although budget constraints also limited 
the size. Beg i nni ng at random, every seventh 1 i st i ng was drawn from 
those houses showing some level of damage on the Red Cross damage assess-
ment list. A 14% sample, or 521 residences, was selected from the 3,722 
victim households. 
A minor deviation from this procedure was used for assuring in-
clusion in the sample of residents from the community of Poipu Beach in 
the Kaloa district. This area was the most heavily damaged, and many of 
the residents were still dislocated from thei r pre-hurricane addresses. 
The maj ority of units in the Poi pu Beach a rea are condomi ni ums. Except 
for those units that were obviously hotel rooms or apartments, usually no 
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di st i nct i on was made in the Red Cross damage assessments between year-
round condominium residents and those staying in time-share condominiums 
or other tourist facilities. Due to the difficulty of locating respon-
dents who had been present at the time of the hurri cane, i ntervi ewers 
were instructed to conduct interviews with victims on each street propor-
tionate to the number of units damaged. Because of the extreme level of 
destruction in this area, many of these households had moved to another 
residence, often in another community further inland. The efforts of 
interviewers familiar with the residents were valuable in tracing dis-
placed respondents. 
Several criteria governed the substitution of households in cases 
where the potential respondent was unavailable or refused to be inter-
viewed. If the potential respondent could not be reached on the first 
call, two callbacks were required before substituting another household. 
Substitutions were selected by interviewers from houses to the immediate 
left and second left, and then to the immediate right and second right. 
Residents living on the same street tended to be fairly homogeneous in 
their demographic composition and to have suffered a consistent level of 
damage due to similar types of building construction within each neigh-
borhood. Thus, bias in making substitutions among available residents did 
not appear to be great. (Completion rates are described in Appendix B, 
Table 3.) 
Characteristics of the Sample 
The sample for Kauai was gathered from a set of scattered towns and 
vi 11 ages, so some respondents have a 1 ivi ng and worki ng pattern whi ch 
makes them more rural than those that live and work in the county seat, 
Lihue. The mean age of the respondents was 48.7 years. About 28% of the 
sample was age 60 or over. Family size averaged 3.59. Eighty-five 
percent of the sample had lived in single-family dwellings prior to the 
disaster, and 51% of the Kauai respondents owned their dwellings. The 
mean number of yea rs that vi ct i m fami 1 i es had 1 i ved in the predi sa,ster 
dwelling was 12.9 years. Since damage patterns followed housing quality, 
which was related to when the home was built, one would expect the 
longest-term res i dents to be included at a hi gher rate. The average 
number of years of residency on Kauai for the respondent households was 
29.6. 
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Almost 20% of the sample declined to reveal their monthly incomes to 
the interviewers, but the average predisaster monthly income (after 
taxes) was put at $1287. On Kauai, 56% of the househol d heads were in 
unskilled or skilled occupations, 28.9% in management or professions, 
and 23% were retired. This level of retirement is probably more a re-
flection of the long-term residency of the sample, and in particular the 
Japanese. In the sample, 52.8% of the heads of household had at least a 
high school diploma and 23.7% had at least a college degree. 
Sample Ethnic Groups 
The intent of the site selection process was to find towns in which 
there would be an adequate degree of ethnic difference in the population 
to provide for comparisons by ethnic grouping. Kauai represents con-
siderable diversity. The sample of victims was 33.2% Caucasian, 25.1% 
Japanese-descent, 19.7% Filipino descent, and 9% Hawaiian, with the 
remaining 16% being Chinese or those representing themselves as being of 
mixed ethnic backgrounds (mostly various combinations of Asians and 
Pacific Islanders). This distribution can be taken as representative of 
the distribution of damage, by ethnic group, for those districts sampled. 
Ethnic group figures from 1980 for the island as a whole were 29% Cauca-
sian, 29% Japanese descent, 26% Filipino descent, and 15% Hawaiian. 
The religious affiliations of the respondents reflect the general 
pattern of religions among the various ethnic subgroups. About 12.5% of 
the heads of household claimed no religious affiliation, 37.7% were 
Catholic, 19% were Protestant, 18.8% were Buddhist, and the remaining 17% 
were a mix of other religions and sects. 
With respect to age, the Kauai ethnic subgroups differed from each 
other: the Caucasian respondents tended to fall into the lower age 
groups; the Japanese heads of victim households were most likely to be 50 
years old or older; and the Filipino heads were only somewhat less likely 
to be that old (Appendix B, Table 4). This reflects the latter group's 
long-term residency on the island. The Japanese have lived and worked 
for many decades in all of Hawaii and are well established in government-
al positions and in the commercial life. As other indicators of this 
long-term settlement, 43% of the Japanese heads of household had lived in 
the same dwelling for 16 years or more, and 74% had lived on the island 
of Kauai for 20 years or more (Appendix B, Table 5). About 71% of the 
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Japanese respondents owned rather than rented their predisaster dwellings 
(Appendix B, Table 6). 
The Caucasian sample is apparently the most transient of the four 
groups, with 58% of them renting their predisaster dwelling rather than 
owning it and over half of them not having lived in their predisaster 
dwellings more than five years. The lowest percentage of Caucasian 
victims (31.6%) had lived on the island 20 years or more. A fairly large 
proportion (59%) of the Filipinos also had been on the island 20 years or 
more, but the Filipinos as a group had moved around more than the 
Japanese. The Filipino victims were more likely to rent than to own (58% 
to 42%, respectively); 20% of the Filipino respondents had some special 
arrangement such as renting housing located on the plantation where they 
worked (included with the other rentals in Appendix B, Table 6). 
With respect to family living arrangements, the Filipinos were the 
1 east 1 i ke ly to res i de in one-person househo 1 ds (Appendi x B, Table 7). 
The Caucasian victim households were more likely than the others, and in 
particular more likely than the Japanese, to contain minor children. 
This is probably due to a greater concentration of older heads of house-
hold in the other two groups. A greater proportion of large famil ies 
were found among the Filipino group (Appendix B, Table 8). 
The Filipino heads of household were more likely to be working, or 
to have worked, in an unskilled occupation than were respondents in the 
other groups (Appendix B, Table 9). The Japanese were 1 ikely to have 
skilled occupations or to be in managerial or professional occupations, 
but the Caucasians were the most likely of any of the groups to have 
managerial and professional occupations. 
With respect to employment status, the Fi 1 i pi nos were the 1 east 
likely to have been unemployed at the time of the hurricane (Appendix B, 
Table 10). The largest proportion of retirees were found among the 
Japanese and Filipino group in the sample, again reflecting the generally 
higher age of those groups. It appears that the Fil ipinos have tended to 
remain more in agricultural work--in particular on the sugar cane planta-
tions--than have the Japanese, and they have less of a presence in the 
political and commercial life of the islands than the other groups. The 
Caucasians are more linked with the resort developments on the island, 
the more recent arrivals having moved there to work in resort communities 
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and businesses or, to a lesser extent, perhaps to retire. 
The income distribution among the three ethnic groups in this victim 
sample was fairly similar, with the Japanese victim respondents being 
somewhat more likely than the other two groups to fall in the middle of 
the distribution (Appendix B, Table 11). About 20% of the respondents in 
the Kauai sample declined to give their income, this information being 
most frequently withheld by Caucasians and Japanese. 
The Filipino victims had the lowest educational level of the three 
groups (Appendix B, Table 12). The Caucasian victim group had the high-
est education level. About equal portions of the Japanese and Caucasian 
respondent heads of household had a least a high school education, but 
the Caucasian sample was somewhat more likely to have had educational 
levels above high school, probably reflecting their younger average age 
compared to the Japanese. 
Comparison of Ethnic Subgroups 
The sample was very complex on Kauai. Caucasian, Japanese, or 
Filipino groups accounted for 78% of the total sample. Other identifica-
tions given were Hawaiian, Chinese, mixtures of other Pacific Islanders, 
and Portuguese, but none of these groups was present in 1 arge enough 
numbers to permit analysis. Thus, this analysis of ethnic group differ-
ences for Kauai will concentrate only on the Caucasian, Japanese, and 
Fi 1 i pi no subgroups. Thi s means that the total number of cases used for 
ethnic comparisons is smaller than the total Kauai sample size indicated 
on tables describing all the victim households in the sample. 
Effects of the Disaster 
Damage and Loss 
The extent of phys i ca 1 damage wrought by a nat ura 1 event is an 
interact i on between its dynami cs and the characteri s tics of the bu i It 
environment in its path. For example, the damage was not total for any 
of the communit i es selected. The pattern of the damage di st ri but ion 
in each community reflects the location of the built environment relative 
to the force of the event. In the vi 11 ages on Kauai, the amount of 
damage was far greater where the structures were exposed not only to the 
high wind velocities of the hurricane, but to the storm surge as well. 
Location was the major key to the amount of damage, although building 
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construction could mediate to some extent the damage caused by either 
wind or water. Generally, only dwellings in the path of the high waves 
and storm surge suffered total destruction. Wind damage also was 
patterned by topography, so that similar dwellings in the same community 
might have suffered differing levels of damage depending on their loca-
tion in relation to ridges and valleys. Thus, the social distribution of 
the damage follows the social distribution of dwelling location. 
Following disasters, communities typically are surveyed for the 
purpose of estimating damages. These estimates provide the basis for the 
provision of disaster relief supplies and programs. Some rough 
"boundary" of the disaster-affected portion of a community can be assumed 
from these surveys. On Kauai, portions of the communities were left 
vi rtually undamaged. Respondents in thi s study were selected from among 
households designated as having had, or having been likely to have had, 
damage of any kind. Levels of damage for the respondents, thus, could 
range from very little to total. This variety makes it pos·sible to 
examine the importance of levels of damage and loss for eventual success 
of recovery. It can be hypothesized that the need for and use of disas-
ter assistance will be related to levels of damage and loss, and that 
eventual recovery wi 11 be rel ated to 1 evel s of damage and loss on the 
part of individual families. 
I n some disasters, such as the Rapi d City fl ood and many fo rei gn 
disasters, families also are affected by the death and injury of members 
and relatives. The most devastating kind of loss--loss of life--did not 
occur duri ng the di saster on Kaua i, and the percent of fami 1 i es in the 
sample with injured members was small on Kauai (1.1%), eliminating this 
as an important variable in the analysis. 
With respect to property losses (Appendix B, Table 13), the average 
level of structural damage to the individual dwelling of each respondent 
family was 32.8%. The average doll ar loss reported by the respondents 
for structural damage was $21,489, probably reflecting, in general, high 
average value of a residence on Kauai and, in particular, the types of 
dwellings destroyed in each community. The average percentage loss to 
the contents of an individual dwelling was 24% on Kauai; the mean dollar 
loss to contents was $7,025. Kauai residents had the additional loss 
(typica"lly in the $100 to $200 range) of perishables caused by the elec-
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tricity having been off for at least a day or more (and typically for a 
week or more). A 1 arge percentage of the sample a 1 so had damage to 
vehicles or boats. 
Few victim families on Kauai perceived themselves as much worse off 
than others in the disaster-stricken community. For those who did, there 
is a significant relationship between seeing themselves as worse off than 
others and having had a higher level of damage to their property. 
Ethnic Group Comparisons. Some differences can be noted when damage 
distributions are examined for each of the ethnic groups being studied 
(Appendix B, Table 14); two seem notable. Although the percents are 
small for all three groups with respect to high levels of damage, the 
Caucasian group was most likely to have suffered a high level of damage 
to the structure or contents of dwellings. This is believed to be a 
reflection of thei r frequent ownership of beachfront houses which were 
destroyed. Otherwise, the damage patterns were similar, with the 
Japanese being slightly less likely than others to have suffered over 25% 
structural damage, and the Filipinos slightly more likely than the others 
to have suffered 26 to 50% damage. The di fferences between these two 
groups may reflect housing quality more than housing location. 
Some differences are also evident among ethnic groups with respect 
to their perception of their postdisaster condition relative to others 
(Appendix B, Table 15). The Caucasians were less likely than the 
Japanese or Fi 1 i pi nos to see themsel ves as better off than others. To 
some extent, this may reflect their greater losses. 
Dislocation and Disruption 
Families affected by disasters such as Hurricane Iwa must make 
adjustments to their losses after the event has ended. Depending on the 
nature and extent of the damage, there is some sort of dislocation and 
disruption in the lives of these victims. It is useful to document the 
adjustments and thei r effects on fami 1 i es in order to i nfl uence the 
design of programs to facilitate disaster recovery. Some differences in 
adjustments may reflect not only family characteristics, but the nature 
of the disaster event. The degrees of dislocation and disruption are 
hypothesized to be related to the level of recovery a family will exhibit 
by a certain point after the disaster. 
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Household Dislocation. Dislocation refers to a family's having left 
its dwelling due to the disaster and the damage or fear that it caused. 
Respondents were asked if the household had to stay somewhere besides 
the dwelling for even one night following the disaster events: 37% of the 
respondents reported this on Kauai, with 3.6% of the families that left 
their homes camping in their yards. 
Excess housing was available in the community to house those who 
were totally displaced from their predisaster housing. FEMA utilized 
available resort housing, such as non-owner-occupied condominiums. The 
extent to which it would have been utilized if not subsidized with feder-
al funds is uncertain. (It might be added here that a major hurricane on 
the Gulf coast of the mainland United States could well result in a 
larger proportion, as well as absolute number, of homeless families than 
was the case on Kauai, where only a relatively small number of dwellings, 
mainly along one small section of coastline, were totally destroyed.) 
Respondents were asked how many times the fami ly had moved after 
the di saster, where they moved, and how long they stayed at each loca-
tion. Once the hurricane was considered to be over, if a family was 
unable or unwilling to stay at their own home or at the home of a rela-
tive, they were most likely to move in with friends or neighbors. In 
talking to the Kauai victims, it often became evident that they had 
stayed with relatives or friends during or after the storm more because 
they wanted to be with others during a time of stress than because their 
homes were uninhabitable. However, the mean amount of time spent in the 
first location (Appendix B, Table 16) indicates many of the moves were 
not just for one night, but for several weeks. 
The most commonly reported destination for the second move was back 
into one's own predisaster dwelling. As indicated by the earlier figures 
on levels of damage, the bulk of the dwellings were less than 50% 
damaged. The movi ng patterns i ndi cate that, for the most part, the 
pattern was one of going into emergency housing of some sort and then 
back into the home once the cri sis was percei ved as past or adequate 
repairs had been made. When moving back into one's home still was not 
pOSSible, renting was the most likely adjustment providing temporary 
housing beyond the emergency period. Some famil ies may have gone from 
emergency housing back to their own homes for a brief time, and then into 
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a rental unit until they could finish repairs or find new permanent 
hous i ng (Appendi x B, Table 16). In addit i on, renters do not have the 
motivation to return to their predisaster location at the same rate as 
home owners. 
In the cases reported in this chapter and the next, the official 
disaster relief programs included provision of federally subsidized 
temporary housing arrangements for victim families whose former dwellings 
were not habitable. These are counted as rental housing in Appendix B, 
Table 16. The destinations of dislocated disaster victims will un-
doubtedly vary according to the extent of housing provided by government 
programs. The long-term doubling up with relatives or friends has been 
noted in a foreign instance where housing was in short supply and housing 
programs for displaced victims were slow to materialize (Bolton, 1979). 
Household Disruption. Media accounts of disasters generally focus 
on people's terror and trauma throughout the course of the event. People 
are asked to describe what they did during the hours of howling wind and 
rising water and how they felt about it. There is much less coverage of 
the longer-term disruptions that accompany the postdisaster clean-up and 
repair. Although 93% of the Kauai victim sample were still in, or back 
to, their predisaster address by the time these interviews were con-
ducted, thi s was not accompl i shed without some i nconveni ence to the 
families. About 58% of the sample reported high levels of disruption 
from the dislocation (Appendix B, Table 17). In general, the respondent 
households felt themselves to be permanently located by the time of the 
interview, but about 19% of the Kauai sample indicated they intended to 
move again in the near future. 
While it may not be necessary to leave a damaged home, repair work 
may be necessary to bring it back to its predisaster condition. About 
78% of the total Kauai sampl e reported they had made repai rs to thei r 
dwellings while living in them after the disaster. Living in a house 
under repair was found to be disruptive, with 38% of the sample reporting 
high levels of disruption for living in such homes. Much of the Kauai 
sample also had undergone the inconvenience of several days, or even 
weeks, without electricity. 
Employment Disruption. The disaster caused damage to commercial and 
industrial property as well as homes. Of the heads of household in the 
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sample who were employed at the time of the disaster event, about 50% had 
their workplaces closed due to the disaster (Appendix B, Table 18). The 
place of work of heads of households in the sample was, on the average, 
closed 4.9 weeks. 
Being out of work for a long period of time can be disruptive 
psychologically as well as economically, both to the employee and his or 
her families. On the other hand, it appears that it was not necessarily 
the case that having one's place of work closed meant either that there 
was no work to be done or that income was disrupted. Considerable varia-
tion probably can be found--depending on specific companies, community 
conditions, and victim's occupational 1eve1--with respect to the actual 
degree of disruption caused by the closure of work places after disas-
ters. In some cases, the place of work might have been closed for 
business, but some of the employees brought in to do clean-up and repair 
work; moreover, they mayor may not have been paid for this work. Volun-
teering to help out at one's place of employment after a disaste-r probab-
ly is not uncommon, espec i a lly among management and supervi sory person-
nel. Certainly if this sort of task is seen as contributing to getting 
the bus i ness ope rat i ng that much sooner, it wi 11 be vi ewed as des i rab 1 e 
to be a participant. 
It is also not the case that employees are without income while 
places of work are closed, although this may be truer for those who are 
paid an hourly wage than those on salary. Further, this loss of income 
may well be compensated for by social programs (unemployment compensa-
tion, food programs). Thus, the loss of work-related income in a U.S. 
disaster is probably not the economic hardship that it is in Third World 
disasters. In general, being out of work for disaster-related reasons 
for over a month was very uncommon in the two sites reported on in this 
and the following chapter, having affected about 7% of all heads of 
households in the Kauai sample, and 3% in the Coalinga sample (Appendix 
B, Table 18). Di saster- re 1 ated unemployment was not an i mpo rtant vari a-
ble with respect to overall community recovery, although it may have 
affected i ndi vi dual famil i es. 
Ethnic Group Comparisons. Differences were observed among ethnic 
groups with respect to dislocation (Appendix B, Table 19): Caucasians 
were more 1 i ke 1y than Japanese or Fil i pi nos to report havi ng been di s-
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located from their homes after the disaster. This is in keeping with the 
higher dwelling damage levels found for the Caucasian group. As noted 
earlier, the greater damage suffered by this group is believed to reflect 
the fact that larger numbers of them live directly facing or close to the 
ocean. 
The temporary loss of employment due to the disaster was fairly 
evenly distributed across the three major ethnic groups in the Kauai 
sample. To some extent, the various ethnic groups are identified with 
di fferent employment sectors and the damage on Kauai affected all three 
major employment sectors. There was substantial damage to the resort 
industry, with some of the longest-term closures being in that sector. 
The publicity of the damage also resulted in an accompanying reduction in 
demand for the undamaged facilities as tourists switched their reserva-
tions elsewhere. This probably accounts for the slightly greater likeli-
hood for longer loss of work in the Caucasian group. Some closures, 
although generally of short duration, were also necessitated by wind 
damage to plantations and to the commercial and governmental district in 
Lihue, mostly affecting the Filipinos and the Japanese. 
Psychological Distress 
A few measures were included in the interview to serve as indicators 
of the extent to which the trauma and disruption of the disaster event, 
disaster losses, and the recovery process affected the levels of physical 
and mental health of the victim households. Since psychological distress 
was not a major focus of the study, these measures are cursory. However, 
they do provide some insights into the consequences of losses and disrup-
tion to these households and serve as an indicator of the level of 
emotional recovery achieved at each site. 
When respondents were asked about thei r general health 1 evel rel a-
tive to others their age, the majority reported their health as excellent 
or good (84.3%). Few Kauai respondents (10%) reported new or worsening 
health problems since the disaster, but most of the ones that had 
occurred were felt to be related to the disaster. 
A strong association was found between emotional strain in the 
family and high levels of disruption from moving or repairs. Respondents 
were asked if anyone in their household had shown emotional strain as a 
result of the disaster. Forty-three percent of the households had a 
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member who showed strain on their mental health and well-being in the 
aftermath of the disaster (Appendix B, Table 20). As an indicator of 
the seriousness of the emotional strain in the postdi saster months, 
respondents were asked if they had sought help for this problem; only 12% 
of households contained a member who had sought professional counseling. 
With respect to emotional strain, there was little difference among the 
ethnic groups on Kauai (Appendix B, Table 21). 
Use ~_Formal Disaster Assistance Programs 
After Hurricane Iwa was declared a major national disaster, disaster 
assistance could be provided under the Federal Disaster Relief Act. As a 
result of the declaration, the site was served by Disaster Assistance 
Centers (DACs) in the weeks following the disaster. These centers are 
central points at which disaster victims can obtain information on the 
assistance programs available and be directed to those for which they are 
likely to be eliyible. In conjunction with these centers, the Red Cross 
also provided mass feeding facilities for a substantial amount of time. 
The use of formal disaster assistance programs was the central focus 
of this study. The findings can reveal the patterns of use, and eluci-
date the relationship of program use to eventual household recovery. The 
studies in this chapter and the next show some variation in the level and 
types of damage, and provide an opportunity to examine differences in 
assistance use across the ethnic groups in the communities studied. 
Use of the DACs and Funds 
While the timing and types of formal disaster assistance made avail-
able were similar in both Coalinga and Kauai, the propensity to use these 
assistance programs varied considerably. On Kauai, where DACs were 
placed in each of several villages in the affected area, 47.6% of the 
respondents said they had visited a DAC (Table V-I); about 23% of them 
reported going to a DAC more than twice. The mean number of visits was 
2.1. 
Not everyone who goes to a DAC is necessarily eligible for, or 
chooses to accept, specific kinds of disaster assistance. On Kauai, 42% 
reported that they actually received assistance from one of the programs 
(Table V-I). Subsequent figures in this subsection on the use of disas-
ter assistance programs will refer to those households which actually 
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TABLE V-1 
INDICATORS OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE USE 
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES 
KAUAI COALINGA 
(N-446) (N-376) 
N % N % 
A. Percent reporting having visited 
Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) 212 47.5 306 81.4 
B. Percent of above reporting 
number of visits as: 
One 119 56.1 78 25.5 
Two 43 20.3 87 28.4 
Three or more 50 23.6 141 46.1 
C. Percent receiving assistance from 
a local, state, or federal program 186 41.7 270 71.8 
received assistance. That portion of the samples not receiving assis-
tance is not indicated in the tables. 
Typically, the most urgent needs immediately following a disaster 
are meals in the early hours and days, perhaps emergency shelter, and--
later on--food items, clothing, and household goods. Voluntary private 
agencies such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, and to a lesser 
extent church groups, traditionally have been the front-line providers of 
these commodities. They give out either the specific items or vouchers 
with which items can be purchased. The Red Cross provides meals and uses 
the voucher system for other supplies; the Salvation Army offers goods 
which they have received through donations. An application process 
establ i shes loss and the unmet needs of those with no other means to 
recover their losses. 
Assistance users on Kauai were more likely to have used the Red 
Cross (84%) than the Salvation Army (26%) (Table V-2). There were some 
rt:!(Jorts that the Red Cross app 1 i cat i on procedure and imported personnel 
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TABLE V-2 
HOUSEHOLD USE OF SPECIFIC DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
FOR KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES (Percent) 
PERCENT RECEIVING AID FROM* 
Red Cross 
Salvation Army 
FEMA Temporary Housing Program 
FEMA Minimum Repair Program 
Small Business Administration 
Food Stamps 
Interfaith (Alliance/Task Force) 
Christian Disaster Relief 
Individual Family Grants Program 
Other Church or Civic 
KAUAI 
(N=186) 
84.5 
26.3 
10.8 
5.9 
5.4 
17.3 
2.7 
6.5 
17.7 
COALINGA 
(N=270) 
79.3 
66.8 
32.2 
9.6 
76.8 
.4 
8.9 
20.7 
22.9 
*Respondent households may have received assistance from more than one 
program. 
had not been well received by the inhabitants of the close-knit communi-
ties on Kauai, who preferred the procedures of the Salvation Army. 
However, our findings did not indicate that such attitudes, if they 
existed, affected use patterns for the majority of assistance receivers. 
In the course of these studies, it did become evident that the Red 
Cross has become virtually synonymous with disaster assistance. There is 
a possibility that respondents occasionally reported the use of the Red 
Cross when actually aid came from other, similar programs. Nonetheless, 
the hi gh 1 eve 1 s of use of the Red Cross and Sal vat i on Army combi ned 
indicate that these programs clearly fulfill the role of the first_line 
provider. An effort was made to get respondents to recall accurately, 
and to distinguish among, the different programs they may have used. 
Generally, few respondents (less than 20% of the assistance receivers) 
reported the use of programs other than those of the Red Cross or Salva-
tion Army. 
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TABLE V-3 
NUMBER OF MAJOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS USED 
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES* 
KAUAI COALINGA 
TOTAL NUMBER USED N % N 
_%-
0 271 60.8 121 32.2 
1 116 26.0 66 17.6 
2 50 11.2 94 25.0 
3 3 
.7 ] 2.0 67 17.8J 25.2 4 6 1.3 28 7 .4 
TOTAL 446 100.0 376 100.0 
*Programs: Red Cross, Salvation Army, FEMA Temporary Housing, Small 
Business Administration, Individual Family Grants. 
Kauai households were not very likely to have made use of either 
Food Stamps or the Individual Family Grants program (IFG). The IFG 
program is one of "last resort," and eligibility for an IFG indicates 
high loss and/or low income among those eligible, as well as inadequate 
coverage by other programs (or insurance) and ineligibility for programs 
such as SBA loans. Only 6.5% of respondents reported use of the IFG 
program on Kauai. 
Table V-3 shows that only 2% of the Kauai households used more than 
one program. However, a full 25% of the Coalinga sample reported using 
three or four of the major programs. A strong association was found in 
both sites between the number of assistance programs used and the level 
of damage to dwell i ng structure and contents. Thi s suggests that the 
lower program use on Kauai may have been related to the generally lower 
damage levels. However, as will be noted later, there was also a tenden-
cy for one of the ethnic groups on Kauai to not use disaster assistance 
programs at the same level as others and also for more losses on Kauai to 
have been covered by insurance. 
Respondents who had received disaster assistance from the formal 
programs were asked to rate how important these disaster programs had 
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TABLE V-4 
IMPORTANCE OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE TO RECOVERY 
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES 
KAUAI COALINGA 
IMPORTANCE RATING* N _%_ N % 
A. Importance to Economic Recovery 
4 89 48.1] 74.0 107 39.8] 66.6 
3 48 2!J.9 72 26.8 
2 28 15.1 50 18.6 
1 16 8.6 25 9.3 
0 4 2.2 15 5.6 
Total 185 100.0 269 100.0 
No response 1 2 
Not applicable, did not 
use assistance programs 260 105 
B. Importance to Emotional Recovery 
4 84 45.4] 71.9 110 40.9] 70.6 
3 49 26.5 80 29.7 
2 29 15.7 37 13 .8 
1 16 8.6 16 5.9 
0 7 3.8 26 9.7 
Total 185 100.0 269 100.0 
No response 1 2 
Not applicable, did not 
use assistance programs 206 105 
*" •• would you rate how important the aid you received from these aid 
programs has been in your household's recovering [economically] 
[emotionally] from the [disaster]?" 4 = Extremely Important; 0 = Not 
Important. 
been in the recovery of the household (Table V-4). When asked about 
importance to thei r economic recovery, 74% of the Kauai respondents 
indicated that the assistance had been of high importance (3 or 4 on a 
scale of 0 to 4), and about 72% of them said the assistance was very 
important with respect to emotional recovery. In both sites, 90% or more 
of the respondents indicated that they were satisfied with the programs 
they had used. 
Awareness of Assistance Programs 
Multiple means were used to advertise the existence of the programs, 
but systematic evidence was not gathered about the publicity programs in 
terms of number of times a message was given, duration of the dissemina-
tion, and style of message delivery. Thus, it is not possible to say 
whether differences in the ways persons heard of programs are due to 
variations in the samples or to the information dissemination programs. 
Nonethel ess, the observed differences in how peopl e heard about the 
programs can be of some value. 
Respondents reported that they were least likely to have learned of 
the program through mail 1 i terature or from seei ng posters or fl i ers 
(Table V-5). The latter method was the least effective source of infor-
TABLE V-5 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
FOR KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES 
KAUAI COALINGA 
SOURCE* N '/, N % 
Television or radio 308 69.1 100 26.6 
Newspapers 99 22.2 67 17.8 
Posters, fl i ers, handbi 11 s 11 2.5 59 15.7 
Word of mouth 288 64.6 315 83.8 
Through the mail 7 1.6 25 6.6 
Loudspeakers** 13 3.5 
*Respondents may have mentioned more than one source. 
**Loudspeakers were not included on the list read to respondents; they 
were given as an "other" response in Coalinga. 
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mation on Kauai, where only 2.5% reported using it. Newspapers were more 
successful, with 22% of the respondents reporting the newspaper as a 
source of information. The use of the radio and television for informa-
tion on programs was even more successful on Kauai, where 69% reported 
those media as a source of information. This is a much higher percentage 
than in Coalinga (27%), and the difference is somewhat remarkable, in 
view of the fact that electricity was out for extended periods of time in 
some areas on Kauai. Thus people probably had and used portable radios 
and televisions immediately following the disaster on Kauai, and radios 
and TVs were also probably an important information source later on. 
Sixty-five percent of those on Kauai reported that their information came 
by word of mouth. 
Ethnic Group Comparisons 
As noted above, the Coalinga victims were more likely than the Kauai 
victims to have visited the official Disaster Assistance Centers (DACs). 
On Kauai, the Japanese were markedly less likely than the Caucasian or 
Filipino households to have visited a DAC (Table V-6). Although they 
tended to have the lowest amount of damage among the groups, they were 
not without damage; the difference is be 1 i eved to refl ect a choi ce on 
their part, perhaps deriving from cultural influences on attitudes toward 
the need for, and the appropri ateness of, seeki ng outs i de ass i stance. 
Since the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands typically have resided there 
for a very long time and typically wield considerable political power, 
this difference is not likely to be a reflection of anticipated discrimi-
nation or language difficulty. One other possible explanation would be 
the greater age of the group in this sample. Those Japanese who did 
visit one of the DACs were more likely than persons from the other two 
groups to make only one visit. 
With respect to us i ng one or more of the di saster ass i stance pro-
grams, the Japanese again differed from the Caucasians and Filipinos in 
the likelihood of using any of the disaster assistance programs (Table V-
6): only about 20% of the Japanese households reported assistance used, 
compared to around 50% for the other two groups. 
When the groups were compared with respect to which of the programs 
they used (Table V-7}, the Filipinos stood out not only as most likely 
to use the Red Cross, but also as most likely to use both the Red Cross 
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TABLE V-6 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY INDICATORS OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE USE (Percent) 
KAUAI COAL INGA 
Caucasian Ja~anese Fili~ino Anglo His~anic 
( N=137) (N=l17) (N=89) (N=260) ( N-1l6) 
A. % reporting 
having visited 53.3 27 .6 53.9 79.6 85.3 
DAC (73)* (32) (48) (207) (99) 
B. % of above 
reporting # 
of visits as: 
One 47.9 74.2 68.8 28.3 20.4 
Two 23.3 12.9 18.8 30.7 24.5 
~Three 28.8 12.9 12.5 41.0 55.1 
C. % receiving 
assistance 
from a local, 47.4 19.7 51.7 66.2 84.5 
state, or (65) (23) (46) ( 172) (98) 
federal program 
*Ns are given in parentheses. 
TABLE V-7 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY USE OF SPECIFIC DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (Percent)* 
KAUAI COALINGA 
Caucasian Ja~anese Fili~ino ~ His~anic PROGRAM (N-65) (N-23) (N-46) (N=172 (N-98) 
Red Cross 80.0 87.0 93.5 77 .3 82.7 
Salvation Army 23.1 21.7 41.3 61.3 76.5** 
SBA 4.6 13 .0 0.0** 9.8 9.1 
Food Stamps 16.9 8.7 4.5 73.4 82.7 
FEt~A Temporary 
Housiny 15.4 0.0 8.7** 23.1 43.4** 
*Each row of figures for each of the samples represents a separate 
comparison; e.y., the first row is a comparison among three ethnic 
yroups in the Kauai sample with respect to their use of Red Cross 
assistance, and a comparison between two ethnic yroups in the Coalinga 
sample. 
**Differences among or between the ethnic groups in the sample were 
significant at the .05 level or better (Chi-square). 
TABLE V-S 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY NUMBER OF MAJOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS USED* (Percent) 
KAUAI COALINGA 
Caucasian Ja~anese Fili~ino 
= 
His~anic 
TOTAL NUMBER USED (N-S9) (N-ll7) (N=137) (N=260 (N=1l6) 
0 56.2 81.2 50.6 3S.1 19.0 
1 30.7 13.7 24.7 19.6 12.9 
2 10.2 5.1 22.5 22.7 30.2 
3 .7 0 0 12.7 29.3 
4 2.2 0 2.2 6.9 8.6 
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Programs: Red Cross, Salvation Army, FEMA Temporary Housing, Small 
Business Administration, Individual Family Grants. 
and the Salvation Army as sources of necessary items. The Japanese were 
more 1 i kely than the other groups to have made use of SBA loans. The 
Caucasians, who, as seen earlier, were more likely than others to have 
suffered extensive damage to their dwellings, were found to be the most 
likely to have used the FEMA temporary housing program. 
With respect to the total number of programs used (Table V-S), there 
was some tendency for the Filipinos to have made the greatest use of the 
programs, but the most noticeable anomaly was that of the non-use by the 
Japanese. The association between level of damage and number of programs 
used was found to hold in both Coalinga and Kauai for all ethnic groups. 
The various groups were compared with respect to their perceptions 
of the importance of the a id they recei ved for the i r economi c and 
emotional recovery. However, virtually no differences were observed 
among the three groups on Kauai. Similarly, comparisons of the groups 
with respect to satisfaction with the programs also revealed virtually no 
difference among the groups, and the compa ri son of info rmat i on sources 
used by the groups to get program information shows no difference among 
the three groups on Kauai (Table V-g). 
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TABLE V-9 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY SELECTED INFORMATION SOURCES (Percent) 
KAUAI COALINGA 
Caucasian Ja~anese Fili~ino An9lo His~anic 
SOURCE* {N-l3n (N=ll7) (N-89) (N=260) (N-1l6) 
Television or 
radio 70.1 75.2 69.7 31.1 16.4** 
Newspaper 19.7 25.6 22.5 23.5 5.2** 
Posters, fl iers, 
handbills 3.4 0.0 1.5 19.2 7.8** 
Word of mouth 63.5 61.5 69.7 86.2 78.4 
*Each row of figures for each of the samples represents a separate 
comparison; e.g., the first row is a comparison among three ethnic 
groups in the Kauai sample with respect to their use of Red Cross 
assistance, and a comparison between two ethnic groups in the Coalinga 
sample. 
**Differences among or between the ethnic groups in the sample were 
significant at the .05 level or better (Chi-square). 
Alternative Adjustments to Losses 
The disaster victims in the study sites were not necessarily totally 
dependent on disaster programs to help them cope with their damages and 
losses. The study also examined three other adjustments to losses: 
insurance, the use of personal resources and strategies, and aid from 
relatives and friends. 
Insurance 
Insurance proved to be a fairly important adjustment to the disaster 
for Kauai households. It was more important than in Coalinga, since 
earthquake insurance was far less likely to be held by those respondents 
than was insurance for wind damage by the Kauai households. In fact, 88% 
of the households in the Kauai sample reported having insurance coverage. 
In many instances, the applicability of insurance was disputed for 
those along the coast, as it was difficult to establish whether the 
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damage had been done by wind or waves. Insurers generally did not con-
sider damage by water to be covered under wind damage, and disputes over 
insurance claims for the waterfront homes centered around whether or not 
wind damage preceded the damage from the waves. Some of the Kauai in-
habitants were eligible for flood insurance under the National Flood 
Insurance Program, but, to a great extent, the dwellings which received 
the most wave damaye were not in an area covered by that program. 
(Furthermore, el i gibil ity cannot be equated with use of the program). 
Although 9% of the respondents reported that their insurance claims were 
not yet settled at the time of the interviews, insurance coverage was 
much better on Kauai in general, where the average proportion of the loss 
covered by insurance was 73%, than in Coalinga where the proportion was 
only 40% (Table V-10). 
TABLE V-10 
INSURANCE USE FOR DISASTER LOSSES FOR THE 
KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES 
KAUAI 
(N=446) 
PERCENT OF LOSSES PAID BY INSURANCE N 
_%-
No coverage 203 45.8 
0% paid for 18 4.1 
1-25% 18 4.1 
26-60% 27 6.1 
51-75% 39 8.8 
76-YY% 39 8.8 
100% paid for 99 22.3 
Total 443 100.0 
No Response 3 
Mean % covered for those with insurance 73.0 
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COALINGA 
(N=376) 
N % 
172 46.4 
66 17.8 
29 7.8 
34 9.2 
18 4.8 
20 5.4 
32 8.6 
371 100.0 
5 
40.0 
TABLE V-l1 
LEVEL OF LOSSES COVERED BY EITHER INSURANCE OR ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES 
KAUAI COALINGA 
PERCENT OF LOSSES COVERED N % N % 
0% 67 15.9 70 19.1 
1-2~% 65 15.4 98 26.7 
26-50% 45 10.7 57 15.5 
bl-75% 60 14.2 36 9.8 
76-99% 69 16.4 37 10.1 
100% 116 27.5 69 18.8 
Total 422 100.0 367 100.0 
Mean % of losses covered 
by a combination of 58% 44% 
insurance and assistance 
When respondents were asked about the percentage of thei r total 
losses which were covered by the combination of insurance and assistance 
programs, Kauai respondents indicated an average coverage of 58% (Table 
V-II). Kauai respondents indicated a higher mean dollar figure for 
insurance and assistance received ($12,320) than did respondents in 
Coalinga ($5,829). Similar portions of the Coalinga sample (36%) and the 
Kauai sample (31%) reported they had money problems trying to replace 
property losses. 
Personal Resources 
Although some portion of the households recouped 100% of their 
losses through a combination of insurance and disaster assistance (27.5%) 
(Table V-II)), most had some losses which were not covered in this way. 
A series of items was included in the interview to determine how people 
dealt with such losses. Persons may decide not to replace some things, 
either because they do not need them at that time or because other items 
received higher priority. Another strategy used when unexpected expenses 
are incurred is that of rest ructuri ng the household budget: foregoi ny 
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TABLE V-12 
STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO UNINSURED LOSSES 
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES (Percent) 
KAUAI COALINGA 
STRATEGY USEO* ( N-446) (N=376) 
Decided not to replace 
certain thi ng s 42.8 64.4 
Did without special 
items (e.g., entertainment) 26.2 17.0 
Used money or loans from 
assistance programs 10.5 30.9 
Used money or loans from 
relatives or friends 14.8 9.8 
Used savings or other 
personal resources 37.9 42.0 
*Respondent households may have used more than one strategy. 
some discretionary expenses (e.g., movies, expensive food items) in order 
to use the money for necessities. Many families also have savings that 
can be used to close gaps in expenditures, or they may have received 
loans and grants from friends or relatives. 
In both Coalinga and Kauai, at least 80% of the households indicated 
that they had engaged in at least one of these strategies, some in more 
than one (Table V-12). The most frequently mentioned strategy was that 
of deciding not to replace certain things (reported by 43% on Kauai), 
followed by using savings or other personal money resources (38%). 
Consistent with the lower use of formal disaster assistance programs on 
Kauai, 11% of the Kauai respondents--compared with 31% in Coal inga--
reported having used loans or grants from disaster assistance programs. 
On the other hand, 26% of the households in the Kauai sampl e i ndi cated 
that they made adjustments in their discretionary spending ("went without 
things") to be able to replace necessary items. 
Ethni c Gro~~~~ons. Di fferences were found among the vari ous 
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TABLE V-13 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY COVERAGE OF LOSSES BY INSURANCE 
AND BY EITHER INSURANCE OR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (Percent) 
KAUAI COALINGA 
INSURANCE COVERAGE Caucasian Jaeanese Filie ino ~ Hi seanic_ OF LOSSES (N-13n (N=1l6) (N=88) (N=256) (N-1l5 ) 
No coverage 59.8 24.1 47.7 33.2 75.7 
0% paid for 2.9 3.5 7.9 19.9 13.0 
1-25% 4.4 3.4 3.4 10.5 1.7 
26-50% 6.6 8.6 3.4 11.7 3.5 
51-75% 9.5 8.6 5.7 6.3 1.7 
76-99% 3.6 11.2 9.1 7.8 0.0 
100% paid for 13 .1 40.5 22.7 10.5 4.3 
INSURANCE OR 
ASSISTANCE (N=129) (N=1l5) (N=84) (N=255) (N=1l2) 
COVERAGE OF LOSSES 
0% 20.9 13.0 14.3 18.3 21.4 
1-25% 24.8 6.1 14.3 26.7 26.8 
26-50% 11.6 9.6 8.3 14.9 17.0 
51-75% 10.9 11.3 15.5 8.6 12.5 
76-99% 10.1 14.8 19.0 12.8 3.6 
100% paid for 21.7 45.2 28.6 18.8 18.8 
ethnic groups with respect to insurance coverage (Table V-13). The 
Japanese were found to be more likely than the other two groups not only 
to have had insurance coverage of special kind, but to have had more than 
75% of their losses covered by insurance. This fact probably explains 
thei r generally lower propensity to use di saster assistance programs. 
But a larger question still remains, then, concerning why the Japanese 
were more likely to have insurance than were other groups. Given that 
the Japanese do not differ significantly from Caucasians regarding educa-
tion or income levels, the most likely explanation seems to be some 
cultural characteristic. 
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In some cases, lack of insurance was made up for by disaster assis-
tance programs (Table V-13). This combination of aid does not result in 
much change in the pattern for the Japanese but, to some extent, closes 
the gap between them and coverage aChieved by the other two groups--
especially the Caucasians. 
The comparison of personal strategies used to deal with losses not 
covered by insurance show few differences among the groups on Kauai 
(Table V-14). As would be expected, the Japanese exhibiced a difference 
TABLE V-14 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO UNINSURED LOSSES (Percent) 
KAUAI COALINGA 
Caucasian Jaeanese Filie ino 
= 
Hiseanic 
STRATEGY USED* (N=137) ( N=ll7) (N=89) (N=260 (N-1l6) 
Decided not to 
replace certain 52.5 52.6 50.7 68.5 55.2** 
things 
Did without 
special items 35.0 26.9 28.0 10.0 32.8** 
Used money or loans 
from re 1 at i ves or 19.2 16.7 17.3 11.5 6.0 
friends 
Used money or loans 
from assistance 18.3 5.1 12.0** 32.7 26.7 
programs 
Used savings or 
other personal 45.8 44.9 37.3 44.2 37.1 
resources 
*Respondent households may have used more than one strategy. Each row 
of figures for each of the samples represents a separate comparison; 
e.g., the first row is a comparison among three ethnic groups in the 
Kauai sample with respect to their use of Red Cross assistance, and a 
comparison between two ethnic groups in the Coalinga sample. 
**Differences among or between the ethnic groups in the sample were 
significant at the .05 level or better (Chi-square). 
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from the other groups with respect to the use of loans from the disaster 
-assistance programs, but otherwise the three groups are fairly similar in 
their adjustments. 
Aid from Friends and Relatives 
Neighbors, friends, and relatives long have been acknowledged as 
important sources of help in disasters and other emergencies. Relatives 
stand out as the most important source of help; in the social science 
literature it has been shown that they are expected to provide, in gener-
al, just about anything which is needed. In particular, they may be the 
most likely source of long-term aid--such as a shared home or financial 
assistance. Although the actual discharging of these responsibilities 
varies, it has consistently been found to be a central feature of disas-
ter recovery. 
Neighbors and friends also can play an important role during crises. 
Neighbors provide various kinds of immediate support and assistance 
primarily because of their physical proximity to one another; friends 
also often provide material and emotional aid in crises even though they 
do not live nearby. Seeing to those near to one in location and near to 
one in blood probably takes precedence over checking on friends in the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster, although much variation can be ex-
pected. 
Receipt of Aid. In order to establish the availability of primary 
group aid ("social support"), respondents were asked some very general 
questions about the presence in the community of relatives, friends, and 
nei ghbors to whom they felt close and about t hei r 1 eve 1 of interact ion 
with these persons. Many respondents on Kauai and in Coalinga (70%) 
indicated very large numbers of close relatives and friends, which would 
imply at least the potential for obtaining help from primary groups. 
The actual informal aid sources used are show in Table V-15. Sixty-
five percent of the households in the Kauai sample received aid from 
informal sources. As with disaster assistance programs, the use of this 
type of aid was strongly associated with the level of damage sustained. 
In general, however, Kauai households were less likely than the Coalinga 
households to have received aid through informal systems, with 35% of the 
respondents saying they had received no aid from relatives, friends, or 
neighbors; while in Coalinga only 20% reported receiving no aid from 
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TABLE V-15 
INFORMAL AID SOURCES USED FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES 
KAUAI COALINGA 
N % N 
_%-
A. Number of Informal Aid Sources Used* 
NUMBER OF SOURCES 
0 156 35.0 74 19.7 
1 113 25.3 145 38.6 
2 93 20.9 84 22.3 
3 84 18.8 73 19.4 
Total 446 100.0 376 100.0 
B. Receipt of Aid from Relatives, Friends, and Neighbors 
RELATIVES 
Received aid from 
relatives 223 50.0 251 66.8 
Aid offered, but did 
not accept 63 14.1 45 12.0 
Not offered aid 160 35.9 80 21.3 
Total 446 100.0 376 100.0 
FRIENDS 
Received aid from 
friends 198 44.4 176 46.8 
Aid offered, but did 
not accept 89 20.0 85 22.6 
Not offered aid 159 35.6 115 30.6 
Total 446 100.0 376 100.0 
NEIGHBllRS 
Received aid from 
neighbors 130 29.1 105 27.9 
Aid offered, but did 
not accept 77 17.3 62 16.5 
Not offered aid 239 53.6 209 55.6 
Total 446 100.0 376 100.0 
*Relatives, friends, or neighbors only; maximum number of sources is 
three. 
TABLE V-16 
TYPES OF AID RECEIVED FROM INFORMAL SOURCES FOR 
KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES (Percent) 
TYPE OF AID KAUAI COALINGA 
RECEIVED* Relatives Friends Nei£!hbors Relatives Friends Neighbors 
Food 29.1 21.5 16.1 38.6 13.0 6.1 
Shelter 15.7 12.3 2.7 36.7 12.2 2.7 
Clothing 6.5 4.5 2.0 5.6 1.9 .3 
Money 17.5 6.3 1.6 16.0 3.5 0 
Emotional/ 
Moral Support 34.3 .2 15.0 50.3 36.4 22.9 
Labor 21.7 21.5 13 .9 14.1 4.8 2.9 
Transportation 7.2 4.7 3.4 10.6 4.0 1.9 
Household or 
Personal Items 14.8 8.7 4.3 15.2 2.4 1.3 
Advice or 
Information 23.1 15.9 8.5 24.5 12.8 5.3 
*Household may have received more than one type of aid. 
these persons. 
Respondents were shown a list containing nine types of aid typically 
received from relatives and friends and asked to indicate which they had 
received after the disaster: food, shelter, clothing money, moral 
support, labor, transportation, household items, or advice. Table V-16 
shows the distribution of these kinds of aid from each of the informal 
sources--relatives, friends, and neighbors. Kauai households appear to 
have received food from across their primary groups, perhaps because the 
lack of electricity for such a long period led people to get together to 
cook and to use up food in danger of spoiling. 
Importance of Aid. When asked about the importance of aid from 
these informal systems, around half or more of the respondents felt it 
had been important (Table V-17). In particular, this aid was viewed as 
more important to emotional recovery than to economic recovery. In 
comparison, the formal programs were considered equally important to both 
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TABLE V-17 
IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL AID SYSTEMS TO RECOVERY FOR THE 
KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES 
KAUAI COALINGA 
IMPORTANCE RATING* N % N 
_%-
A. Importance to Economic Recovery 
4 116 40.6 J 59.8 98 32.9J 48.3 
3 55 19.2 46 15.4 
2 36 12.6 44 14.8 
1 35 12.2 37 12.4 
0 44 15.4 73 24.5 
Total 286 100.0 298 100.0 
No response 4 2 
Not applicable, did not 
receive informal aid 156 76 
B. Importance to Emotional Recovery 
4 180 62.9 J 82.5 183 61.4] 80.9 
3 56 19.6 58 19.5 
2 35 12.2 27 9.1 
1 6 2.1 18 6.0 
0 9 3.1 12 4.0 
Total 286 100.0 298 100.0 
No response 4 2 
Not applicable, did not 
receive informal aid 156 76 
*" ••• would you rate how important the aid you received from your 
relatives, friends, and neighbors has been in your household's 
recovering [economicallyJ [emotionally] from the [disasterJ?" 4 = Very 
Important; 0 = Not Important. 
economic and emotional recovery (Table V-4 above). 
"Ethnic Group Comparisons 
When the number of sources of informal aid are examined among the 
ethnic groups, it is clear (Table V-18) that on Kauai the Caucasian group 
TABLE V-18 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY NUMBER OF INFORMAL SYSTEM SOURCES OF AID 
KAUAI COALINGA 
Caucasian Ja~anese Fi'l~ino ~ His~anlc NUMBER OF SOURCES* (N=13l) (N=lll) (N-89) (N=260 (N=1l6) 
0 24.1 47.0 40.4 18.1 23.3 
1 29.9 19.7 29.2 35.4 45.7 
2 27.7 17.1 13.5 24.2 18.1 
3 18.2 16.2 16.9 22.3 12.9 
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Relatives, friends, and neighbors only. Maximum of three sources. 
was more likely to have received aid from a wider range of their primary 
groups than the other ethnic groups. For all the respondents, relatives 
do not stand out clearly as the most important of the three potential 
sources (Table V-19), although the extent to which they were a source is 
similar across all three ethnic groups. For the Caucasians, friends as 
the most important source differentiated them from the Japanese and 
Fil ipinos. 
Overall Recovery 
Respondents were asked to rate thei r 1 eve 1 of recovery at the time 
of the interview, eight months after the disaster. The amount of time 
between the di saster and the survey all ows for the di saster assi stance 
programs to have been utilized, and for people to have made economic and 
emotional adjustments after the disaster. On the other hand, it is soon 
enough after the disaster that there still is variance in the level of 
recovery and, thus, the possibility of ascertaining influences on the 
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TABLE V-19 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY RECEIPT OF AID FROM INFORMAL SOURCES (Percent) 
RECEIPT OF AID 
FROM RELATIVES 
Received aid 
from relatives 
Aid offered, but 
did not accept 
Not offered aid 
by rel atives 
Total % 
RECEIPT OF AID 
FROM FRIENDS 
Received aid 
from friends 
Aid offered, but 
did not accept 
Not offered aid 
by friends 
Total % 
RECEIPT OF AID 
FROM NEIGHBORS** 
Received aid 
from neighbors 
Aid offered, but 
di d not accept 
Not offered aid 
by neighbors 
Total % 
KAUAI 
Caucasian Japanese Filipino 
(N=137) (N=117) (N=89) 
48.9 
13.1 
38.0 
100.0 
55.5 
21.9 
22.6 
100.0 
35.8 
18.2 
46.0 
100.0 
42.7 
16.2 
41.0 
100.0 
34.2 
17.1 
48.7 
100.0 
25.6 
12.8 
61.6 
100.0 
48.3 
12.4 
39.3 
100.0 
34.8 
19.1 
46.1 
100.0 
23.6 
22.5 
53.9 
100.0 
COALINGA 
~ Hispanic 
(N=260) (N-116) 
68.5 
13 .5 
UI.1 
100.0 
51.2 
25.0 
23.8 
100.0 
31.2 
18.8 
50.1 
100.0 
8.6 
28.4 
100.0 
37.1 
17.2 
45.7 
100.0 
20.7 
11.2 
68.71 
100.0 
*Differences among ethnic groups in Kauai were significant at the .05 
level or better; differences between ethnic groups in Coalinga were 
significant at the .01 level or better (Chi-square). 
**Differences among ethnic groups in Coalinga only were significant at 
the .05 level or better. 
TABLE V-20 
PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC AND EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES 
KAUAI COALINGA 
RECOVERY RATING* N % N % 
A. Perception of Economic Recovery 
4 198 44.4 J 79.8 119 31.6 J 66.2 
3 158 35.4 130 34.6 
2 65 14.6 78 20.7 
1 16 3.6 35 9.3 
0 9 2.0 14 3.7 
Total 446 100.0 376 100.0 
B. Perception of Emotional Recovery 
4 274 61.4 J 87.9 132 35.1 J 74.2 
3 118 26.5 147 39.1 
2 39 8.7 67 17 .8 
1 10 2.2 23 6.1 
0 5 1.1 7 1.9 
Total 446 100.0 376 100.0 
*" •• would you rate how we"ll recovered [economicallyJ [emotionallyJ 
your household is from the [disasterJ?" 4 = Extremely Important; 0 = 
Not Important. 
rate of recovery. Respondents were asked to make separate ratings for 
the household's economic recovery and its members' emotional recoveries. 
Group Recovery Levels 
At about ei ght months after the di saster, the 1 eve 1 of househo 1 d 
recovery differed for Coalinga and Kauai (Table V-20). Economic recovery 
at the 1 eve 1 of the famil y appea rs to have progressed at a more rapi d 
rate for Kauai than for Coalinga, with 44% of those on Kauai rating 
themselves as completely recovered. Kauai residents did claim to have 
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suffered considerable secondary economic impact from the temporary drop 
off in tourism following Hurricane Iwa. With respect to emotional re-
covery, many more Kauai victims (61%) than Coalinga victims (35.1%) felt 
their households had achieved complete recovery. 
This is consistent with the differences in disaster events and 
damage levels in the two communities. With the exception of the most 
badly damaged housing and resort area on the beachfront, well out of view 
of most of the island's long-term inhabitants, the Kauai residents were 
not (by eight months after Hurricane Iwa) faced with the reminders of 
devastation that greeted Coalinga residents daily. This is probably also 
why emot i ona 1 recovery on Kaua i outpaced economi c recovery. Thi s differ-
ence in household recovery also could be related to other factors; for 
example, it could rest with the effectiveness with which disaster pro-
grams were actually implemented in the community, or with a cultural 
propensity for the inhabitants of Kauai to be more positive about circum-
stances. 
Recovery rates for the different ethnic groups (Table V-21) follow 
the distribution of damage across the groups (see Appendix B, Table 14, 
above). Indeed, it seems 1 ike ly that differences between ethni c groups 
in recovery level as well as in usage of disaster assistance can be 
attributed in part to differences in damage incurred unevenly across the 
groups. For all three groups on Kauai, emotional recovery far out-
stripped economic recovery but, in keeping with the damage distribution, 
the Caucasian victims reported the lowest levels of both kinds of re-
covery. Again, among the three groups, the most extreme difference in 
disaster assistance use was found with the Japanese. These victims as a 
group were very unlikely to have used programs or even to have visited a 
DAC. Explanations for this include not only their generally lower damage 
levels but also their higher coverage by insurance--both possibly attri-
butable to a cultural value of self-sufficiency. 
In general, differences in ethnic group recovery could also be due 
to the differential application of assistance, or to various socio-
economi c factors that come into play when fi nanci a 1 c ri ses are experi-
enced and a complex institutional system must be negotiated to obtain 
assistance. In addition, some element of the differences could lie in 
the tendency of various ethnic groups to view their progress from differ-
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TABLE V-21 
COMPA~ISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC AND EMOTIONAL RECOVERY (Percent) 
KAUAI COALINGI\ 
Caucasian Japanese Anglo Hi span; 
RECOVERY RATING* (N=137) ( N=ll7) 
Fi 1 ipi no 
(N=89) (N=260) (N-116 
4 
3 
2 
1 
o 
4 
3 
2 
1 
o 
A. 
B. 
Perception of Economic Recovery 
38.0 511.4 47.2 
38.7 29.9 37.1 
16.1 11.1 6.7 
3.6 .9 7.9 
3.6 1.7 1.1 
Perception of Emotional Recovery 
54.7 72.6 62.9 
32.1 19.7 24.7 
9.5 6.8 7.8 
2.2 .9 4.5 
1.5 
34.6 
33.0 
19.6 
8.8 
3.9 
39.6 
38.5 
14.2 
6.2 
1.5 
*Level of recovery at about 8 months after the disaster. 
25.0 
37.9 
23.3 
10 .3 
3.4 
25.0 
40.6 
25.9 
6.0 
2.4 
ent perspectives, resulting in similar situations being reported in 
di fferent ways. 
~la.l~_r:!.[_Ec~nomi c:._~~c:.o_~~12 
A simple model of the hypothesized relationship of the central 
variables is provided in Figure V-I. This model assumes that patterns of 
long-term dislocation and use of disaster assistance programs can be 
explained by three primary influences: level of the disaster-related 
damage, loss of work, and predisaster socioeconomic status. Further, it 
assumes that the level of economic recovery reported at eight months 
after the disasters can be explained to some extent by the combination of 
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FIGURE V-l 
PATH DIAGRAM OF THE FAMILY 
RECOVERY HODEL 
Where: x, " 
X2 " 
X3 = 
X4 = Xs = 
Y, = 
Y2 = 
Y3 = 
Y4 = 
Percent of Damage to Dwell i ng Structul'c 
and Contents 
Number of Weeks out of Work (Head of 
Household) 
Education Level (Head of Ilousehol dl 
Family Income Level 
Age (Head of Household) 
Number of Disaster Assistance Programs 
Used 
Number of Sources of Informal Aid 
Use of Insurance 
Percent of Losses Covered by 
Insurance or Disaster Assistance 
Number of Post-Di saster Ilousehol d r~ove~ 
Self-assessment of Economic Recovery 
Error Variance 
these variables. 
The variables in the model have been measured in the following ways. 
The perception of recovery is based on a five-point rating given by the 
respondent regarding the degree of economic recovery achieved by the 
household by the time of the interview, with a score of 4 indicating 
complete recovery. The use of the disaster assistance is measured as the 
total number of major disaster assistance programs used by the household 
after the disaster; this can vary from 0 to 4. The use of informal aid 
is measured in terms of the use of aid from three major primary groups 
(relatives, friends, and neighbors), and thus can vary from 0 to 3. The 
use of insurance was measured by whether or not the household received 
any insurance payment (excluding comprehensive coverage from automobile 
damage) to apply toward its losses, with 0 representing no insurance 
payments and 1 representing the recei pt of an insurance payment of any 
amount. The percent of losses covered refers to the percentage of all 
losses that were recouped through some combination of the use of assis-
tance programs and insurance payments, ranging from 0% to 100%. 
Damage to dwelling was calculated as the summation of the percent of 
damage to both structure and to the dwelling's contents; it varies from 
0% to 100%. In order to keep this damage relevant to economic recovery, 
specifically, renters were re-coded as having 0% structural damage. This 
is predicated on the belief that renters do not incur direct economic 
costs from structure loss, that being the economic responsibility of the 
landlord. However, renters may be forced into moving, just as are 
owners, if the dwelling was made uninhabitable. Thus, this coding policy 
somewhat attenuates the hypothes i zed re 1 at i onshi p between damage 1 eve 1 s 
and residential dislocation in favor of the relationship between level of 
damage as an indicator of economic loss and economic recovery. 
Weeks out of work refers to the total number of weeks the head of 
household was without work due to the disaster-related closure of his or 
her workplace, varying from 0 to 30, although there was very little 
variance for the either Kauai or Coalinga. Education is measured from 
low to high levels of education completed, income from low to high month-
ly household income, and age from low to high for the head of household. 
The hypothesized direction of the relationship is indicated in 
Figure V-l. In traditional models of assistance, which underlie the 
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provision of many kinds of relief services for various kinds of crises, 
the expected direction of the relationships is based on a general, two-
part hypothesis: 1) the higher the need, the more assistance used; and 2) 
the more ass i stance used, the more rap i d the recovery from the cri sis. 
The analytical technique applied here is not the best approach for test-
ing that general hypothesis, since damage would have to be held constant. 
However, a path analytical technique has been selected for the purpose of 
determining the relative effect on disaster recovery of each of the 
following specific factors: age, socioeconomic status, disaster losses, 
disaster dislocation, and use of assistance. 
In order to examine differences in the importance of these variables 
to separate ethni c groups, ethni c group membershi p has been hel d con-
stant. A multiple regression has been performed on the variables in the 
model for each of the five ethnic groups studied in both Kauai and 
Coalinga. 
An Ethnic Group Comparison 
A comparison of the model across the various ethnic groups indicates 
some difference in the variables found to exert the most influence on the 
level of recovery. A detailed discussion of each of the observed varia-
tions would be more tedious then revealing for our purposes here, so 
discussion will be held to a general overview of what the analysis seems 
to indicate about recovery. 
The path coeffi ci ents for each dependent vari ab 1 e and the 1 evel of 
variance explained are presented initially in tabular form. There is a 
separate set for each of the ethnic groups, as follows: Caucasian, Kauai 
(Table V-22); Japanese, Kauai (Table V-23); Filipino, Kauai (Table V-24); 
Anglo, Coalinga (Table V-25); and Hispanic (Table V-26). Significant 
path coefficients and multiple R2s are designated in the tables;discus-
sion is limited to these significant indicators only. It should be noted 
that sample size exerts some degree of influence on significance, and 
that the size of the groups bei ng analyzed vari es from 89 (Fil i pi no 
group) up to 260 (Anglo group). 
From among the ethnic groups, the variables in the model are best 
suited to explaining recovery for the Caucasian group in the Kauai 
sample. In that instance, 33% of the variance in recovery is explained 
by the variables used (Table V-22). The second best fit of the model is 
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Dependent 
Variable 
Use of 
Disaster 
Assistance 
(Y 1) 
Use of 
TABLE v-22 
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS OF THE PATH HODEL 
OF FAMILY RECOVERY: CAUCASIAN GROUP, KAUAI (N=13]) 
Independent Path Explained 
Variable Coefficient Variance 
Damage to Dwelling (X~) .19* 
Heeks out of \,ork (X) .03 
Education (X 3 - .06 .04 Income (X4) -.04 Age (Xs) -.06 
Damage to Dwelling .31* 
Heeks out of Hork .03 
Informal Aid Education .16 .12 
(Y 2) Income -.01 
Age -.01 
Damage to Dwelling -.03 
Use of \-leeks out of Hork -.10 
Insurance Education -.05 . 2~ 
(Y 3) Income .19* 
Age .40* 
Percent of Damage to Dwelling -.14 
Losses Weeks out of Work -.11 
Covered Education -.12 .13 
(Y4) Income .14 Age .26* 
Damage to Dwelling .43* 
Household Weeks out of Work .10 
Moves Education .14 .23 
(Y5 Income .02 
Age - .17 
Damage to Dwelling -.18 
Weeks out of Work -.26* 
Education -.12 
Income -.17* 
Perception Age .02 .33 
of Recovery Use of Disaster Assistance -.32* 
(Y6) Use of Informal Aid -.01 
Use of Insurance -.21* 
Percent of Losses Covered .19* 
Household Moves -.01 
* Path coefficients significant at the 0.5 level or better. 
Error 
Variance 
.96 
.88 
.78 
.82 
.77 
.67 
TABLE v-23 
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARANETERS OF THE PATH NODEL 
OF FAHILY RECOVERY: JAPANESE ETHNIC GROUP, KAUAI (N=ll7) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Use of 
Disaster 
Assistance 
(Y 1) 
Use of 
Informal Aid 
(Y2 
Use of 
Insurance 
(Y 3) 
Percent of 
Losses 
Covered 
(Y 4) 
Household 
Hoves 
(Ys) 
Perception 
of Recovery 
(Y6) 
Independent 
Variable 
Damage to Dwelling (Xl) 
Weeks out of Hork (X? 
Education (X3) -Income (X
4
) 
Age (Xs) 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of \~ork 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of Hork 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of \.,rork 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Use of Disaster Assistance 
Use of Informal Aid 
Use of Insurance 
Percent Losses Covered 
Household Moves 
Path Explained 
Coefficient* Variance 
.01 
.09 
-.03 .04 
-.07 
-.18 
.32* 
• 16 
-.08 .16 
.08 
.03 
.13 
.05 
.02 .18 
-.01 
.40* 
.03 
-.00 
.03 .06 
-.00 
.24* 
.07 
.16 
-.07 .04 
-.06 
-.01 
.01 
-.12 
.02 
-.04 
-.06 .25 
-.04 
-.28* 
-.14 
.35* 
-.06 
* Path coefficients significant at the .05 level or better. 
Error 
Variance 
.96 
.84 
.82 
.94 
.96 
.75 
TABLE v-24 
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PA~!ETERS OF THE PATH MODEL 
OF FAMILY RECOVERY: FILIPINO ETHNIC GROUP, KAUAI (Ns 89) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Use of 
Disaster 
Assistance 
(Y 1) 
Use of 
Informal Aid 
Use of 
Insurance 
(Y 3) 
Percent of 
Losses 
Covered 
(Y 4) 
Household 
Moves 
(Y 5) 
Perception 
of Recovery 
(Y 6) 
Independent 
Variable 
Damage to Dwelling (X ) 
Weeks out of Work (X2} Education (X3) Income (X4) Age (X5) 
Damage to Dwelling 
Heeks out of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of \~ork 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of \~ork 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
\~eeks out of \~ork 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Use of Disaster Assistance 
Use of Informal Aid 
Use of Insurance 
Percent Losses Covered 
Household Moves 
Path Explained 
Coefficient* Variance 
.18 
.05 
-.13 .05 
.01 
-.18 
.15 
-.08 
.49* .18 
-.16 
.13* 
.29* 
-.17 
.27* .24 
.02 
.42* 
.29* 
-.23* 
.07 .15 
.05 
.10 
.26* 
.15 
.15 .18 
.02 
-.13 
-.31* 
-.10 
-.10 
. II 
-.10 .21 
.03 
-.09 
.31 
.02 
-.02 
* Path coefficients significant at the .05 level or better. 
Error 
Variance 
.95 
.82 
.76 
.85 
.82 
.79 
TABLE v-25 
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARANETERS OF THE PATH MODEL 
OF FANILY RECOVERY: ANGLO GROUP. COALINGA (N=260) 
Dependent Independent Path Explained Error 
Variable Variable Coefficient* Variance Variance 
Use of Damage to Dwellings (Xl) .05 
Disaster Weeks out of Work (X2) .06 Assistance Education (X3) -.03 .05 .95 (Y 1) Income (X4) -.20* Age (Xs) -.06 
Damage to Dwelling -.03 
Use of !-Ieeks out of Work .08 
Informal Aid Education -.09 .03 .97 
(Y2) Income -.08 Age .06 
Damage to Dwelling .11 
Use of Weeks out of Work -.08 
Insurance Education .14* .08 .92 
(Y 3) Income .21* 
Age .07 
Percent of Damage to Dwelling .12* 
Losses Weeks out of Work -.13* 
Covered Education .09 .04 .96 
(Y 4) Income .03 
Age -.07 
Damage to Dwelling .16* 
Household Weeks out of Work .01 
Moves Education .13* .05 .95 
(Y5) Income -.06 Age -.08 
Damage to Dwelling -.09 
Weeks out of Work -.02 
Education .02 
Income .01 
Perception Age -.08 .19 .81 
of Recovery Use of Disaster Assistance -.08 
(Y6) Use of Informal Aid -.16* Use of Insurance -.09 
Percent Losses Covered .41* 
Household Moves -.08 
* Path coefficients significant at the .05 level or better. 
TABLE v-26 
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS OF THE PATH MODEL 
OF FAMILY RECOVERY: HISPANIC GROUP, COALINGA (N=166) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Use of 
Disaster 
Assistance 
(Y 1) 
Use of 
Informal Aid 
(Y 2) 
Use of 
Insurance 
(V ) 
·3 
Percent of 
Losses 
Covered 
(Y4) 
Household 
Moves 
(yS) 
Perception 
of Recovery 
(Y 6) 
Independent 
Variable 
Damage to Dwelling (Xl) 
Weeks out of Work (X?) 
Education (X
3
) -
Income (X4) Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Heeks out of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
'-leeks out of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Damage to Dwelling 
Weeks out of ',ork 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Dama~e to Dwelling 
'~eeks out of "ork 
Education 
Inc0me 
Age 
Damage to D'oJe 11 ing 
Heeks out of Hark 
Education 
Income 
IIge 
Use of Disaster IIssistance 
Use of Informal Aid 
Use of Insurance 
Percent Losses Covered 
Housphold Naves 
Path Explained 
Coefficient* Variance 
.12 
.16 
-.21 .10 
.04 
.07 
.18 
-.01 
.11 .06 
-.04 
-.06 
-.07 
-.06 
-.05 .05 
.18 
.Il 
-.31* 
-.09 
-.14 .11 
-.04 
-.09 
.23* 
.07 
-.14 .10 
-.02 
-.16 
.IJ 
.241: 
.05 
.10 
-.18 
-.17 
.03 
.08 
.27* 
-.29* 
.25 
* Path coefficients significant at the .05 level or better. 
Error 
Variance 
.90 
.94 
.95 
.89 
.90 
.75 
Damage to 
Dwell i ng 
Weeks out 
of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Use of Disaster 
Assistance 
Use of 
Informal Aid 
1 ___ us_e __ o_f ________ ~~L~---p-e-rc-e-p-t-io-n----~ _ Insurance I' of Recovery 
Percent of 
Losses Covered 
Household 
Moves 
FIGURE V-2 
+ 
RELATIOtJSHIPS IN THE PATH 140DEL SUPPORTED BY TIiE DATA, 
CAUCASIAN GROUP. KAUAI 
Damage to 
Dwelling 
Weeks out 
of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Use of Disaster 
Assistance 
Use of 
Informal Aid 
Use of 
Insurance 
Percent of 
Losses Covered 
Household 
Moves 
FIGURE V-3 
Percepti on 
of Recovery 
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PATH MODEL SUPPORTED BY THE DATA. 
JAPANESE GROUP. KAUAI 
Damage to 
Dwell i ng 
Weeks out 
of Work 
Education 
Income 
Age 
Use of Di saster 
Assistance 
Use of 
Informal Aid 
Use of 
Insurance 
Percent of 
Losses Covered 
Household 
Moves 
fIGURE V-4 
Perception 
of Recovery 
RELATIONSIHPS IN THE PATH MODEL SUPPORTED BY THE DATA, 
FILIPINO GROUP, KAUAI 
Damage to 
Dwell i ng 
Weeks out 
of Work 
Education 
Income 
I Age 'L--_ 
Use of Disaster 
Ass i stance 
Use of 
Informa 1 Aid 
Use of 
Insurance 
r--------., +1 
Percent of ---1 
losses Covel-ed 
Household 
Moves 
FIGURE V-5 
Percepti on 
of Recovery 
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PATH MODEL SUPPORTED BY TH~ DATA, 
ANGLO GROUP, COALINGA 
Damage to 
Dwell; ng 
Weeks out 
of Work 
Education 
Income 
I Age 'L--_ 
Use of Di saster 
Assistance 
Use of 
Informal A; d 
Use of 
Insurance 
Percent of 
Losses Covered 
Household 
Moves 
fIGURE V-6 
Percept; on 
of Recovery 
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PATH MODEL SUPPORTED BY TI1E DATA, 
HISPANIC GROUP, COALINGA 
found for the Japanese group (Table V-23) and the Anglo group (Table V-
26), where 25% of the variance in recovery is explained. No good ex-
p 1 anat i on for the re 1 at i ve "success" of the mode 1 across groups can be 
offered, unless it is the relative greater variability within the Cauca-
sian group with respect to the independent variables under consideration. 
In order to bri ng into re1 i ef the most important "paths" to recovery 
found in the various groups, those with significant path coefficients 
have been plotted on a diagram of the model. These have been prepared 
for each of the groups, as follows: Caucasian, Kauai (Figure V-2); 
Japanese, Kauai (Figure V-3); Filipino, Kauai (Figure V-4); Anglo, 
Coalinga (V-5); and Hispanic, Coalinga (Figure V-5). A few general 
observations will be ventured, based on these comparisons. 
For all groups but the Filipinos, the level of losses covered by 
insurance or assistance was of particular importance, compared to other 
variables, in explaining recovery level. The relationship between income 
and insurance is positive, whereas the one between income and program use 
is negative. This suggests that those few who did receive insurance 
payments were less likely to make extensive use of the disaster assis-
tance programs (and would have been ineligible for some types of assis-
tance). For the Filipino group, the percent coverage of losses was not a 
significant variable in explaining level of recovery. Even though the 
level of damage for the Filipino households was positively and signifi-
cantly related to the level of loss coverage, coverage of losses does not 
contribute significantly to the explanation of level of recovery. Only 
level of damage in a direct path is found to be of relatively greater 
importance to recovery level than other variables in the model. The 
relationship is negative, as would be expected--that is, the higher the 
level of damage, the lower the perceived recovery. This implies that for 
Filipinos, neither disaster assistance nor insurance removed the sting of 
thei r losses. 
As noted in an earlier section, the Japanese group was found to be 
very unlikely to have used disaster assistance programs, or even to have 
gone to the DACs to fi nd out about them. They were the most 1 ike 1y of 
all the groups to have had insurance and to have applied it to their 
losses. The level of damage of their dwellings was not found to affect 
the level of loss coverage, as was apparently the case with respect to 
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level of coverage from assistance programs for some of the other groups. 
However, 1 evel of damage was important to whether or not the Japanese 
accepted a high level of help from their primary groups. The negative 
relationship of high use of informal aid suggests that the Japanese 
tended either to have and rely on insurance, or to rely on their primary 
groups. However, the type of aid obtained from primary groups apparently 
does not strongly affect economic recovery, and the Japanese victims in 
high damage situations who relied on this type of aid apparently were 
less likely to consider themselves as recovered. 
Many more of the variables in the model contribute to the explana-
tion of recovery for the Caucasian group. As was observed with most 
other groups, the percent of losses covered was important to the level of 
recovery they reported (a positive correlation as might be expected). 
The negative correlation of the use of disaster assistance programs and 
of insurance suggests that these measures were less than efficacious in 
dealing with losses. The negative correlation for insurance wa~ probably 
related to damage to beach front homes, mainly incurred by this group, for 
which insurance coverage was disputed. The level of damage sustained by 
Caucasians on Kauai did not explain the level of loss coverage achieved 
by the time of the survey, as it had for other groups depending mainly on 
assistance programs. 
Conclusion 
These comparisons indicate some differences among the ethnic groups. 
For the Japanese, who were more likely than others to use insurance, 
the level of damage was not important to level of coverage. This is most 
likely a characteristic of insurance users rather than of Japanese, per 
se. For some reason, assistance recei ved by the Fi 1 i pi nos (note the 
importance of level of damage in explaining level of coverage of losses) 
did not contribute to them considering themselves recovered. The other 
two Kauai groups, the Caucasians and the Japanese, apparently did not 
pursue the assistance route to its full potential, especially as compared 
to both of the Coalinga groups. 
However, it can be suggested that the more notable differences have 
to do with the site and the disaster event, rather than separate values. 
In Coalinga, both the Anglos and the Hispanics appear to have been able 
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and willing to make use of the potential of the disaster relief programs. 
On Kauai, only the Filipino group exhibited a strong correlation between 
level of damage and level of assistance, but level of assistance received 
did not have a s i gnifi cant effect on percept i on of recovery. For the 
Filipino victims, recovery was explained mainly by the direct effect of 
level of damage: the greater the damage they sustained, the lower their 
perceived recovery at the time of the interview--regard1ess of the per-
cent of thei r losses covered by di saster re 1 i ef proy rams 0 r ins urance. 
This could reflect some difference in Filipino perception characteris-
tics, or it might be attributable to measurement error since interviewers 
had some language difficulties with this group. 
Insurance seems to be a relatively important factor in the recovery 
process for the Caucasians and the Japanese, although that adjustment was 
more successful for the Japanese. This may be due to the type of damage 
they sustained, compared to the damage befalling the mainly Caucasian 
beachfront dwell ers--the coverage of whi ch, as noted, was di sputed. In 
an earlier section, it was noted that none of the Kauai groups made the 
same level of use of disaster assistance programs as did the Coalinga 
groups, with this being particularly pronounced for the Japanese. This 
may simply be a reflection of the generally lower 1 evel s of damage re-
lated to Hurricane Iwa compared to the Coalinga earthquake. However, 
again, it might also indicate a community or cultural norm on Kauai not 
to seek assistance from outsiders. A third explanation could be that the 
formal disaster relief effort was simply not as effective on Kauai, with 
that island's much more scattered population (compared to the compact 
small community of Coalinga). Our data do not generally give us reason 
to believe that to be true, although certainly the scattered and hetero-
geneous population on Kauai would have been much more difficult to serve 
than the hi gh 1 y concent rated and somewhat mo re homogeneous commun ity of 
Coalinga. 
A general observation can be offered on the basis of this analysis: 
higher levels of recovery were best explained by the level of loss cover-
age from insurance or assistance. The level of loss coverage obtained 
was best explained by the level of damage sustained by the household. 
This seems most true in instances where insurance was not a major factor 
ina househol d's recovery process. Where insurance coverage was appro-
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priate to the source of damage, the level of coverage did not depend on 
the level of damage. When disaster assistance programs were the major 
source of loss coverage, the level obtained seems to have varied with the 
1 eve 1 of damage--greater coverage bei ng exp 1 a i ned by greater damage. It 
is not clear whether this is a function of the way the program works or 
of the intensity with which those suffering the greatest losses "work" 
the disaster relief system. 
F rom the fi ndi ngs of thi s study, it can be conc 1 uded that 1 eve 1 of 
damage is more important than socioeconomic or ethnic or minority group 
status in explaining the rate of recovery from disasters. However, when 
the interact i on of the di saster agent and the characteri st i cs of the 
built environment lead to greater levels of damage within ethnic or 
minority groups, their demographic and cultural characteristics (e.g., 
income, level of trust in the government) and patterns of adjustment 
(e.g., purchase of insurance) will then determine their use of assistance 
and rate of recovery. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE COALINGA, CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE 
The monitoring of disasters described in Chapter V yielded another 
site for study in May of 1983, when an earthquake hit Coal i nga, Ca 1 i-
fornia. Although Coalinga only marginally met some of the criteria for a 
study site, it was deemed particularly valuable for examination because 
of the ongoing National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program and the 
associated increased national concern for better understanding of, and 
preparation for, earthquake disasters. 
As in Chapter V, the responses di scussed here were obta i ned from 
disaster victims several months after the earthquake struck. Because the 
studies are so similar, some additional comparisons of the Kauai and 
Coalinga disasters are offered in this chapter, and the data for Coalinga 
are included with the data in Chapter V for Kauai. Information on all 
the other aspects of the disaster in Coalinga--which was intensively 
studied by numerous researchers and agencies--is available in various 
reports, most notably ina comprehensive revi e\~ of all the research on 
Coalinga recently published by the California Seismic Safety Commission 
(Tierney, 1985). 
The Disaster and the Community 
At 4:42 p.m. on May 2, 1983, an earthquake occurred with a mean 
Richter magnitude of 6.7 centered ten miles northeast of Coalinga. It 
was quickly followed by an aftershock with a magnitude of 5.6. The two 
shocks on May 2nd destroyed most of the central business district of 
Coalinga and caused major damage to about 50% of all dwellings. The 
major source of damage was groundshaking. 
In recent times, Coalinga has frequently experienced minor seismic 
activity believed to be associated with the nearby San Andreas Fault. 
However, it was a less conspicuous, undocumented fault in the Coalinga 
ant i c 1 i ne that produced the May 2nd quake. That event was fo 11 owed by 
over 7,200 aftershocks from May 2 to August 1, 1983. Of these, 147 
registered magnitudes greater than 3.0, and 28 greater than 4.0. Accord-
ing to Earthquake Engineering Research Institute descriptions, a complex 
network of faults approximately 40 km long, 15 km wide, and more than 
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10 km deep is responsible for these continuing aftershocks. 
Impa~~~1:...I!.~ar~~~~ 
There have not been any previous earthquakes that have caused damage 
to the town of Coalinga. However, historical analysis of seismicity of 
the central coastal range indicates that the Coalinga earthquake should 
not be considered anomalous. In this area an event of this magnitude can 
be expected every 161 years; a quake of magnitude 6.0, every 55 years. 
Desp i te thi s pat tern of sei smi c act i vity east of the San And reas, most 
residents of the area perceived the threat of earthquake hazards as 
small. 
Because the city is relatively small (approximately one and one-half 
miles between its farthest points), self-contained, and geologically 
uniform, damage patterns followed variations in dwelling structure. 
Nearly all the residences were si ng1 e-story, wood frame homes, and over 
two-thirds were at least 20 years old. The most severe damage was to 
01 der homes whi ch were improperly anchored to thei r foundat·i ons and 
lacked adequate lateral bracing. Typically, these houses were thrown off 
their foundations. For the most part, damage to newer homes was limited 
to interior furnishings, chimneys, brick veneers, and unanchored porches. 
Nonstructura1 damage, such as falling bricks and breaking glass, was one 
of the most common sources of injury. About 95% of the central downtown 
business district, made up mainly of older brick buildings, was de-
st royed. 
Damage reports vary from report to report, and across time as esti-
mates are revised. Appendix B, Table 2 presents estimates based on Red 
Cross reports. These figures may have changed somewhat since they were 
initially compiled. However, they give an indication of the magnitude of 
the losses and damage related to the earthquake. 
Disaster Assistance 
One and one-hal f hours after the quake hit, the Red Cross estab-
lished a mass shelter and feeding unit with the aid of the Salvation Army 
and local churches. Other groups such as the National Guard, the Naval 
air station, and private companies and utilities were instrumental in 
providing labor and other services to meet immediate needs. 
A Presidential Declaration authorizing federal assistance was made 
on May 5, 1983. The Coalinga Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) was open 
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between May 7 and May 25 as a cent ra 1 process i ng stat i on for di saster 
. assistance information and applications for services. Approximately 
2,500 claims were made with federal, state, and local governments and 
private organizations that were represented at the DACs. 
The Community 
Coalinga is somewhat isolated from the rest of the state. It is a 
small city of approximately 6,600 people situated 60 miles southwest of 
Fresno on the western fringe of the San Joaquin Valley. Developed in the 
late 1880s as a coaling station for the railroad, since the 1920s it has 
been sustained by oil pumping operations, agriculture, and education. 
Seen from the air, development density is fairly uniform throughout 
the town, the boundaries of which are fairly discrete. In addition, 
there are a few smaller towns several miles away and small settlements of 
agricultural workers clustered around the headquarters of cotton farms 
and feed lots in the vicinity. One enters the Coast Range foothills just 
to the west of town, and an interstate highway lies about 13 miles east 
of the commun ity. On 1-5 one can get to San Jose to the no rt h, 0 r Los 
Angeles to the south in two to three hours. Fresno, the county seat, is 
about an hour away. 
Largely a result of the California Water Project, agriculture in the 
area, now increasing in importance, has attracted a number of Hispanic 
farm workers to the Coalinga area. Although Coalinga is relatively 
homogeneous in its ethnic composition, with over four-fifths of the 
community consisting of white/Anglo residents, nearly all of the remain-
ing residents are of Hispanic origin (16%). In addition, there are 
several farms and ranches in the outlying area that employ and provide 
housing for Hispanic workers and their families. About 13% of the resi-
dents speak Spanish within the home. 
The bulk of Coalinga's families consist of married couples (87%), 
and 44% of all married couples have children under the age of 18. For 
the most part, Coalinga is a middle-income community, with median family 
income in 1979 dollars just below that of the State of California as a 
whole ($20,403 vs. $21,537). About 7% of the family incomes were below 
the poverty level; the average for the state is 8.7%. 
Despite dwindling oil reserves over the past 15 years, unemployment 
has remained only slightly above the state average (5.3% vs. 4.1%), and 
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the standard of living is comparable to that found statewide. Approxi-
mately 58% of all residents 25 years or older are in the labor force, 
with the majority employed in education, retail trade, oil operations, 
agriculture, and construction (in that order). A lower proportion of the 
residents than is characteristic for the state are either professional/ 
managerial workers (17% vs. 25%) or technical/sales/clerical workers (24% 
vs. 33%). 
About 64% of Coalinga residents have a high school diploma, relative 
to 74% of state residents. However, a fairly high proportion have had at 
least some college, probably due to the presence of a junior college in 
the community. 
A large proportion (84%) of the Coalinga residents live in single-
family dwellings; almost two-thirds of the year-round housing units are 
owner-occupied. In 1980 there was little excess housing in Coalinga; 
1 ess than 1% of homes owned were vacant, and about 6% of rentals were 
vacant. Coalinga is a fairly stable community. Over 50% of its resi-
dents surveyed in the 1980 census were occupying the same house they had 
lived in five years previously. 
The Study Method 
The interview schedule used in Coalinga was virtually the same as 
that used in Kauai, with the exception of a few changes that made it 
site-specific. For Coalinga, both English and Spanish versions of the 
interview schedule were prepared and used. The same field director 
conducted both the Kauai and Coalinga surveys, and interviewers were 
recruited and trained on site for both studies. In Coalinga, four of the 
16 interviewers used were bilingual and conducted interviews mainly with 
Hispanic households. They could use either the English or Spanish ver-
sion of the interview. 
Interviewing 
The interviewers in Coalinga had valuable local information and 
experience, as did those in Kauai, and they enjoyed the trust of the 
local residents. There was a new problem in Coalinga, however, in that 
many of the residents already had been interviewed by many researchers 
and were reluctant to participate in yet another survey, regardless of 
who was conducting it. As had been the case in Kaua i, i ntervi ews were 
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conducted in the language most comfortable for the respondent. 
Sampling 
An enumeration of damaged dwellings consisting of the damage assess-
ment list from the American Red Cross was used. The Red Cross damage 
estimates were obtained by volunteers canvassing the impact zone immedi-
ately following the disaster. Dwelling units were evaluated as sustain-
ing minor, major, total, or no damage, and as being either sing.e-or 
multifamily. Either an address or a description of the dwelling and its 
location was provided. For this study, buildings which were described as 
havi ng no damage were eli mi nated. Then, to obta in the ta rgeted sample 
size, 400 households (representing 22% of the affected residents) were 
selected randomly from the Red Cross list. 
Appendix B, Table 3 provides information on the completion rate and 
reasons for non-completion of interviews with this initial sample. There 
was a relatively high refusal rate attributed by the interviewers to the 
large number of other surveys already administered to the residents. 
Substitute sampling units were randomly selected, but, after making 
approximately 25 substitutions in this manner, it became clear that an 
insufficient number of Hispanic households were included in the sample. 
Si nce the central intent of the study was to compare ethni c groups, it 
was decided to compromise the sampling procedure in order to obtain 
adequate numbers of Hispanics to permit valid analysis. This lower than 
expected number of Hispanic interviews was due both to there being fewer 
Hispanic families present in the community than had been anticipated from 
earlier survey reports, and to the mObility of Hispanic households as a 
result of the quake. Hispanic families were more apt than Anglo to live 
in poorly constructed housing, which suffered greater than average 
damage, and many had moved from their pre-earthquake homes. They were 
also less likely to be home owners and therefore more mobile than other 
residents. 
Thus, as a means of increasing the number of Hispanic respondents, a 
disproportionate sample of Hispanic households was drawn in addition to 
the initial sample. Of the 120 substitutions made from the original 
sample of respondents who were not interviewed, 80 were allocated to the 
Hispanic group. Three clusters of Hispanic households were identified, 
two consisting of neighborhoods within the city, and one consisting of 
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clusters of farm employees at the ranches and farms around the community 
which had sustained damage in the earthquake. Nearly all available 
Hispanic households residing within these areas that had suffered quake 
damage were interviewed. 
~~~~~cteri s_~i c~_o.!_~~e.._~ampl e 
The Coalinga sample represents mostly persons who live and work 
in the community; a sma 11 proport i on 1 i ve on scattered ranches (cotton 
farms), and some of the town dwellers work on the ranches or in the oil 
fields. The mean age of the victim respondents in Coalinga was 42.5 
years, with 18% of the sample over the age of 60. There were 3.4 persons 
per family, and 95% of the victim families resided in single-family 
dwellings before the disaster; 55% of those owned the dwelling. The mean 
number of years the victim family had lived in their home was 8.9; the 
mean number of years in Coalinga was 18.4. 
The average predisaster monthly income (after taxes) in the Coalinga 
victim sample was $1405, reflecting in part the fairly high salaries of 
oil workers. Heads of households were predominantly in unskilled and 
skilled occupations (72.2%), as opposed to management or professional 
positions (18.4%); 11.4% were reti red. Forty-five percent of the house-
hold heads had high school diplomas and 14.7% had college degrees. About 
12.5% of the heads of household claimed no religious affiliation, 35.1% 
were Catholic, 42.6% were Protestant, and the remaining 9.8% claimed some 
other affiliation. 
~~11!~ Eth~~Ci~~ 
About 70% of the sample classified itself as Anglo, and 30% as 
Hispanic. Census figures indicate about 16% of the Coalinga population 
is Hispanic, but the damage patterns suggested that Hispanics would be 
di sproport i onate 1 y represented ina sample of vi ct i ms. Because of the 
extraordinary measures taken to find Hispanic victims, and the possibili-
ty that many of the Hispanics present at the time of the earthquake were 
migrant farm workers who had since moved on, it is difficult to say how 
representat i ve thi s di st ri but ion is of the damage incurred by the two 
groups. The Hispanics appear to be mainly Mexican-American or Mexican 
national, with a few from various other Central and South American coun-
tries. No effort was made during the interviews to establish whether or 
not respondents were citizens of the United States, although there is 
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evidence indicating that the sample includes some "illegal aliens" mainly 
from Mexico. 
The distinction between the ethnic groups was very discrete. Vir-
tually all the non-Hispanic respondents characterized themselves as 
belonging in the Anglo category. Three households were mixed, with one 
spouse being Anglo and one something else (American Indian or Asian). 
All were placed in the Anglo sample; thus, 31% of the sample was classi-
fied as Hispanic and 69% as Anglo. Although there was no significant 
pattern with respect to age differences in the two ethnic groups of 
victim respondents, the Hispanic heads of household tended to be somewhat 
younger than the Anglo heads of household (Appendix B, Table 4). 
The Hispanics in the samp"le were somewhat less likely than the 
Anglos to have lived in their pre-earthquake dwelling for over five 
years, while Anglo households were much more likely than the Hispanics to 
have lived in theirs for over 15 years (Appendix B, Table 5). About 73% 
of the Anglo group had lived in Coalinga for twenty years or more, com-
pared to 27% of the Hispanic victim group. Hispanic respondent house-
holds also were more likely to be renters, with 68% renting or living in 
employer-provided housing, compared to 34% renters among the Anglo group 
(Appendix B, Table 6). 
The Hispanic victims were less likely than the Anglos to represent 
one-person households and slightly more likely to live in households with 
children (Appendix B, Table 7). The larger families were somewhat more 
likely to be found in the Hispanic group than in the Anglo group (Appen-
dix B, Table 8). The heads of the Hispanic victim households were most 
likely to be found in the unskilled and laborer categories of occupation, 
while the Anglos were most likely to be found in the more skilled and 
professional occupations (Appendix B, Table 9). The Hispanic laborers 
were most likely to be associated with the agricultural activities, while 
the Anglos were employed in the commercial activities in Coalinga or with 
the oi I compani es. Pre-ea rthquake unemployment rates were simi I a r for 
the two groups, although the Hispanics perhaps could be characterized as 
more underemployed (7.8% worked only part time) (Appendix B, Table 10). 
Fewer of the victim Hispanics classified themselves as retired--7% com-
pared to 13.5% for the Anglo group. 
The two groups of victims clearly differ with respect to thei r 
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income level (Appendix B, Table 11). The Hispanic victims were much more 
likely to be in lower income categories compared to the Anglos, who were 
likely have a monthly income of over $1000. The general level of educa-
tion of the heads of the Hispanic victim households also was lower than 
for the Anglos (Appendix B, Table 12). Around 32% of the Hispanic heads 
of household reported having at least a high school education, while 
almost 80% of the Anglo heads of household had a high school education or 
more. 
Effects of the Disaster 
Damage and Loss 
The entire community was subject to essentially the same magnitude 
earthquake, but the damage patterns reflected to a great extent the 
nature of the construction of each individual building and its placement 
on the lot. The social distribution of damage and loss generally 
followed the distribution of housing by social class. High death and 
injury counts for earthquake events are frequently related to particular 
kinds of structures--specifically, those with unreinforced masonry walls 
and/or heavy tile roofs. 
For Coalinga, one subsequent death was attributed to the earthquake, 
and some of the families in the samples reported that one or more family 
members were injured badly enough to need medical attention. However, 
most of the older, "pre-code" dwellings were of wood rather than unrein-
forced masonry and thus less subject to total collapse and less prone to 
cause injury. The unreinforced masonry buildings present in the communi-
ty (mostly in the downtown area) typically did not withstand the forces 
of the earthquake, and the relatively few deaths were fortuitous. 
Port ions of the community were 1 eft undamaged, but, as desc ri bed 
above, the study respondents were selected from lists of households that 
had been destroyed or damaged. As was the case with the Kauai respon-
dents, damage levels for the householdS varied. Hypotheses employed in 
this survey were the same as those applied to Kauai. 
Of the respondent famil i es, 41.2% reported some damage to thei r 
dwellings, and 24% reported that their dwellings were totally destroyed 
(Appendix B, Table 13). The latter figure is particularly important with 
respect to postdisaster needs and household disruption (to be discussed 
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later}. The average dollar loss for structural damage was $12,994, the 
mean loss to contents was $2,908, and the average percentage loss to the 
contents of dwellings was 31%. The total loss of a structure, however, 
did not necessarily mean the total loss of the contents. 
Ethnic Gro~~~~i~ons. In Coalinga, the Hispanic group was twice 
as likely as the Anglo group to have suffered a high level (over 75%) of 
structural damage (Appendix B, Table 14). Based on field observations of 
the community, this difference is due to the greater likelihood of this 
group living in the older and less structurally sound housing in the 
communi ty. 
In examining victim attitudes, a relationship was found between 
level of damage and sense of being worse off than others (Appendix B, 
Table 15). In Coalinga, the Hispanics were more likely to see themselves 
as worse off than others, but not in the numbers one mi ght have been 
expected in view of the level of loss within this group. One explanation 
for this might be that when asked to compare themselves to others in the 
community, they tended to compare themselves to other Hispanics. This 
would make their comparison group one with similar levels of loss. 
Dislocation and Disruption 
A major characteristic peculiar to earthquakes can affect post-
disaster decisions. It could not be assumed that "the earthquake" was 
over in Coalinga after the initial damaging jolt. Major aftershocks 
occurred soon thereafter, causing further damage and creating concern 
among the inhabitants of the community about the safety of returning to 
their dwellings. Noticeable tremors continued throughout the months 
following the disaster and are expected to continue for several years. 
Household Dislocation. Families in Coalinga were likely to have 
left their home, with 75% reporting being out at least one night. It is 
probable that the high dislocation rate in Coalinga is related to the 
the frequent and severe aftershocks which convinced many families that it 
was prudent to rema in outs i de thei r homes, even if the st ructure was 
essentially habitable. 
More than half the Coal i nga famil i es who moved out of thei r homes 
reported camping in their own yard after the earthquake (Appendix B, 
Table 16). This is probably related more to the uncertainty about being 
inside than to not having other places to go, although there was in-
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adequate housing available for the displaced. In addition, the pleasant 
weather in Coalinga at that time permitted people to stay outdoors in 
tents or in cars if they desired. The adjustment would probably have 
been different had the weather been i ncl ement. Thus, a better under-
standing of the interaction between type of disaster and weather condi-
tions and the resultant effect on where families decide to stay immedi-
ately after a disaster (i.e., in the yard, inside damaged homes, or in 
shelters and others' homes) is clearly important for disaster relief 
planning. 
The provision of housing for disaster victims in areas where housing 
supply is tight (due to disaster damage or predisaster patterns) creates 
fairly complicated logistical problems for the providers of disaster 
relief. In Coalinga, where housing alternatives were virtually nonexist-
ent after the earthquake, FEMA mobile homes were used. In a another site 
we studied--Alviso, California--most flood victims were initially housed 
in motels in unflooded areas. Each solution created different kinds of 
dissatisfaction for the dislocated families. These will be discussed 
later. 
Similar percentages of those persons who were dislocated in both 
Coalinga and Kauai moved in with relatives following the disaster (Appen-
dix B, Table 16). In Coalinga, these relatives might well have lived 
outside of town and therefore be considered a reasonable alternative to 
staying in the earthquake zone. As mentioned, over 50% of the victim 
families devised some means to stay near but outside their homes, and 
only a few moved in with neighbors or friends. As is typically found in 
instances where housing alternatives exist, few in either site selected 
an official shelter as a first destination, although utilization of such 
shelter was much more likely on Kauai than in Coalinga. Of course, there 
are no figures for those whose first or perhaps second disaster-related 
move was to leave town for good, since they are not included in the 
samples. 
Household Disrl!.~~~. Due to the differing natures of the disaster 
events and their impacts, the families in Coalinga were more likely to 
have been dislocated temporarily from their damaged homes, while the 
families in Kauai were more likely to have lived in their homes while 
they were under repair. Some families in Coalinga suffered both types of 
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disruption. 
Although 73% of the Coalinga victim sample were back to their pre-
disaster address by the time these interviews were conducted (seven to 
eight months after the disaster), 75% of the Coalinga households had left 
their homes, at least temporarily, following the disaster event (Appendix 
B, Table 17). Respondents for households which had been dislocated from 
their homes were asked how disruptive the moves had been; having to leave 
one's home was reported to be very disruptive by 56% of the sample. That 
29% of the Coalingans indicated they intended to move again in the near 
future may be a refl ect i on of the great number who had not returned to 
their predisaster location or who were still living in FEMA-provided 
housing at the time of the interview. The intent of most victims was to 
find a more suitable dwelling in the community; few voiced the intention 
of leaving the area. 
About 49% of the sample reported that they had made repairs to their 
dwellings while living in them after the disaster, and 40% said that 
living in a house under repair was highly disruptive. 
Employment Disruption. Since the earthquake caused damage to com-
mercial and industria"1 property, some people were laid off from their 
jobs. Twenty-seven percent of the heads of household had thei r work-
places closed--an average of 3.3 weeks (Appendix B, Table 18). However, 
only 3% of the sample reported that they were out of work for over One 
month. Although being out of work can be economically and emotionally 
difficult, it does not seem to have caused great hardship to very many 
families in this sample. 
Ethnic Group Comparisons. Both Anglos and Hispanics were apt to 
have been di sl ocated from thei r homes and to have moved twi ce, but 
Hispanics were more likely than Anglos to have moved more than twice 
(Appendix B, Table 19). The two-move sequence typically involved living 
for a time in emergency housing and then moving back into one's predisas-
ter dwelling. Moving more than twice seems to have been occasioned by 
difficulty in finding suitable housing for permanent resettlement. That 
this was frequently the case with Hispanics is attributable to three 
interrelated circumstances: Hispanics lived in the oldest and most 
damaged housing; they generally rented; and the type of housing they 
occupied was either unlikely to be repaired or, if it was fixed up, it 
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was likely to be priced out of the market it once occupied. 
Anglos were more adversely affected by damage to their work places 
than were Hispanics, largely because Anglos worked in the heavily damaged 
downtown section of Coalinga and most Hispanics were agricultural 
workers. 
Psychological_~~stress 
The measures of psychological distress included in the study were 
designed to reveal some of the consequences of loss, disruption, and 
dislocation, and to indicate levels of emotional recovery among the 
victim families. In response to the query about their general health, 
72.6% of the sample said it was excellent or good, but 19% said that it 
had worsened since the disaster. About 80% of the complaints were felt 
to be related to disaster effects. 
There were some reports of increased smoking, drinking, or taking of 
med i cat ions fo 11 owi ng the di saster. These increases may be related to 
the extent of damage and destruction which Coalingans had to face, or to 
the long-term disruptions they had to cope with. An attempt was made to 
determine whether the continuing aftershocks of the quake caused stress: 
80% of the respondents said that, indeed, they were disturbed by the 
tremors. 
Sixty-four percent of the households had one or more members dealing 
with emotional problems, but in only 28% of the households was pro-
fessional help sought (Appendix B, Table 20). Hispanics sought counsel-
ing more often than Anglos, but it is difficult to determine whether this 
was because they had more damage and disruption, or because there was a 
concerted effort made by a regi ona 1 mental health team to reach the 
Spanish-speaking population (Appendix B, Table 21). 
Use of Formal _D_i2.~ster _~~~~ance Prog.rams 
The Presidential Disaster Declaration made recovery and reconstruc-
tion funds available under the Disaster Relief Act and established a 
Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) in Coalinga. The Red Cross also set up 
a mass feeding facility in conjunction with the DAC. 
Use of DACs and Funds 
-----------------
Of the respondents interviewed, 81.4% reported that they had gone to 
the Disaster Assistance Center, with 46% saying they had gone more than 
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twice (Table V-I; data for Coalinga are included with the data for Kauai 
presented in the previ ous chapter). Thi s hi gh usage and return rate 
(particularly in relation to Kauai) could be because food and other 
commodities were available at the DAC and/or because the people had a 
great need for help. Seventy-two percent of the respondents said they 
received some type of assistance from one of the formal programs, with 
79% of them getting aid from the Red Cross, 76% using food stamps, 67% 
benefittin9 from a Salvation Army program, 32% seeking shelter through 
the FEMA Temporary Housing Program, and 20% applying for Individual 
Family Grants (Table V-2). 
There was higher use of federal programs in Coalinga than in Kauai, 
perhaps reflecting a programmatic use difference that exists in normal 
times, the greater need for temporary housing in Coalinga, or the greater 
need for the "last resort" funds provided by IFGs for victims not covered 
by other programs or by insurance. Over 25% of the sample in Coalinga 
reported using three or four major relief programs (Table V-3). As in 
all the other study sites, there was a high positive correlation between 
number of programs used and damage to dwelling place. 
When they were asked to judge the importance of aid programs to 
their own family's recovery (Table V-4), 67% of the respondents said they 
were helped in their economic recovery, and 71% said their emotional 
well-being was aided by the programs. About 90% of the people who had 
used some program said they were satisfied with it. 
Awareness of Assistance Programs 
Various means were used to advertise the existence of aid programs 
(Table V-5). Our survey did not attempt to determine in great detail the 
specifics of different publicity programs, but we did ascertain how 
respondents found out about the programs they used. Only 6% of the 
Coalinga respondents said they learned about aid programs through mail 
literature, 15% mentioned fliers and handbills, 18% cited a newspaper as 
their source of information, and 27% named TV or radio. By far the most 
frequently noted source of information was word of mouth; 83% of the 
respondents said much of their information came that way. 
Eth~ic Gr~up Comparisons 
As mentioned above, Hispanics were significantly more likely than 
Anglos to have made multiple visits to a DAC (Table V-6). This is con-
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sistent with their higher damage and loss levels. Hispanics were also 
more likely to have used some local, state, or federal disaster assis-
tance program (85% compared to 66%), no doubt because of thei r greater 
losses, more frequent displacement, and lack of resources. It is appar-
ent, at least in Coalinga, that aid programs were used most by those who 
needed most. 
Hispanics were also the more frequent users of Red Cross, Salvation 
Army, food stamp, and temporary housing programs; and they were much more 
likely to use multiple sources of aid (Tables V-7 and V-8). However, 
Hispanics reported the programs as only slightly more important to their 
recovery than did Anglos. A significant difference between ethnic 
groups, and one that should be noted by all providers of aid, is the way 
each got its information: common modes of public communication were far 
less effective for Hispanics than was word of mouth (Table V-9). 
Alternative Adjustments to Losses 
Respondents were queried about sources of help available to them 
other than the formal aid programs di scussed so far. Three avenues of 
recourse were specifically examined: insurance, other personal resources, 
and aid from relatives and friends. Each one needs to be understood in 
order to form a complete picture of how victims recover from disasters. 
Insurance 
Only 9% of the households in the Coalinga sample reported having 
earthquake insurance, 46% had no coverage at all, and 18% had some kind 
of insurance but received no compensation. Traditional insurance cover-
age applied to some of the kinds of damage, and, in some instances, 
structural damage was ruled to be covered even for those without specific 
earthquake coverage. For the Coalinga households that did receive some 
compensation, the average proportion of loss covered was 40% (Table V-
10). At the time of the survey (seven to eight months after the disas-
ter), 20% of the respondents indicated that their insurance claims, had 
not yet been settled. Households were highly unlikely to have recouped 
over 75% of their total losses through assistance and insurance combined 
(Table V-II). At least 36% of the sample reported continuing money 
problems in their efforts to replace lost property. 
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Personal Resources 
Although 18% of the households recouped 100% of their losses through 
a combination of insurance and disaster assistance, most had losses that 
were not covered by any other provisions. At least 80% of the households 
had to fall back on some other st rategi es to fi 11 in gap s, among them: 
not replacing some things they had lost (64% of the sample), restructur-
ing the household budget to provide for necessities (17%), using savings 
to cover expenses (42%), borrowing money from disaster loan programs 
(31%), or borrowing money from friends and relatives (10%) (Table V-
12) • 
Aid from Friends and Relatives 
Although relatives were the most important informal source of aid 
during disaster recovery in Coalinga, neighbors and friends also played 
an important role in providing aid to households in need (Table V-l~). 
Respondents in Coalinga were much more likely than those in Kauai to 
indicate that they had no close relatives, friends, or neighbors from 
whom to get help. However, 70% of those interviewed said they had at 
least one close friend or relative in town, so there was great potential 
for social support. In fact, 80% of the sample in Coalinga reported 
having received aid from relatives, friends, or neighbors. 
Respondents were shown a list of aid types typically received from 
relatives and friends, and they were asked to indicate what kinds of 
support they had gotten. Categories of help included: household items, 
advice, moral support, labor, transportation, shelter, food, clothing, or 
money. In Coalinga, relatives tended to provide shelter, and they, as 
well as people close to the victim families, both gave moral support 
(Table V-16). Both of these findings are consistent with the fact that 
people were dislocated in Coalinga and needed both shelter and moral 
support for that reason. 
Ai d from fri ends and re 1 at i ves was vi ewed by at 1 east !JO% of the 
respondents as having been very important, especially for emotional 
recovery (Table V-17). 
Ethnic Group Comparison 
Hispanics were found to be much less likely than Anglos to have 
household insurance of any kind, due in large part to their lower income 
levels (Table V-l3). As was noted earlier, over 50% of the Hispanic 
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families had a monthly income of $800 or less, compared to 17% of the 
Anylos. This lack of insurance was, to a great extent, made up for by 
the disaster assistance programs. Table V-13 indicates very little 
difference between the Hispanics and Anglos with respect to the percent-
age of their total losses covered when insurance and disaster assistance 
are considered together. 
As far as personal strategies for coping with losses, Hispanics were 
more likely than Anglos to change budget priorities and go without 
special items in order to afford necessities; Anglos were more likely to 
decide against replacing certain lost items (Table V-14). 
Anglos were considerably more likely to have received informal aid 
from more than one source, that is, help came from re 1 at i ves, fri ends, 
and neighbors (Tables V-18, V-19). There are two possible explanations 
for this; 1) the friends and neighbors of the Hispanics were frequently 
as bad off as they were, and 2) Hi spani cs in general interact more with 
thei r relatives than with other groups. For both ethnic groups, rela-
tives were the biggest source of help. 
Overall Reco~~ry 
Eiyht months after the disaster, when the interviews took place, 
respondents had had sufficient time to adjust somewhat to their post-
disaster situation, but very few had recovered completely from economic 
and emot i ona 1 setbacks. When respondents we re asked to rate thei rove r-
all recovery, then, they provided clues to the factors that affected the 
rate and success of their economic and emotional recovery. 
Group Recovery Levels 
Ei ght months after the di saster, 32% of the vi ct im famil i es rated 
themselves as completely recovered economically, and 35% said they were 
emotionally back to normal (Table V-20). The relative slowness of re-
covery compared to Kauai may very well be due to the nature of earthquake 
damage and its aftereffects. The damaye in Coalinga was more severe; not 
only was damage everywhere easily seen by all the community residents, 
but reminders of the devastation persisted. There were empty lots in the 
downtown area where familiar businesses had once been, and vacated houses 
in residential districts stood as silent, disturbing testimony to the 
losses Coalinga had suffered. In addition, there were recurring after-
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shocks for a number of weeks. These recurring reminders in Coalinga may 
account for the fact that on Kauai emotional recovery far outpaced eco-
nomic recovery whereas in Coalinga, the two progressed at about the same 
rate. Community economics could have also played a role: the Coalinga 
economy had not been particularly robust prior to the disaster, making 
community redevelopment following the disaster questionable to some. 
The 1 eve 1 s of economi c and emot i ona 1 recove ry in Coa 1 i nga refl ect 
the varying rates of damage sustained by the different ethnic groups, 
with higher levels of both sorts of recovery reported by Anglos. As 
noted earlier, the Hispanics were notably more likely than the Anglos to 
have suffered losses of 100%, while the Anglos typically suffered a loss 
of 25% or less, or--put another way--40% of the Hispanics compared with 
20% of the Anglos suffered damage to over 75% of their residence and 
personal property. As mentioned, Hispanics were more likely to make use 
of several disaster assistance programs. Indeed, there is much evidence 
that higher damage level is related to greater use of assistance pro-
grams (as well as to -low 1 eve 1 s of recovery). 
As ment i oned in Chapte r V, differences in ethn i c group recove ry 
could be due to the differential application of assistance and aid, or--
more likely in Coalinga--to the socioeconomic factors that come into play 
when ethnic minorities must deal with the financial difficulties and 
complex institutional arrangements associateu with a disaster. Since 
this study was based on self-evaluation by the victims, some of the 
di fferences may be due to the vari ous ethni c groups I di fferent vi ews of 
their pre- and postdisaster situations. 
~ 1 a in i r1.~.lcono~~~<:.~ery 
Our model of the hypothesized relationship of the central variables 
was thoroughly described in Chapter V. However, some of its implications 
for Coalinga should be reviewed here. For both the Hispanics and Anglos 
in Coalinga, it is likely that disaster assistance programs--not insur-
ance--accounted for most of the loss coverage, al though some Coal i nga 
victims did have at least partial insurance coverage. In the Anglo 
group, both insurance use and high use of assistance programs are in-
fluenced by income. The relationship between income and insurance is 
positive; that between income and program use is negative. This suggests 
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that those few who did receive insurance payments were less likely to 
make extensive use of the disaster assistance programs (and would have 
been ineligible for some types of assistance). 
Again, for both the Anglos and the Hispanics, level of damage to the 
dwelling was significant in explaining the level of losses covered. In 
fact, the relationship was found to be a positive one--the higher the 
damage levels, the higher the eventual percent coverage of losses. This 
might indicate that--at least in disasters similar to the Coalinga earth-
quake--di saster assi stance programs work the best for persons with the 
greatest damage. 
Conclusion 
This analYSis indicates some differences in recovery between the 
ethnic groups in Coalinga, as well as differences between recovery on 
Kauai and recovery in Coalinga (discussed in detail in the conclusion to 
Chapter V). Also, importantly, it shows a strong positive relationship 
between level of damage and losses covered by disaster assistance pro-
grams. This relationship might reflect the extent to which persons with 
ligh levels of damage continued to pursue the system to its fullest, 
IIhile others, with manageable levels of loss, gave up that endeavor. 
(Thus, in the Anglo group, there was a negative and significant relation-
ship between income and the number of disaster assistance programs used). 
An alternate expl anation--that di saster assistance programs attend in a 
more effective way to the needs of those with high losses--perhaps 
warrants further study. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This report has considered a voluminous amount of data across a 
range of disaster sites and victim characteristics. The following is a 
summary of findings, comparing results from the various sites, and a 
discussion of the conclusions and policy implications that might be 
derived. 
Summary 
The data for this study resulted from four different disaster agents 
(earthquake, tornado, hurricane, and floodS) affecting two small towns, a 
developed urban area, and a somewhat dispersed set of rural villages and 
residences. Coalinga and Paris were rural communities of similar popula-
tion where a disaster significantly damaged residential areas. The Utah 
disaster affected an urban strip along the front of a mountain range, and 
damage was restricted to areas along streambeds and adjacent mountain 
slopes. The disaster on Kauai was more widespread and damaged parts of 
the entire island. 
At each site, different racial, ethnic, and religious groups were 
involved. The Coalinga sample consisted of about 70% Anglo and 3U% 
Hispanic victims. The Paris disaster had almost equal numbers of black 
and white victims. For both of these sites, the victims belonging to 
racial minorities were also of significantly lower socioeconomic status. 
The Kauai sample included victims from several ethnic groups; the three 
sufficiently large to permit multivariate analyses were Caucasian (40%), 
Japanese (34%), and Filipino (26%). Unlike the samples at the first two 
sites, the Hawa i i an vi ct i ms showed no ma rked income differences among 
groups. The Utah victims were predominantly Mormons, members of a fairly 
distinct subculture. They \~ere all white, essentially middle-income 
suburbanites. Each site, except Utah, permitted a comparison of disaster 
response and recovery among ethnic groups. 
Th~ distribution of disaster impacts among victims at each site was 
related primarily to disaster agent characteristics, topography, and 
residential location, and secondarily to the sort of housing each of the 
groups tended to live in. On Kauai, damage was related to topography 
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since, as in most hurricanes, damage was most severe to beach front 
properties. Most such properties were likely to be owned by Caucasians. 
Damages to dwellings away from the ocean front were related in part to 
how the topographic features of the island affected wind patterns and 
intensity levels, and in part to the structural characteristics of the 
dwellings (those cllaracteristics themselves being a reflection of the 
socioeconomic status of the occupants). Structural characteristic,s of 
housing were also a prime determinant of damage in Coalinga: newer, more 
solid homes were less likely to be damaged, irrespective of location; 
however, as in Kauai, structural soundness was related to the socio-
economic status of the residents. In Utah, damage was directly linked to 
location: homes at the mouths of canyons and near runoff channels sus-
tained the most damage, and the actual area of impact was quite limited. 
In Paris, damaye was a function of both residential l~c~tio~ andt.yp~. 
Tornadoes are notoriously capricious in the damage they do, and it was 
not unusual in Paris to see a house completely destroyed while another 
100 feet away sustained only a few broken windows. ~ousing type did 
affect damage 1 eve 1 s: fragi 1 e wood-frame homes suffered greater damage 
(other thi ngs bei ng equa l) than bri ck homes. Thi s study found quite, 
clearly that disaster agent characteristics, as well as damage levels, 
are important in understanding response patterns of victims. 
Damage levels were directly related to ethnicity for two reasons: 
1) residential patterns tend to be determined by ethnicity (segregation) 
and 2) different ethnic groups frequently live in differing sorts of 
houses. Housing type relates to ethnicity because types of construction 
and location are determined by costs and the ability to pay (which, as 
already noted, is closely correlated with race/ethnicity). Thus, on 
Kauai, Caucasians incurred the highest damages because of their prefer-
ence for, and ability to purchase, beachfront housing. In Coalinga, 
Hispanics reported higher damage levels, because they were more likely to 
reside in older, less structurally sound homes. However, in Utah, losses 
were not directly related to class or ethnicity, but simply to home 
location. The situation in Paris was analogous to that in Coalinga--
blacks were more likely to live in older, poorly built homes. Con-
sequently, compared to whites, they reported higher levels of physical 
damage but lower dollar losses. 
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A number of differences regarding residential dislo~ation were 
observed both between and within sites. For example, dislocation was 
much more likely in Coalinga and Paris than on Kauai. In part, this was 
due to the greater damage levels at those two sites, and, in Coalinga, it 
was also attributable to the nature of that town's disaster. Many "dis-
located" families stayed outside their own homes for one or more nights, 
often camping in their yards, because of the threat posed by aftershocks. 
On Kauai, families who found it necessary or desirable to find alterna-
tive shelter after the hurricane were most likely to stay initially with 
relatives. In both Coalinga and Kauai, the longest stays in temporary 
housing and the greatest number of postdisaster residential changes were 
related to levels of damage. However, families on Kauai were more likely 
than those at the other sites to stay in or move back to homes in need of 
repair instead of staying in temporary shelter. 
The pattern of residential dislocation and postdisaster moves was 
somewhat different in Paris. There, blacks were more likely than whites 
to have sought temporary emergency shelter, but whites tended to make 
more postdi saster moves. While the pattern, to an extent, was damage-
related (i.e., people whose homes were destroyed tended to live else-
where), it was quite clearly related to class and race as well. The 
pattern reflects one of the prerogatives of class--the ability to seek 
out optimal temporary housing while a home is being rebuilt. While 
previous research has indicated that blacks have stronger kin networks 
than whites, in Paris there was no difference between the two groups in 
obtaining temporary shelter from kin. Perhaps the most striking differ-
ence between the two groups (one also illustrating the perquisites of 
race and class) was that the overwhelming majority of victims living in 
FEMA trailers were black. Such trailers are rarely considered desirable 
by vi ctims (e.g., Bol in, 1982), and the fact that few whites resided in 
them probably reflects the options available to those with a higher 
socioeconomic status. 
Both blacks and whites in Paris suffered emotional strain~_Jr_om the 
effects of postdisaster moves and inadequate temporary housing, but 
blacks were more likely to report high levels of stress. Data from both 
Kauai and Coalinga also indicated that postdisaster moves create emotion-
al disruptions and stress. At both those sites, and in Utah as well, 
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living in a damaged home was also reported to cause problems; however, 
those displaced in Coalinga generally reported higher levels of emotional 
strain than those living in damaged homes on Kauai. In Utah, the pro-
tracted nature of the flooding added to the uncertainties and stresses 
associated with living in a damaged home. Similarly, in Coalinga, the 
continued aftershocks caused stress and acted as a recurrent reminder of 
the ea rthquake. 
Because of the _s_tress, as well as the greater levels of damage and 
the higher level of residential dislocation, more Coalinga families-than 
Kauai families reported emotional strain. Again, there were few differ-
ences in levels of reported emotional strain among the three ethnic 
groups on Kauai. However, in Coalinga, Anglos were significantly more 
likely than Hispanics to report such strain--a fact consistent with other 
mental health literature. The Paris data showed that blacks reported 
slightly more psychosocial disruption than whites, but differences were 
not large. 
Variances among ethnic groups became more clear when looking at 
patterns of utilization of forma1_ aid __ at the various sites. While the 
timing and types of assistance were similar at all four sites (with the 
notable exception of the Mormon Church at the Utah site), there were 
distinct differences among the various groups of victims in their use of 
these programs. For example, Coalinga victims were much more likely to 
go to DACs than were Kauai victims, and the same may be said for Paris 
victims versus Utah victims. In Coalinga, almost three-fourths of the 
victim households reported that they actually received assistance from at 
least one program. However, on Kauai, less than half of the respondents 
used any of the programs. There, it was the Red Cross and the Salvation 
Army that were most 1 i ke1y to be used, because they offered vi rtually 
immediate assistance. 
In Paris, housing programs from FEMA were used relatively frequent-
ly, more often by blacks than whites; among whites, younger victims' were 
more likely to use FEMA than were older victims. However, white victims 
were twice as likely as blacks to receive SBA reconstruction loans--
reflecting, at least in part, the poorer blacks' inability to qualify 
for such financing. On the other hand, the lower incomes of blacks made 
them more 1 i ke 1y to recei ve IFG moni es (IFG bei ng a program of "1 ast 
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resort"), but whites generally received larger cash grants from IFG. 
Blacks also utilized Interfaith Disaster Services and other local 
charitable organizations more often than whites. The greater likelihood 
of blacks to use multiple aid sources reflects both their inability to 
receive adequate support from fewer sources and thei r poorer insurance 
coverage. Utah victims, Mormon or not, tended most often to use aid from 
the Mormon Church, sometimes to the exclusion of aid from federal, state, 
and private disaster organizations (such as the Red Cross). In some 
instances, Utah victims did utilize SBA loans to rebuild homes, but the 
Mormon Church disaster effort overshadowed other programs. 
At all sites, the use of multiple aid programs typically was found 
to be associated with higher levels of damage and loss, although the 
pattern was more distinct in Paris and Coal inga than Kauai or Utah. On 
Kauai, Japanese were the ethnic group least likely to use any assistance 
program or even to visit a DAC. In a sense, their behavior was compara-
ble to that of Mormons in Utah: their attitude toward and use of aid 
probably reflects a cultural ethic analogous to the Mormon doctrine of 
self-reliance. In Coalinga, Anglos were less likely than Hispanics to 
have used multiple programs of assistance (paralleling the situation in 
Paris), but the pattern may be explained by both diffe,rences in damage 
levels and the already mentioned differences in resources available to 
each group. 
Victims at all sites and across all ethnic groups reported that the 
aid they recei ved was important in thei r recovery. Approval rates were 
somewhat lower in Paris than other sites, and blacks there were most 
likely of all groups to consider the aid they received inadequate. 
There are some important differences between sites that are associa-
ted with the nature of the disaster agent and its impact. Only 9% of the 
Coalinga victims reported having earthquake insurance--reflecting the 
relative scarcity and expense of such coverage. Similarly, virtually no 
one interviewed in Utah had flood insurance. On Kauai, 88% of the vic-
tims reported having coverage for wind damage, and they had far better 
coverage by insurance of any kind than did Coalinga respondents. 
In Paris, blacks and whites utilized insurance at essentially equal 
rates, although somewhat below the level of Kauai respondents. However, 
blacks were less likely to report having adequate coverage. Still, most 
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victims in both racial groups felt that the settlements they received 
from their insurers were fair. Not surprisingly, whites were more likely 
to have additional living expense coverage to pay for temporary housing. 
This explains, in part, both their lower utilization of FEMA housing and 
the fact that insurance coverage was associ ated with the economi c re-
covery of whites but it was not for blacks. 
The possession of insurance was directly related to ethnicity and 
socioeconomic status, with victims of higher status having more adequate 
coverage. In general, the distribution of aid at all sites demonstrated 
that assistance is typically added to insurance coverage to reduce dis-
crepancies between losses and reimbursements. A common strategy across 
groups for adapting to losses not covered by insurance or aid programs 
was simply not to replace certain items. Victims who had personal 
savings (typically middle and upper class) utilized them rather than 
loans or grants. 
At all sites, victims often utilized thebelp and support of kin, 
neighbors, and/or friends. On Kauai, the receipt of such aid was clearly 
related to levels of household damage, with higher loss victims being 
more likely to receive help from kin or friends. The same pattern held 
in Paris for both racial groups, but not in Coalinga. There, informal 
aid was received by a broad range of victims and was not specifically 
related to high damage levels. As a source of aid, relatives were more 
important in Coalinga than on Kauai, although aid from friends and neigh-
bors was similar for the two sites. 
Because of the greater importance for Hispanics of extended family, 
in Coalinga they were more likely than Anglos to have received assistance 
from relatives. The white groups in Paris, Coalinga, and Kauai were more 
1 i kely to have recei ved aid from ~or~ than one of the three primary 
groups (kin, neighbors, friends) than were the minority groups. 
At all sites, the role of kin in providing moral support and emo-
tional comfort was quite obvious, and at sites where there were relative-
ly high rates of residential dislocation (i.e., Paris and Coalinga), the 
role of relatives in providing shelter and food, especially during the 
emergency period, was also particularly evident. In all cases, aid 
received from informal sources was generally viewed by recipients as more 
important for emotional rather than economic recovery. 
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When data were gathered eight months after the respective disasters, 
levels of household recovery varied among sites as well as among ethnic 
groups within each site. Recovery was most rapid on Kauai. There, 
residents were considerably more likely than victims at the other sites 
to report high levels of emotional recovery. This differential recovery 
rate was probably related to the greater damage levels at the other sites 
and, in the case of Coalinga, to the long-term effects of the damage to 
houses and to continuing aftershocks. 
Within the Kauai and Coalinga samples, the ethnic groups that had 
suffered the highest levels of damage also reported the lowest levels of 
economic recovery (Caucasians and Hispanics, respectively). Similarly, 
in Paris, a smaller proportion of blacks than whites were recovered; 
however, that differential rate was due mostly to the differing socio-
economic status of the two groups. Family size in Paris proved to be 
important in recovery with, as might be suspected, small families of both 
racial groups recovering economically more quickly than larger ones. 
The high use of assistance programs by those with greater damage may 
be related to those victims I needs to use the full range of programs to 
mitigate their losses. This need was obviated by sound insurance cover-
age. Still, many of those victims who readily used assistance had not 
achieved recovery by the time of these interviews. Therefore, it should 
not be surprising that, in spite of the available aid, many victims--
especially those belonging to ethnic minorities and those of lower socio-
economic status--reported that assistance was inadequate to meet their 
needs. 
Conclusions 
This report is a first attempt to examine the influence of race and 
ethnicity. on family recovery from disaster. Of course, concern with race 
and ethnicity is essentially concern with culture and traditions, but 
cultural variations are not due solely to differences in race or ethnici-
-ty--class i.s a determinant as well. Social classes have distinctive 
values, traditions, attitudes, and ways of behaving just as do racial, 
ethnic, and religious groups. Therefore, in a sense, this study attempts 
to assess the effects on disaster response and recovery of cultural 
variation that is itself a complex interplay of both class and ethnicity. 
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Indeed, it has been impossible not to refer to certain class factors 
in comparing the various ethnic groups. Class factors certainly figured 
strongly in the Paris data, where victims of lower socioeconomic status 
simply did not recover as quickly as did those of- higher socioeconomic 
status, irrespective of race. However, data from that site also dis-
closed certain recovery strategies that could not be attributed directly 
to class. Thus, disaster response and recovery behavior is determined by 
a dynami c i nte rp 1 ay of the characteri st i cs of the di saste r i tse lf, the 
losses of the victims, and the complex set of family and cultural tradi-
tions, resources, and ways of responding to stress. 
In this study, we have tried to select a reasonable set of variables 
to examine, but as in all such enterprises, several factors may have been 
overlooked or arbitrarily excluded. If the omissions are glaring, we 
hope other researchers may profit from such oversights by focusing on 
them in future research. 
Among the few general conclusions that may be drawn from this study, 
the most obvious is that poor families and large families have the most 
trouble acquiring adequate aid and recovering from disaster, and are 
consequently more vulnerable to a disaster. Members of ethnic minori-
ties, particularly blacks and Hispanics, are typically more likely to 
belong to such families. These families have greater numbers of non-
productive dependents, poorer insurance coverage, less money in savings 
accounts, and fewer personal resources. As noted in the theoretical 
discussion of stress (Chapter II), such families are under stress even 
prior to a disaster and have fewer abilities (material, social, or 
psychological) to cope with additional demands. Recovery policies should 
recognize this fact so that social inequities will not be magnified by a 
disaster. 
This study found that blacks and Hispanics used multiple aid sources 
in thei r~T?orts to recoup losses. Yet, they were st ill more likely than 
whites to evaluate aid received as inadequate and to recover economically 
more slowly. Clearly, programs for outreach to such groups must be 
expanded and used in disasters involving significant numbers of blacks or 
Hispanics. This recommendation is particularly pertinent for those 
involved in planning for earthquakes in southern California; such earth-
quakes will almost certainly involve both groups. 
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We also observed that certain ethnic/cultural traditions tend to 
keep some victims out of the formal aid network. In Utah, for example, 
tfie~-~Mormontradition of self-reliance, coupled with the church's elabor-
ate, decentralized self-help system, encouraged citizens to use non-
governmental aid. However, this situation is probably relatively unique; 
the LOS church could only maintain a private disaster recovery program 
because of its great wealth and far-reaching organization. It is unlike-
ly that emergent or established organizations such as the Red Cross could 
alone provide adequate resources following a major disaster. The Utah 
case also highlighted certain organizational domain and conflict issues 
that emerged when established disaster organizations had to deal with a 
new and powerful aid group (the LOS Church) during response and recovery. 
Again, disaster planners could profit greatly if they would anticipate 
such interorganizational problems. 
On Kauai, cultural traditions of family and self-reliance also 
seemed to keep Japanese out of the fo rma 1 aid system. However, two 
additional factors (found significant at all sites) affected thei r re-
sponse: loss levels and insurance coverage. 
Loss levels, of course, are important because they create the need 
that results in a search for aid, and because they are used as guidelines 
for the receipt of aid. In addition, high loss levels are associated 
with the receipt of aid from a primary group. Beyond that, however, loss 
levels are related to both ethnicity and class. Cultural traditions 
determining home sites (Kauai) and patterns of residential segregation 
(Paris), and class attributes influencing choice of house type (Coalinga 
and Paris) can all affect loss and the resultant need for aid. Thus even 
a seemingly "objective" category such as disaster loss is underlain by 
cultural and class factors. 
Another revelation from this study is thatlilck .of insurance or of 
act.g~quate coverage forces victims into the formal aid system. In 
Coalinga, where few victims had earthquake insurance and in Utah, where 
few had flood insurance, this was quite clearly the case. At the other 
two sites, inadequate (rather than nonexi stent) coverage was associated 
-with victims seeking out additional sources of financial aid. In Paris, 
minorHie-s and those of lower socioeconomic status were the most likely 
to_J<lt-e their coverage as inadequate. Ethnicity and social class affect 
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strongly insurance use and its contribution to recovery. 
! While this study attempted to provide some initial answers to the 
! 
,I question of race and ethnicity in long-term family recovery, the issues 
are complex, interwoven, and amenable to only the broadest interpretation 
at this point. At the time of these interviews--eight months following 
the disasters--many families had not yet recovered fully or, in the case 
of the poorest minorities, even begun to recover. Thus the families were 
in or enteri ng a proces s of change (see, for example, Drabek and Key, 
1984). Part of any future research program should examine the effect of 
such changes on the various categories of victims over the three to five 
years following impact. 
Disaster recovery planners should recognize the differential access 
to, and util ization of, formal and informal aid programs. It appears 
that it is difficult for some disaster victims--particularly those of 
lower socioeconomic class and those on fixed income--to qualify for some 
programs, such as SBA loans. Failure to receive such loans or grants to 
rebu il d a home can mean a 1 ong-te rm dec 1 i ne in the qua 1 ity of 1 ife and 
standard of living of poorer victims. The formal aid system has proven a 
key element in disaster recovery, but policies and standards that ex-
clude minorities and the poor must be re-examined unless disasters are to 
create increasingly large social inequities. 
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APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER III 
TABLE 1 
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
INCOME 
Leas than $500 
$500 - $999 
$1,000 - $1,999 
$2,000 and more 
x2 _ 91.04, P < .02 
WHITE VICTIMS 
20.8% (44) 
32.5% (69) 
32.5% (69) 
14.2% (30) 
n - 212 
TABLE 2 
BLACK VICTIMS 
59.8% (131) 
29.2% 
9.6% 
1.4% 
64) 
21) 
3) 
n - 219 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD OCCUPATION 
OCCUPATION WHITE VICTIMS BLACK VICTIMS 
Unskilled Service 
Worker 11.0% (22) 44.0% (81 ) 
Laborer 20. 0% (40) 27.7% (51) 
Operative 7.5% (15) 3.8% ( 7) 
Craftsmen and Kindred 14.0% (28) 6.0% (11) 
Skilled Service Worker 5.5% (11) 10.9% (20) 
Clerical and Sales 11. 0% (22) 2.7% 5) 
Farmers and Ranchers 1. 0% ( 2) .5% 1) 
Managers 21. 5% (43 ) 2.2% 4) 
Professionals 8.5% (17) 2.2% 4) 
n - 200 n - 184 
(~7 missing observations) 
X -99.01,P<..05 
TABLE 3 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION 
EDUCATION LEVEL WHITE VICTIMS BLACK VICTIMS 
Lei. than High School 46.7% (98) 56.9% (124) 
High School Graduate 23.8% (50) 30.3% 66) 
Some College or Technical 
School 14.3% (30) 8.7% 19) 
College Graduate and 
Post Graduate 15.2% (32) 4.1% 9) 
n - 210 n - 218 
(3 misling observations) 
X2 
- 20.48, P < .05 
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NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD 
MEMBERS AT TIME OF 
TORNADO 
2 
4 
5 or more 
x2 • 24.96, P <. .OS 
TABLE 4 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
WHITE VICTIMS 
18.9% (40) 
37.7% (80) 
17.9% (38) 
lS.1% (32) 
10.4% (22) 
n • 212 
TABLE 5 
HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Non-chi1drearing 
Households 
WHITE VICTIMS 
61.3% (130) 
Households with Dependent 
Children 33.0% 70) 
Three Generation 
Household 5.7% 12) 
n • 212 
x2 • 12.97, P < .OS 
TABLE 6 
MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENT 
STATUS WHITE VICTIMS 
Harried 67.9% (144) 
Single 8.0% 17) 
Divorced 6.6% 14) 
Separated 1. 4% 3) 
Widowed 16.0% 34) 
n • 212 
X2 • 64.43, P < .OS 
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BLACK VICTIMS 
22.8% (SO) 
20.S% (4S) 
17.4% (38) 
14.2% (31 ) 
2S.1% (55) 
n • 219 
BLACK VICTIMS 
47.S% (104) 
37.9% 83) 
14.6% 32) 
n • 219 
BLACK VICTIMS 
30.1% (66 ) 
20.S% (4S) 
11.9% (26 ) 
8.7% 0.9) 
28.8% (63) 
n • 219 
AGE GROUP 
Le •• than 30 Years 
30 to 59 Years 
60 Years and Older 
x2 - .24, N. S. 
PERCENT OF ROUSE 
DESTROYED 
1% - 25% 
26% - 50% 
51% 75% 
76% - 99% 
100% 
x2 • 4.84, N. S. 
AMOUNT OF LOSSES 
TO HOUSE 
Le.s than ~5,OOO 
$5,000 - $15,000 
$16,000 - $25,000 
$26,000 - $35,000 
$36,000 or more 
TABLE 7 
AGE OF RESPONDENT 
WHITE VICTIMS 
17.0% ()6) 
44.8% (95) 
38.2% ( 8ll 
n - 212 
TABLE 8 
DAMAGE TO RESIDENCE 
WHITE VICTIMS 
28.8% (61) 
19.8% (42) 
8.0% (17) 
5.7% (12) 
37.7% (80) 
n - 212 
TABLE 9 
DOLLAR LOSS TG HOUSE 
STRUCTURE BY RACE 
WHITE VICTIMS 
25.3% (45) 
29.8% ( 53) 
20.8% (37) 
8.4% (15) 
15.7% (28) 
n - 178 
x2 • 14.26, P < .05 
BLACK VICTIMS 
18.7% (41) 
43.4% (95) 
37.9% (83) 
n - 219· 
BLACK VICTIMS 
26.9% ( 59) 
26.9% ( 59) 
9.6% ( 2ll 
3.2% ( 7l 
33.3% 03) 
n - 219 
BLACK VICTIMS 
36.5% (42) 
34.8% (40) 
9.6% (1ll 
12.2% (14) 
7.0% ( 8) 
n - 115 
Appendix A 
138 Missing Observations: 132 rented their homes - 12.3% (26) 
white victims; 48.4% (106) black 
victims. 
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PERCENT OF CONTENTS 
DESTROYED 
u - 25% 
26% - 50% 
51% - 75% 
76% - 99% 
100% 
x2 • 8.19, P < .05 
TABLE 10 
DAMAGE TO HOME 
CONTENTS BY RACE 
WHITE VICTIMS 
43.4% (92) 
14.6% (31) 
8.0% (17 ) 
5.7% (12) 
28.3% (60) 
n • 212 
TABLE 11 
DOLLAR LOSS TO HOME 
CONTENTS BY RACE 
AMOUNT OF LOSSES TO 
HOME CONTENTS WHITE VICTIMS 
Le.1 than $5,000 
$5,000 - $10,000 
$10,100 - $15,000 
$15,100 - $20,000 
More than $20,000 
x2 • 9.65, P < .05 
55 Milsing Observations 
61.1% ( 118) 
22.3% 43) 
5.7% 11) 
3.6% 7l 
7.3% 14) 
n • 193 
228 
BLACK VICTIMS 
42.9% (93) 
22.6% (49) 
6.0% (13) 
8.3% (18) 
20.3% (44) 
n • 217 
BLACK VICTIMS 
71.0% ( 130) 
21. 9% 40) 
3.8% 7) 
1.1% 2) 
2.2% 4) 
n • 183 
.l!l!.lll VICTIMS 
High Illcome** 
Il • 62 
Moderate Income** 
Il • 150 
BLACK VICTIMS 
Bigh I~ 
Il • 10 
Moderate Illcome 
Il • 209 
WH ITE VI CTIMS 
High Illcome 
Il • 62 
Moderate Income 
n • 150 
BLACK VICTIMS 
High Illcome 
Il • 10 
Moderate Illcome 
Il • 209 
2 Missing Observations 
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TABLE 12 
LOSSES BY VICTIM INCOME LEVELS 
DAMAGE LEVELS TO HOUSE STRUCTURES 
HIGH DAMAGE* MODERATE DAMAG E* 
30.6% (19) 69.4% 43 ) 
40.7% ( 61) 59.3% 89) 
10.0% ( 1) 90.0: 9) 
34.4% (72) 65.6% ( 13 7J 
DAMAGE LEVELS TO ROME CONTENTS 
HIGH DAMAGE*** MODERATE DAMAGE*** 
19.4% (12) 80.6% ( 50) 
32.0% ( 48) 68.0% ( 102) 
( 0) 100.0% ( 10) 
21.3% (44) 78.7% ( 163) 
*Bigh Damage (Structure) is equivalellt to 75% to 100% of structure 
de s tr oye d. 
Moderate Damage (Structure) is equivalent to 0-74% of structure 
destroyed. 
**High Income is equivalent to $1300+ earlled per month. 
Moderate Income is equivalent to $0-1,299 earlled per month. 
***Bigh Damage (Contents) ia equivalent to 100% of contents destroyed. 
Moderate Damage (Contents) is equivalent to 0-99% of contents destroy", 
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WHITE VICTIMS 
11 - 212 
BLACK VICTIMS 
11 - 219 
X2 - 0.0, N.S. 
WHITE VICTIMS 
11 - 212 
BLACK VICTIMS 
11 - 219 
X2 _ 7.31, P <. .05 
WHITE VICTIMS 
11 - 212 
BLACK VICTIMS 
11 - 219 
X2 - 0.0, N.S. 
TABLE 13 
NUMBER OF INJURIES WITHIN 
PRIMAIlY GIlOUPS 
NUMBER OF llELATIVES INJURED 
NONE ONE OR MORE 
92.9% (1971 7.1% (15) 
93.2% (204) 6.8% (15) 
NUMBER OF FRIENDS INJURED 
NONE ONE OR MORE 
90.1% (191) 9.9% (21) 
80.4% (176) 19.6% (43) 
NUMBER OF NEIGHBORS INJURED 
NONE ONE OR MORE 
87.7% (186) 12.3% (26) 
87.2% (191) 12.8% (28) 
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WHITE VICTIMS 
11 • 212 
BLACK VICTIMS 
11 • 219 
X2 • 0.09, N.S. 
WHITE VICTIMS 
11 • 212 
BLACK VICTIMS 
D • 219 
X2 • 10.08, P < .05 
WHITE VICTIMS 
D • 212 
BLACK VICTIMS 
11 • 219 
X2 • 0.07, B.S. 
TABLE 14 
BUMBER OF DEATHS WITHIB 
PRIMARY GROUPS 
Appendix A 
BUMBER OF RELATIVES KILLED 
BOBE ONE OR MORE 
93.9% (199) 6.1% (13) 
95.0% (208) 5.0% (11) 
NUMBER OF FRIENDS KILLED 
NONE ONE OR MORE 
82.5% (175) 17.5% (37) 
68.9% (151) 31.1% (68) 
NUMBER OF NEIGHBORS KILLED 
NONE ONE OR MORE 
86.8% (184) 13.2% (28) 
88.1% (193) 11.9% (26) 
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TAIILE 15 
EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF DEATHS IN 
PRIMARY CROUP 
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY 
INCOMPLETE COMPLETE 
.!!!!!1.l! v I C TI M 5 
Number of Relative. Killed 
Hone (n • 199) 54.3% (l08) 45.7% ( 91) 
1 or Hore (n • 13) 84.6% ( 11) 15.4% ( 2) 
X2 . 3.41, P <- .05 
Number of Friends Killed 
None (n • 175) 56.6% 99) 43.4% (76) 
1 Or Hore (n • 37) 54.1% 20) 45.9% (7) 
X2 
· 
0.01, N.S. 
Number of Neighbors Killed 
Hone (n • lS4) 53.8% 99) 46.2% (85) 
1 or More (n • 28) 71.4% 20) 28.6% ( 8) 
x
2 
· 
2.39, N.S. 
BLACK~ 
Number of Relatives Killed 
None (n • 20S) 65.4% (136) 34.6% (72) 
1 or Hore (n • 11) 63.6% ( 7) 36.4% (1) 
X2 
· 
0.0, N.S. 
Number of Friends Killed 
Hone (n • 151) 64.2% 97) 35.8% (54) 
1 or Ho re (n • 6S) 67.6% 46) 32.4% ( 22) 
X2 
· 
0.11, N.S. 
Number of Neighbors Killed 
None (n • 193 ) 64.2% (124) 35.8% (69) 
1 or Hore (n • 26) 73.1% ( 19) 26.9% ( 7) 
X2 • 0.45, N.S. 
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TABLE 16 
POST-TORNADO RESIDENTIAL CHANGES 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESIDENTIAL CHANGES 
WHITE VICTIMS 
High Damage 
n • 80 46.3% ( 37) 53.8% (43) 
Moderate Damage 
n • 132 84.1% (111 ) 15.9% (21) 
BLACK VICTIMS 
High Damage 
n • 73 58.9% ( 43) 41.1% (30 ) 
Moderate Damage 
n • 146 90.4% (132) 9.6% (1 Ii 
IIHITE VICTIMS 
High Income 
n • 62 61.3% ( 38) 38.7% (24 , 
Moderate Income 
n • 150 73.3% (110) 26.7% (40) 
BLACK VICTIMS 
High Income 
n • 10 60.0% 6) 40.0% ( 4) 
Moderate Income 
n • 209 80.9% ( 169) 19.1% (40) 
WHITE VICTIMS 
Under 60 Years of Age 
n • 131 60.3% 79) 39.7% (52) 
60 Years and Older 
n • 81 85.2% 69) 14.8% (12) 
BLACK VICTIMS 
Under 60 Years of Age 
n • 136 76.5% (104) 23.5% (32) 
60 Year. and Older 
n • 83 85.5% ( 71) 14.5% (12 ) 
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TABLE 17 
EFFECTS OF RESIDENTIAL CHANGES ON VICTIMS 
VICTIM EXPERIENCES 
WHITE VICTIMS 
Reduced Leisure 
Storm Related Upsets 
Family Strains 
BLACK VICTIMS 
Reduced Leisure 
Storm Related Upsets 
Family Strains 
WHITE VICTIMS 
~ 2 Changes 
~3 Changes 
BLACK VICTIMS 
!:2 Changes 
"2.3 Changes 
NUMBER OF POST-DISASTER MOVES 
~2 
34.5% 51) 
54.7% 81) 
19.6% 29) 
n • 148 
38.9% ( 68) 
61. 7% (08) 
36.6% ( 
n • 
TABLE 18 
FAMILY DISRUPTION DUE TO 
QR5Tn~NTTA~ CRANGE 
64) 
175 
None Moderate 
8.8% 03 ) 35.4% (52) 
8.4% 7l 39.8% (33) 
9.4% 6) 29.7% (9) 
3.5% 5) 20.6% ( 29) 
5.2% 5) 23.7% (23 ) 
13.6% ( 6) 
~3 
42.2% ( 27) 
60.9% (39) 
31.3% (20) 
n • 64 
38.9% on 
81.8% (36 ) 
47.7% (21) 
n • 44 
High 
55.8% 82) 
51.8% 43) 
60.9% 39) 
75.9% (107) 
71.1% 69) 
86.4% 38) 
*Index ia baaed on 288 families who experienced residential change •• 
WHITE VICTIMS 
B LACK VICTIMS 
TABLE 19 
FAMILY DISRUPTION DUE TO 
RESIDENTIAL REPAIRS 
RESIDENTIAL ~ DISRUPTION ~ 
Rone 
8.9% (1) 
6.9% ( 8) 
Moderate Extreme 
50.4% (62) 40.7% (50) 
47.4% (55) 45.7% (53) 
*Index is based aD 239 families lived in their homes during which repair 
work val being performed. 
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TABLE 20 
CHANGES IN VIS InTI ON RATES 
OF VICTIMS 
KIN VISITATION FREQUENCY 
Pre-Tornado Nov. 1982 
# of Month1! Visits # of Monthl! Visits 
~5 I ~6 ~5 :::6 
VICTIMS 
n • 431 52.2% (225 ) 47.8% (206) 51. 5% (222) 48.5% (209) 
.R!!l.ll .!l£.I.1l:!.§ 
n • 212 53.3% (113) 46.7% ( 99) 52.8% (112 ) 47. 2% (100 ) 
High Damage 
n • 80 58.8% ( 47) 41. 3% ( 33) 57.5% ( 46) 42.5% ( 34) 
Moderate Damage 
n • 132 50.0% ( 66) 50.0% ( 66) 50.0% ( 66) 50.0% ( 66) 
BLACK VICTIMS 
n • 219 51.1% ( 112) 48.9% (lon 50.2% ( 110) 49.8% (l09) 
High Damage 
n • 73 58.9% ( 43) 41.1% ( 30) 54.8% ( 40) 45.2% ( 76) 
Moderate Damage 
n • 146 47.3% ( 69) 52.7% ( 71) 47.9% ( 70) 52.1% ( 76) 
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TABLE 20 (Continued) 
VISITATION FREQUENCY WITH FRIENDS 
Pre-Tornado Nov. 1982 
# of Month1x Visits # of Monthl! Visits 
~S ~6 :S ~6 
VICTIMS 
n - 431 64.7% (279) 3S.3% (1S2) 6S.0% (280) 3S.0% (1S1) 
WRITE VICTIMS 
n - 212 6S.1% (138) 34.9% ( 74) 64.6% (137) 3S.4% ( 7S) 
High Damage 
n - 80 67.5% ( 54) 32.5% ( 26) 67.5% ( 54) 32.5% ( 26) 
Moderate Damage 
n - 132 63.6% ( 84) 36.4% ( 48) 62.9% ( 83) 37.1% ( 49) 
BLACK ~ 
n - 219 64.4% (141) 35.6% ( 78) 65.3% (143 ) 34.7% ( 76) 
High Damage 
n - 73 71. 2% ( 52) 28.8% ( 21) 74.0% ( 54) 26.0% ( 19) 
Moderage Damage 
n - 146 61.0% ( 89) 39.0% ( 57) 61.0% ( 89) 39.0% ( 57) 
NEIGHBOR VISITATION FREQUENCIES 
VICTIMS 
n - 431 65.2% (281) 34.8% (150) 64.7% (279) 3S.3% (152) 
WRITE~ 
n - 212 69.8% (148) 30.2% ( 64) 67.5% (143) 32.5% ( 26) 
High Damage 
n - 80 68.8% ( 55) 31.3% ( 25) 67. 5% ( 54) 32.5% ( 26) 
Moderate Damage 
n - 132 70.5% ( 93) 29.5% ( 39) 67.4% ( 89) 32.6% ( 43) 
BLACK VICTIMS 
n - 219 60.7% (133) 39.3% (86) 62.1% (136) 37.9% (83) 
High Damage 
n - 146 68.5% (100) 31. 5% (46) 68.5% (100) 31.5% (46) 
Moderate Damage 
n - 73 56.8% ( 41) 43.2% (32) 58.9% ( 43) 41.1% (30) 
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n • 431 
WHITE VICTIMS 
n • 212 
BLACK VICTIMS 
n • 219 
WHITE VICTIMS 
High Damage 
n • 80 
Mo dera te Dama ge 
n • 132 
BLACK VICTIMS 
High Damage 
n • 73 
Moderate Damage 
n • 146 
WHIT! VICTIMS 
Under 60 Year. of Age 
n • 131 
60 Year. and Older 
n • 81 
.!lr.!£! V I C TI MS 
Under 60 Year. of Age 
n • 136 
60 Year. and Older 
n • 83 
TABLE 21 
POST-DISASTER CHANGES III 
S TAIIDARD 0 F L IV IIiG 
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CHAIIGES IN STANDARD OF LIVING SIIiCE STORM 
LOWUED REMAINED SAME OR RISEN 
28.1% (121l 71. 9% ( 310) 
17 .9% ( 38) 82.1% (174) 
37.9% ( 83) 62.1% ( 136) 
31.3% 25 ) 68.8% ( 55) 
9.8% 13 ) 90.2% ( 119) 
42.5% 31l 57.5% 42) 
35.6% 52) 64.4% 94) 
15.3% 20) 84.7% ( 111l 
22.2% 18) 77.8% ( 63) 
43.4% 59) 56.6% 77) 
28.9% 24) 71.1% 59) 
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THOSE AGREEING WITH 
THE STATEMENT THAT 
Prices have risen 
since the tor na do 
My expense 8 have risen 
since the tornado 
The coat of my housing 
TULE 22 
POST-DISASTER INCREASES 
IN COST OF LIVING 
n • 212 
48.1% ( 102) 
40.6% 86 ) 
has 
risen since the storm 35.4% 75) 
TABLE 23 
n • 219 
70.8% ( 155) 
67.2% ( 147) 
48.9% ( 107) 
STORM-RELATED FAMILY PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACTS 
PERCE NT AG REE ING 
SELF-REPORTED IMPACTS WRITE VICTIMS 
Upsets With Storm 56.6 % (120) 
Time Pressures 45.3% 96 ) 
Lack of Patience 32.1% 68) 
Strained Family Re 1 at iODsh ips 23.1% 49) 
Strengthened Family Ties 93.9% (199) 
Decreased Importance of 
Material Possessions 61.8% ( 131) 
Increased Family Happiness 27.4% ( 58) 
n • 212 
TABLE 24 
INCIDENCE OF STRAINS TN 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 
BLACK VICTIMS 
65.8% (144) 
49.7% ( 109) 
42.9% 94) 
38.8% 85) 
87.7% (192) 
63.0% ( 138) 
19.6% ( 43) 
n • 219 
PROPORTION OF SAMiLE REPORTING STRAINS 
IN FAMILY RELATIONS 
WHITE BLACKS 
Victims Overall 23.1% (49) 38.8% ( 85) 
High Loaa Victim. 35.0% (28) 42.5% (31) 
Moderate L08s Victims 15.9% ( 21) 37.0% ( 54) 
Under 60 Yrs. of Age 28.2% (37) 46.3% ( 63) 
60 Yr •• and Older 14.8% (12) 26.5% (22) 
N • 212 N • 219 
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TABLE 25 
INCIDENCE OF DISRUPTIONS 
IN FAMIL Y L IF! 
Vict i .... 
High Da ... age 
Moderate Da ... age 
Under 60 Yr •• of Age 
6 a Yre. of Age 
RESPONDENTS INDICATING STORM RELATED 
DISRUPTIONS OF FAMILY LIFE 
WHITES 
32.1% (66) 
21.2% (28) 
47.5% (38) 
32.1% (42j 
29.6% (224) 
TABLE 26 
BLACKS 
47.0% (103) 
44.5% 
52.1 % 
52.2% 
38.6% 
65) 
38) 
711 
32) 
POST-TORNADO HOUSING IMPACT EVALUATIONS 
RESPONDENTS AGREEING 
RESPONDENT EVALUATION 
OF HOUS ING SITUATION WHITE VICTIMS BLACK VICTIMS 
Current Hou.ing is as 
Nice a8 Pre-Tornado 
Hou.ing 76.4% ( 162) 62.5% ( 137) 
Satisfied With Comfort 
of Current Housing 88.7% ( 188) 76.7% ( 168) 
Current Rousing Better 
Built and Safer 35.9% 76) 29.2% 64) 
Current Housing Makes it 
Difficul t to Recover 14.2% 30) 21.0% 46 ) 
TABLE 27 
EFFECTS OF POST-DISASTER NEIGHBORHOOD 
ON FAMILIES 
RESPONDENT EVALUATION 
OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGES 
Neighborhood Construction 
Has Been an Obstruction 
to Recovery 
Po.t-Disa.ter Neighborhood 
i. Le.s Pleasant Than 
Pre-Disa ster 
RESPONDENTS AGREEING 
WH ITE VICTIMS BLACK VICTIMS 
42.5% (90) 61.6% (135) 
43.9% (93) 74.9% (164) 
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TABLE 28 
EMOTIONAL IMPACTS OF THE TORNADO 
SELF-REPORTED SYMPTOMS 
Nervousness 
in Stormy 
Weatber 
Bad Dreams 
About tbe 
Storm 
Sleeplessness 
Separation* 
Fear iD Children 
CbildreD** 
Nervous in Stormy 
Weatber 
WH ITE VICTIMS 
88.7% (188) 
32.1% ( 68) 
53.3% (113) 
85.6% ( 77) 
90.2% (10I) 
N • 212 
BLACK VICTIMS 
86.8% (190) 
38.4% ( 84) 
55.9% (122) 
91.9% (125) 
91.8% (134) 
N • 219 
'* For fsmilie s with children responding to this question, 
tbe D'S are 90 for white victims and 136 for black 
victims. 
**Por families with children responding to this question, 
the n l 8 are 112 for white victims and 134 for black victims. 
TABLE 29 
STORM ANXIETY AMONG VICTIMS 
RESPONDENTS EXPRESSING NERVOUSNESS 
FAMILY CHARACTERISTIC WHITES BLACKS 
Higb Damage 93.8% ( 75) 87.7% ( 64) 
n • 80 n • 73 
Moderate Damage 85.6% ( 113) 86.3% (126) 
n • 132 n • 146 
Under 60 Years of Age 90.1% ( 118) 90.4% (123 ) 
n • 131 n • 136 
60 Years and Older 86.4: ( 70) 80.7% ( 67) 
n • 81 n • 83 
3 Persons or Less 87.3% ( 138) 84.2% ( 112) 
n • 158 n • 133 
4 or Hore Per SODS 92.6% ( 50) 90.7% ( 78) 
n • 54 n • 86 
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TABLE 30 
lESPONDENT ATTITUDES 
WHITE VICTIMS 
Appendix A 
BLACK VICTIMS 
Index Item Percent Agreeing With Statement 
Many times I feel that 
I have little influence 
over the things that 
happen to me. 
In the long run the 
bad things that happen 
to us are balanced by 
the good ones. 
It is not always wise 
to plan too far ahead 
because many things turn 
out to be a matter of 
luck (good or bad) anyhow. 
Sometimes I feel that I 
donlt have enough control 
over the direction my life 
ia taking. 
TABLE 
58.5% (124) 
91.0% (193) 
57.5% (122) 
34.4% ( 73) 
N • 212 
31 
FATALISM AND DISASTER LOSSES 
WRITE VICTIMS 
High Damage 
n • 80 
Moderate Damage 
n • 132 
63.8% 
55.3% 
AGREEMENT WITH FATALISM 
(51 ) 90.0% ( 72) 65.0% 
(73) 91.7% ( 121) 53.0% 
60.7% (133) 
73.5% (161) 
80.8% (177) 
46.6% (102) 
N • 219 
ITEMS* 
4 
52) 40.0% 
70) 31.1% 
(32) 
( 411 
X2 • 1.14 X2 . .03 X2 . 2.45 X2 . 1.39 
Sig. . .286 Sig. . .870 Sig. . .117 Sig. . .23S 
BLACK VICTIMS 
High Damage 60.3% (44) 65.8% ( 48) 78.1% ( 57) 39.7% (29 ) 
n • 73 
Moderate Damage 61.0% (89) 77.4% (113 ) 82.2% ( 120) 50.0% (73 ) 
n • 146 
X2 . 0.0 X2 . 2.82 X2 . .30 X2 . 1.67 
sig. . 1.000 Sig. . .093 Sig. . .585 Sig. . 
*Fataliam was measured using the following statements: 
1. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things 
that happen to me. 
.196 
2. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by 
the good onea. 
3. It ia not alwaya wiae to plan too far ahead becauae many thinga 
turn out to be a matter of good or bad luck. 
4. Sometime. I feel that I don't have enough control over the 
direction my life i. taking. 241 
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ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTERS V AND VI 
TABLE 1 
RED CROSS DAMAGE ESTIMATES FOR HURRICANE IWA. 
KAUAI. HAWAII. NOVEMBER 23. 1982 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
Residential Damage: 
Destroyed: 
Maj or Damage: 
Minor Damage: 
o (2 on Oahu) 
7 hospitalized 
Of 14,800 total housing units, 4.845 were 
damaged or destroyed. 
Single Familv 
209 
1,134 
2.699 
Apartments/Condos 
314 
292 
197 
FEMA's 1/5/83 estimate placed residential losses at $41 million plus 
losses to public housing alone totalling $2.2 million. 
Business Losses: 7S small business destroyed or sustaining major 
damage; 105 small businesses were damaged altogether. 
$59.5 million loss to business. excluding agriculture. 
Most of this was to resort hotels and apartments. 
State Agriculture Department estimated almost S15 
million to facilities. 
Due to island-wide power failure, nearly every 
household suffered the loss of perishable food items. 
In some communities electricity outages lasted over 
two weeks. 
An estimated S234 million in losses statewide, with 
most of this impacting Kaua!. 
Actual business losses are expected vary from $67 
million to $151 million, depending on the recovery of 
the tourist industry. 
TABLE 2 
COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON 
DAMAGE AND INJURIES ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE 
COALINGA EARTHQUAKE, MAY 2. 1983 
Deaths: 
Injuries: 
Residential Damage: 
Destroyed: 
Major Damage: 
Minor Damage: 
Business Damage: 
Total Estimated Loss: 
o 
32 Major (21 hospitalized) 
173 Minor 
Of 2,500 housing units total, 2,092 were 
damaged or destroyed (About 1000 persons 
displaced) • 
Single Family 
309 
653 
985 
Apartments 
33 
39 
73 
46 of 51 Total Buildings Destroyed 
141 Businesses Damaged (According to state 
Office of Emergency Services report to Governor, 
5/4/83) 
$31,076,300 ($5,947,300 of this public) 
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TABLE 3 Appendix B 
Survey Completion Summary 
1. Dwelling units selected from 
sampling frame 
2. Number interviewed of initial 
sample drawn 
3. Number of substitutions 
for unlocated households 
4. Number of Hispanic families 
added to assure representation 
in sample 
5. Residents moved and untraceable 
(For Coalinga, 6 had moved 
there after quake) 
6. Residents unable to complete 
interview due to illness or 
incapabity 
7. Refusals 
8. Residents not at home after 
three attempts 
9. Total number of interviews 
attempted 
10. Total number interviewed 
(Completion rate) 
TABLE 4 
Coalinga 
400 • 22% of 
impacted 
residences 
256 (64%) 
40 
80 
27 
6 
77 
24 
520 
376 (72.3%) 
21% of 
impacted 
households 
Kauai 
521 • 13% of 
impacted 
residences 
from 3 
districts 
417 (80%) 
29 
NA 
42 
41 
19 
550 
446 (18%) 
11% of 
impacted 
households 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES, 
BY AGE GROUP OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent) 
Kaua! Coalinga 
Caucasian Japanese Anglo Hispanic 
AGE GROUP 
(in years) 
17 thru 29 13.2 6.1 8.0 20.2 38.4 
30 thru 39 37.5 13.9 14.8 27.5 19. & 
40 thru 49 16.2 19.1 22.7 21.7 1&.1 
50 thru 59 15.4 21.7 21.6 10.1 12.5 
60 thru 69 11.8 25.2 17.0 8.9 12.5 
70 thru 79 4.4 11. 3 11. 4 7.4 .9 
80 and over ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Respondents, N- 136 115 88 258 112 
Nonrespondents, N-
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TABLE 5 
COHPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS III THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAI-lPLES, 
BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE (Percentl 
A. Length of Resi dence at Pre-di saster Address 
Kauai Coal inga 
YEARS Caucasian Japanese Filipino Anglo Hispanic 
1 year or 1 ess 21.3 4.3 7.9 19.6 21.6 
2 - 5 years 32.4 17.2 28.1 34.6 41.4 
6 - 10 years 19.9 19.0 15.7 13.8 19.0 
11 - 15 years 10.3 16.4 19.1 10.0 10.3 
Over 1 5 years 16.2 43.1 29.2 21.9 7.8 
Total 'l. lllO":O T5Q.O TOO:O T5Q.O TOlr.O 
Respondents, N= 136 116 89 260 116 
tlonrespondents, 11= 0 0 0 
B. Length of Resi dence in the Communi tl 
Kauai* Coalinga 
YEARS Caucasi an Japanese Fil ipino Anglo Hispanic 
1 year or 1 ess 7.4 3.8 4.3 
2 - 5 years 23.5 6.9 6.8 18.5 15.5 
G - 10 years 15.4 6.0 14.8 16.1 24.1 
11 - 15 years 13.2 6.0 10.2 12.3 11.2 
16 - 20 years 8.8 6.9 9.1 10.0 12.9 
Over 20 years 31.6 74.1 59.3 39.2 31.9 
Total j, iOD.O TOO:O lOQ."O TOO:O TOO:O 
Respondents, N= 136 116 88 260 116 
Nonrespondents, N= 0 0 0 
* The disaster area for the study in Hawaii \~as the Island of Kauai, 
rather than one particular cor.t;1unity. Kauai respondents were asked how 
many years they had 1 ived on Kauai. Even though there are many 
cOllUDunities on the various islands, we believe that one's island of 
residence provides a distinct residential identity. Since the hurricane 
affected virtually all of populated Kauai, residents considered the 
island, and not just specific cOr.lllunities, as a disaster area. 
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TABLE 6 
COIIPARISON OF ETHIIlC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAlIPLES, 
ilY OWNERSHIP OF DWELLING 
Kauai Coalinga 
Caucasian Japanese Fil ipino Anglo Hispanic 
OWELLltlG 
OW~ERSHIP 
(Pre-disaster) 
Owner of 
residence 40.1 70.9 41.6 65. a 31. 9 
Renter of 
residence 58.4 26.5 58.4 33.8 50.0 
Provided by 
thi rd party* ~ --1..:i _._4 ~ 
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Respondents. N= 137 116 39 260 116 
tlonrespondents, N= 0 0 0 0 0 
* For example, a few agricultural workers in each sample were provided 
rent-free housing on the plantations or cotton farms. A fe~1 respondent 
fami 1 i es 1 ived in housi ng loaned by parents. Households were coded as 
renters if they said they rented their housing from their employer. 
TABLE 7 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SMPLES, 
BY EXTENDEDNESS OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent) 
Kauai Coalinga 
Caucasi an Japanese Filipino Anglo Hi spani c 
IIUIIBER OF 
GENERA TI OilS 
IN HOUSEHOLD 
(Pre-di saster) 
One person 
househol d* 11.8 15.5 5.6 15.0 8.6 
tlore than 1 person, 
same generation** 27.9 38.8 37.1 25.8 26.7 
Two 
generat i ons ~ 52.9 36.2 44.9 55.6 62.1 
Three or more 
generations## ~ ---12 ....l1..:i ~ --1..:i 
Total ::; 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Respondents, N= 135 116 89 260 116 
Nonrespondents. N= 0 0 0 
* Refers to one adul t, 1 iving alone. 
**ilore than one adult, such as husJand and 'dife, no chil dren; or adul t 
sibl i ngs. 
/I Typically one or two parents and one or more minor children; can also be 
adult child or couple and their parents. 
IIMi nor chil dren, thei r parents, and the chil dren' s grandparent( s). 
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TABLE 8 
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SMAPLES 
BY SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD 
Kauai Coal i nga 
Caucasian Japanese Fil ipino Anglo Hispanic 
SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD 
(Pre-di saster) 
1 person 10.9 10.3 5.8 12.7 6.9 
2 persons 27.0 26.7 23.3 24.2 15.5 
3 persons 16.8 22.4 18.6 18.7 20.7 
4 persons 23.4 17.2 20.9 24.2 24.1 
5 persons 13.1 15.5 14.0 13.5 19.0 
6 or more persons ~ ---.Z.& .JL.! ~ ..ll.:.Q. 
Total ~ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Respondents. N= 137 116 86 260 116 
ilonrespondents. N= a 3 a a 
TABLE 9 
COl1PARISOli OF ETHIIlC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAJ1PLES. 
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent) 
Kauai Coal i nga 
Caucasian Japanese Fil i pi no Anglo Hi spanic 
OCCUP A TI mlAL 
LEVEL* 
Unskilled service 
worker** 13.9 11.8 10.7 17.1 23.5 
Laborer 6.2 11.8 28.6 10.0 30.4 
Operative 4.6 5.5 15.5 10.8 19.1 
Craftsman 20.0 27.3 15.5 30.0 17.4 
Skilled service 
worker .8 6.4 4.8 4.0 .9 
Clerical. sales 15.4 9.1 9.5 5.2 1.7 
t~anagers. farm & 
ranch opera tor 12.3 11.8 7.1 8.8 3.5 
Professional 26.9 
.J.E..:.i ~ 14.0 ....1:2. 
Total ~ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Respondents. tl= 130 110 84 250 115 
Nonrespondents. N= 7 7 5 10 
* For current or last he1 d job. 
**Inc1 udes "never worked" (typi cally students) and housel1i yes. 
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TABLE 10 
COMPARISOtI OF ETHIIIC GROUPS III THE KAUAI AND COALlNGA SAI~PLES. 
BY EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLO (Percent) 
Kauai Coalinga 
Caucasian Japanese Filipino Anglo Hispanic 
EI~LOYr~ENT 
CATEGORY (at time 
of interview) 
Working full time 67.2 55.6 58.4 72.3 70.7 
llorking part time 8.8 3.4 6.7 1.5 7.3 
Retired 13.9 32.5 27.0 13.5 6.9 
Homemaker 2.9 1.7 1.1 4.2 1.7 
Di sabl ed 1.5 3.4 5.6 4.2 6.9 
Unemployed 5.8 2.6 1.1 3.5 4.3 
Other .9 .8 1.7 
TABLE 11 
conPARISOII OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAl1PLES. 
BY IIONTHLY INCOi~E CATEGORY (Percent) 
Kauai Coalinga 
Caucasian 
ti0NTHLY FAlHLY 
Japanese Fil ipi no Anglo Hispanic 
IilCariE 
$000 - $600 14.2 10.7 16.4 10.6 32.1 
$601 - $800 10.4 13.1 17.8 6.5 20.8 
$801 - $1000 19.8 20.2 19.2 10.6 15.1 
$1001 - $1500 29.2 36.9 24.7 25.5 20.8 
$1601- $2000 17.0 9.5 5.5 19.0 9.4 
$2001 & over 9.4 9.5 16.4 27.8 1.9 
TABLE 12 
COIiPARISON OF ETHIIIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AlID COALlNGA SAI,IPLES. 
BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent) 
Kauai Coal inga 
Caucasian 
EDUCATIONAL 
Japanese Fil ipino Anglo Hi spani c 
LEVEL 
Grade 9 
or 1 ess 11.3 22.1 39.5 8.5 46.6 
Some hi gh 
school 4.0 4.4 7.0 11.6 20.7 
High school 
graduate 33.1 32.7 20.9 32.6 19.0 
Some college or 
techni cal school 29.0 21.2 17.4 27.5 10.3 
College 
graduate 22.6 19.5 15.1 19.8 3.4 
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TABLE 13 
DWELLltlG DA!~AGE FOR KAUAI AllO COAL! NGA 
DISASTER VICTIM SA:"PLES (Percent) 
A. Damage to ()o./ell ing: Structure* 
Kauai 
II '); 
DAMAGE (Percent) 
None 16 3.6 20 5.7 
25% or 1 ess** 226 50.8 165 47.7 
26'); - 50'j', 112 27.4 54 15.5 
51'j', - 75'j',** 44 9.9 17 4.9 
76'j', - 99'j', 18 4.0 9 2.6 
100',!; 
...l2. ~ ~ 23.6 
Total 445 100.0 340 100.0 
No Response 28 
Average 
Percent Damage 32.8 41.2 
B. Damage to lJo..,elling: Contents 
N % 
DAMAGE (Percent) 
Ilone 102 23.0 2 .6 
25'j', or 1 ess 215 48.4 209 57.6 
26% - 50't 66 14.9 87 24.0 
51'1'. - 75'j', 21 4.7 24 6.6 
76'j', - 99~ 17 3.8 13 3.6 
100',!; 23 5.2 28 -L2 
Total 444 100.0 363 100.0 
No Response 2 13 
Average 
Percent Damage 24.0 31.3 
* Figures for Coalinga include total damage to dwelling and contents from 
the initial ;~ay 2nd earthquake and from succeeding aftershocks. 
**Giving a percent figure for structural damage was difficult for 
apartment dwellers. For those unwilling to venture an estimate but who 
characterized the damage as minor, the response was coded 25%; for those 
who characterized the damage as major, the response was coded 75'); (the 
latter only infrequently occurring). 
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TABLE 14 
COIIPAAISOII OF ETHtlIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAHPLES, 
BY LEVEL OF DAHAGE (Percent) 
A. Percent of Structure Damaged 
Kauai Coalinga 
Caucasi an 
DAJoIAGE LEVEL 
Japanese Fil ipino Anglo HI spani c 
None 3.6 3.4 4.5 6.5 3.7 
25~ or less 50.4 57.3 49.4 57.3 26.2 
26~ - 50't 20.4 25.6 36.0 13.8 19.6 
5a - 75't 10.9 10.3 5.6 2.9 9.3 
76~ - 99't 5.8 2.6 2.2 2.1 3.7 
100't 8.8 .9 2.2 17.5 37.4 
TOii':O TOii':O 'iOQ.O TOD.O 'iOlf:O 
Respondents, N= 136 117 89 240 
Nonrespondents, tl= 0 0 0 20 
B. Percent of Contents Damaged 
Kauai Coalinga 
Caucasi an Japanese Filipino Anglo Hi spani c 
DAl-IAGE LEVEL 
None 14.0 4l.4 24.7 .4 1.0 
25't or 1 ess 50.0 36.2 56.2 66.4 35.6 
26't - 50~ 14.7 15.5 11.2 22.0 23.8 
51~ - 75'l, 5.9 4.3 3.4 5.4 9.6 
75$ - 99'l, 5.9 3.4 3.1 4.8 
100't 9.6 2.6 1.1 2.7 20.2 
TOlJ.O" TTIlf.Q roo.o roo.o roo.o 
Respondents, 11= 136 116 89 259 104 
Nonrespondents, N= 0 12 
TABLE 15 
COI·IPARISON OF ETHIHC GROUPS IN THE KAilAI AND COALINGA SAl1PLES, 
BY PERCEPTION OF POST-DISASTER CONDITION (Percent) 
Kauai Coalinga 
Caucasi an Japanese 
CONDITION 
Fil ipino Anglo Hispanic 
RELATIVE TO 
OTHERS* 
I~uch or somewhat 
better off 53.3 75.3 73.0 73.4 61. 2 
About the same 3l.4 22.2 19.1 18.1 26.7 
Somelihat or much 
worse off ~ ~ I:.'i 3.5 ~ 
Total 't 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Respondents, N= 137 117 89 260 116 
Nonrespondents, N= 0 0 0 0 0 
* Item wording was: "In terms of all your losses, how do you think your 
situation compares to others in (Coal i nga/Kauall who were a1 so affected 
by the (disaster)?" Five choices, collapsed here to three, were read 
for the respondent to se1 ect from. 
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TABLE 16 
DESTINATIONS OF DISLOCATED DISASTER VICTIMS, BY STAGE IN RELOCATION 
PROCESS, FOR KAUAI AND COALINGA SAI-1PLES (Percent) 
Kauai Coal inga 
First Second Third First Second Third 
r-tove Move Move Move I~ove Move 
DESTINATION 
i'toved in with 
rel atives 39.4 7.4 2.1 33.9 13.5 11.3 
Moved in with 
friends or 35.8 11.1 4.3 7.4 6.9 5.2 
neighbors 
Went to an 
official shelter 12.1 a 0 .4 .7 a 
140ved to rental 
apartment or house 5.4 17 .3 34.1 2.9 17.1 42.6 
Bought a house 1.8 1.9 a a a 4.3 
Rented a hotel/ 
motel room 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.8 3.3 1.7 
Camped near own 
home 3.6 .6 a 53.7 9.9 7.8 
Returned to pre-
di saster dwell i n9 IlA 59.9 57.4 NA 48.5 27.0 
Total t 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
~umber movi n9 165 162 47 283 274 115 
Never 1 eft own 
dwell ing 281 93 
Ilumber not respondi ng a a 2 a a a 
I·lean number of 
weeks at that 3.8 6.7 8.4 2.9 15.3 13.4 
location for those 'Ilks 'Ilks wks tiles 'Ilks 'Ilks 
who moved again* 
* Average, especially for First Move, is somewhat inflated by counting the 
response "1 week or 1 ess" as one week. Famil i es lihi ch had not 1 eft thei r 
third destination are not included in the length-of-stay figure for the 
third move. 
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TABLE 17 
DISRUPTION FROl~ RESIDENTIAL DISLOCATION AIIO REPAIRS 
FOR KAUAI AND COALINGA SA1"PLES (Percent) 
A. Disruption from Residential Dislocation 
DEGREE OF DISRUPTION*"" 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
Di dn' t Move 
Total j', 
Respondents, N= 
Nonrespondents, 11= 
B. Disrupti on 
DEGREE OF DISRUPTION** 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
Didn't Do Repairs 
Total '10 
Respondents, N= 
Nonrespondents, N= 
Kauai 
Households 
Ilhi ch Hoved All 
Once or 1~ore* Househol ds 
38.7-
1 57.7 14.1 19.0- 7.0 
17.2 6.3 
11. 7 4.3 
13.5 4.9 
NA 63.4 
100.0 100.0 
162 445 
1 1 
from Res i denti al Repair 
Kauai 
Househol ds 
Wh i ch I"oved All 
Once or i"ore* Househol ds 
18.9-
1 38.1 14.5 19.2- 14.9 
31.4 24.3 
19.5 15.1 
11.0 8.6 
NA 22.5 
100.0 100.0 
342 444 
2 2 
Coal inga 
Households 
Whi ch I~oved All 
Once or i·lore Househol ds 
35.2-
1 55.5 26.5 20.3- 15.2 
17.1 12.8 
16.0 12.0 
11 .4 8.6 
IIA 24.9 
100.0 100.0 
281 374 
2 2 
Coal i nga 
Househol ds 
IIhich i"oved All 
Once or ;"ore Househol ds 
22.3-
1 40.2 10.9 17.9- 8.8 
26.6 13.1 
24.5 12.0 
8.2 4.0 
NA .2l.,1. 
100.0 100.0 
183 375 
1 1 
* Dislocation includes short-term as well as long-term dislocations and single 
as well as multiple; that is, every household out of their dI~elling one 
ni ~ht or more, and no r.1atter how r.1any tiones they moved before 1 ocati n9 
permanently again. 
** Measured with the item: On a scale of 0 to 4, would you rate how disrupted 
your houshold has been due to [moves/damages or repairs] since the 
[disaster]? 4 a Extremely disrupted; 0 = llot disrupted at all. 
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LOSS OF WORK DUE TO CLOSURE OF WORK PLACE, FOR HEADS OF 
HOUSEHOLD IN KAUAI .~ND COALINGA SAMPLES (Percent) 
Kauai Coalinga 
All All Employed All Employed All Employed 
Respondents Respondents Respondents Res2ond'!nts 
DURATIOII OF 
CLOSURE 
P1 ace of work of 
head of household 33.9 50.2 52.6 73.0 
not closed due to 
di saster 
Closed one week 
or less 11.4 16.9 10.2 14.2 
Closed one to 
two weeks 6.5 9.6 3.5 4.9 
Closed tliO to 
three weeks 4.9 7.3 2.4 3.4 
Closed three to 
four weeks 3.8 5.6 .3 .4 
Closed four weeks 
or more 7.0 10.3 3.0 4.1 
tlot app1 icab1e, 
not working at 32.5 NA 28 •. 0 tlA 
time of di saster 
Total ('l,) 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 
Respondents, N= 466 150 371 72 
ilonrespondents, tl= 0 0 5 5 
Not app1 icab1e, ,1= 296 299 
TABLE 19 
CO:~PARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI A~ID COALINGA SA.'IPLES, 
BY tlUMBER OF POST-DISASTER MOVES (Percent) 
K3uai Coal inga 
Caucasi an Ja2anese Filipino Anglo Hispanic 
POST-DISASTER 
t~OVES* 
~Io moves 51.8 74.4 73.0 30.0 12.9 
Hoved once 1.5 .9 2.3 2.6 
t~oved twi ce 31.4 22.2 19.1 43.1 40.5 
;~oved three times 10.2 2.6 7.9 14.2 27.6 
:~oved four or 
more time ~ 10.4 ....!§..:..! 
Total 'l, 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Respondents, N= 137 117 89 260 116 
Nonrespondents, N= 0 0 0 0 0 
* Every relocation is counted, including moving back to one's pre-disaster 
dlie1ling. 
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TABLE 20 Appendix B 
EfolOTIONAl STRAIN FROM THE DISASTER, COMPARISON OF 
THE KAUAI AIlD COALINGA SAlo1PlES 
A. Percent of househo1 ds 
wi th one or more members 
experiencing emotional 
strain as a resu1 t of 
the di saster 
B. Percent of those 
househo1 ds \~hi ch 
used fonna1 
counse 1 i ng for 
this problem 
C. Source of counseling 
(may have used one 
or more): 
Professional (e.g., 
physician, social 
worker, counselor) 
Church-re1 ated 
counsel ing 
Other 
O. Degree of strain related 
to subsequent earthquake 
tremors in Coalinga: 
Not at all di sturbed 
Somewhat di sturbed 
Very di sturbed 
Kauai 
(H=il'4O) 
N $ 
192 
23 
8 
8 
10 
TABLE 21 
43.0 
12.0 
243 
69 
51 
20 
9 
66 
203 
~ 
64.6 
28.4 
17.6 
54.0 
28.5 
376 100.0 
COr~PARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES. 
av EflOTIONAl STRAIN FROII THE DISASTER 
A. 
Percent of house-
holds with some 
member( s) experi-
encing emotional 
strain* 
(Number) 
B. 
Percent of above 
total \~hich sought 
counsel ing 
(llumber) 
Kauai 
Caucasian J(~alm F1Vmo (11~'31l* = r = 
44.5 
(61 ) 
18.0 
(11) 
40.2 
(47) 
4.3 
( 2) 
38.2 
(34) 
11.8 
( 4) 
Coalinga 
~ HiSPiji C (11=2-60) N= 6) 
69.6 
(131 ) 
26.0 
(47) 
53.4 
(62) 
35.5 
(22) 
* The item wording was: "A number of people we have ta1ke1 to have tol j 
us about the emotional strain they have experienced from the 
(di saster). Have you or anyone in your househo1 d experienced anything 
similar?" 
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